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The integration of FPGA devices in many different architectures and services 
makes monitoring and real time detection of errors an important concern in FPGA 
system design. A monitor is a tool, or a set of tools, that facilitate analytic 
measurements in observing a given system. The goal of these observations is 
usually the performance analysis and optimisation, or the surveillance of the system. 
However, System-on-Chip (SoC) based designs leave few points to attach external 
tools such as logic analyzers. Thus, an embedded error detection core that allows 
observation of critical system nodes (such as processor cores and buses) should 
enforce the operation of the FPGA-based system, in order to prevent system 
failures. The core should not interfere with system performance and must ensure 
timely detection of errors. 
This thesis is an investigation onto how a robust hardware-monitoring module 
can be efficiently integrated in a target pcr b<;>ard (with FPGA-based application-
processing features) which is part of a critical computing system. An error detection 
and recovery core was implemented that requires no manual intervention for 
illustrating the benefits of this approach. The Error Detection Monitor Unit 
(EDMU) can be considered as a monitor and control wrapper for PCr-compatible 
cores that monitors the application transactions between the PCr-based FPGA board 
and the host in a timely marmer. The nearly concurrent functionality of EDMU 
allows the core to operate as a "fuewall", preventing the communication between 
the FPGA-configured application and the host computer, upon detection of errors. A 
predefined policy framework groups the application and pcr protocol errors 
according to a severity scale; thus suspicious or undesirable transactions are treated 
considering their severity rating. Therefore, the PC-based critical system uses 
EDMU in order to guarantee quality in the offered services, such as maintainability, 
aVaIlability and error tolerance. 
The high portability and reusability ofEDMU makes it ideal for remote network 
configuration PC systems and failure-resistant critical computing platforms similar 
to Active Networks. There are several other target application examples for using 
the error-detection features of our module, including pcr protocol checking, 
hardware testing and debugging ofpredefmed conditions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Intl:'oduction 
1.1 The research topic 
Today's computer-based products are complex and require extensive effort for their 
design and test. The complexity in such systems is increased because they comprise 
many components, advanced software and hardware functionality. This trend is clearly 
seen in the consumer electronics market, and in state-of-the-art industrial systems. The 
development of these products tends to be challenging as well as increasingly time-
consuming, expensive, and error-prone. Therefore, the developers need to cut down the 
development time and improve quality, which in turn, demands better tools and 
development methodologies. 
One important aspect in the development process of computer systems is 
observabilIty, i.e. the ability to observe the system's behaviour at various abstraction 
levels in the design. The observations are required for many reasons, for instance, when 
looking for design errors, during debugging, during optimisation of algorithms, for 
extraction of design data, and a lot more. Observability is however not an issue 
restricted to development purposes only, it may also be necessary after the deployment 
of products (e.g., for error recovery, for surveillance issues, for collection of statistical 
measurements). The quality of observability could be characterised as high if the 
system allows for detailed and accurate analysis of all of its components, and Iow if the 
system is obstructive and hard to analyse confidently. The motivation for investigating 
this area is to provide better observability for complex computer systems based on 
state-of-the-art programmable logic architectures. 
In more detail the aim of this research study is to offer a failure resistant PC 
platform with in-built hardware monitor and control features, for high performance 
processing of applications. The Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices satisfy 
the ever growing demand for flexible and dedicated processing power. Therefore, 
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various software-based applications are transfonned into programmable hardware 
applications in order to be integrated in systems that use the FPGA technology. 
Moreover nowadays, the trend is to create a whole system within a FPGA device by 
"hardwiring" hardware cores (e.g. microprocessors, memory, transceivers etc) inside 
the programmable logic area of a FPGA. The new era belongs to this new fonn of 
FPGAs that can realise a programmable System-on-Chip (SoC). 
The state-of-the-art FPGA devices are becoming increasingly popular; systems that 
demand re-programmability and high perfonnance parallel processing adopt the 
solution of FPGAs. The more the popularity of the FPGAs increases, the more they 
play a key role in important systems since they are used as critical components within 
them (e.g. co-processors). Therefore, it is obvious that such systems need an integrated 
monitoring support in order to trace the activity of the applications and guarantee their 
stable operation. Run-time observability in embedded system architectures is also a 
requirement for testing, debugging, and for validating design assumptions made about 
the behaviour of the system and its environment. The classical approach to run-time 
observability is to apply monitoring, i.e. the process of detecting, collecting, and 
interpreting run-time infonnation regarding the system's execution behaviour. A 
significant conclusion of the work presented in this thesis is the fact that on-chip 
policy-based monitoring support will be required in future development of similar 
systems, especially those based on SoC architectures. The timely/concurrent detection 
of errors that are produced from applications configured in FPGA devices will be a 
major issue in the near future. 
One of the main deliverables of the research process is to investigate the impact that 
application errors can have in critical systems that are built around FPGA devices, 
using as a case study a PCI-based reconfigurable FPGA platfonn. Some indicative 
examples of such systems could be: 
• Real time systems, 
• Safety critical systems, 
• Security sensitive systems, 
• Systems that require maintainability, availability and operability features. 
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The target was to define the requirements of a similar system in terms of performance, 
security and fault tolerance; also, in which way the applications errors can critically 
influence vital functions and services of the system. Public network and communication 
systems are built with the inherent requirement to operate even under harsh conditions 
(i.e. system malfunctions, security attacks, lack of processing resources, reaching the 
limit of users that can be served etc). The functions and the services that they deliver 
are -in most of the cases- important and must be maintained at all cost, or at least up to 
an acceptable level (i.e. fault tolerance). 
1.2 The research and development challenges 
A synopsis of the research challenges that this work had to cope, with are given in 
the list that follows: 
1. Define a flexible and high performance application-processing platform; justify the 
selection of the individual hardware and software components with reference to the 
target topology. 
2. Select and study the properties of a real world critical system, based on a computer 
architecture (i.e. PC). 
3. Define the security framework of the system according to the specific properties 
and requirements of the critical system that is under investigation. 
4. Design, implement and test a hardware, momtor and control core that does not 
introduce intrusiveness to the system application-processing. The core should be 
permanently confignred in order to satisfy the pragmatic needs of a real world 
critIcal computer system. 
5. Prevent the propagation of errors in the system offering by this way high 
availability, operability and dependability. Thus, the application-layer errors have to 
be detected in a timely manner. 
1.2.1 Application processing with reconfigurable programmable arrays 
Reconfigurable computing systems comprising microprocessor, memory and 
reconfigurable logic represent a promising technology, which is well suited for bit-
intensive applications such as digital signal processing, error correcting codes, control 
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applications, bit manipulation, compressionldecompression and encryptionldecryption. 
The flexIbility, capacity and performance of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 
have opened up completely new avenues in high performance computation forming the 
basis of reconfigurable computing. FPGAs can be considered as the obvious candidate 
for achieving the performance requirements of the bit-intensive applications that are 
going to be used as part of reconfigurable computing applications. Moreover, the re-
configurability of FPGAs makes them ideal for remote field upgrades of systems. A 
new bitstream containing a new version of a circuit can be downloaded through a 
remote connection. Several different approaches address the remote reconfiguration of 
FPGAs; commercial schemes and academic research projects have proposed different 
architecture solutions for a remote configuration execution environment. More 
information on this topic IS given in chapter three. 
The execution environment of reconfigurable computing applications can be 
defined as the abstraction layer or the physical component where the applications are 
implemented or executed. It can be one or more of the following abstraction domains: 
1. The microprocessor 
2. The kernel space ofan operating system 
3. A reconfigurable array (FPGA, CPLD etc) 
4. A topology comprising of Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), or 
other types ofICs 
5. A hybrid solution of the above components (System-on-Chip) 
1.2.2 Active Networks - a dependable. reconfigurable-computing system 
The detection of errors that are initiated from FPGA-based applications in PC 
systems is a platform-independent concept; hence it is not necessary to integrate it in 
any of the critical systems that were described in the previous paragraph in order to 
prove -the obvious- necessity for using it. However, it is important to use an example 
platform for studying and identifying the requirements, the limits, the technical details, 
the development issues and the theoretical background of the system under 
investigation. Active Networks (2] are secunty problematic systems with real time and 
fault tolerance constraints that require significant processing resources; their operation 
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is critical and must be maintained because the services that they deliver are important 
for the network infrastructure and the users. Considering the available infrastructure, 
the experience and the know-how at Loughborough University, Active Networks was 
the obvious candidate for collecting the required structure-definitive specifications for 
the error detection system. For this reason, a detailed study of the properties and the 
specifications of an Active Network was delivered. It can be claimed that the 
performance and secunty-critical issues of Active Networks with programmable logic 
support, defined the fundamental design goals and the response of the system. 
Architecture level solutions have already been offered to confront the side effects of 
Active Applications when the Execution Environment is realised either in the Active 
Host's microprocessor or in the kernel space of the operating system. However, in the 
scenario under investigation, the execution environment is an FPGA-based 
reconfigurable platform. Figure 1.1 is a representation of a PC-based Active Router 
with programmable logic support; the PC carries a pcr board with one FPGA device 
dedicated for applications that need a bit intensive processing environment. 
Code 
___ e • 
• 
: Active 
Processing 
• Engine 
.... -_ ........•• 
FIgure 1.1: An Active Network with a reconflgurable processing engine. 
Following the Active Network design approach, a configuration bitstream that 
targets such a platform could be carried in a series of Active Packets. These packets are 
identified as active when the Active Router processes them. The Active Router then 
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decides whether to download the new configuration bitstream to the FPGA device or 
not, depending on the current activity on the FPGA board. 
1.2.3 Security implications and counteract framework 
The dependable system described in the previous section has FPGA processing and 
reconfigurable features that are examined as a case study in order to detect 
vulnerabilities and system defects. Applications that configure the FPGA device of the 
PC! board, pose threats analogous to software program threats (i.e. resource 
consumption, applIcation layer faults, design bugs). The new configuration can 
potentially extend and modify the network infrastructure. The routing and the 
forwarding of the packets are vital processes of such system and must not be interfered 
with, by any means since their maintenance is important for the viability of the 
network. Moreover, the operabilIty of routers in general is cntical to the proper and 
correct running of many other important systems and services. Therefore, a designer of 
reconfigurable systems of this type should consider new possible threats on top of the 
already existent network security issues (3). [4). [5). (6). [7). [8). and [9). 
The secunty threat model has to be identified, considering all the platform-specific 
characteristics and the requirements that were set for a realistic implementation of the 
FPGA-based reconfigurable system. The potential threats and the "enemies" for the 
candidate architecture have to be identified. This important design consideration could 
allow the monitoring component to be integrated in a FPGA-based programmable 
architecture. 
Designers of dependable computing systems should deal with several issues related 
with reliability, availability, testability, maintainabdity and system robustness. In public 
network systems, a part of which could be Active, security issues are raised and thus 
measures must be taken to overcome the effects of potential failures. Considering the 
above, the design of the FPGA-based reconfigurable platform realises a set of 
measures, which are divided into four levels of action: 
I. PolIcy-based monitoring, 
11. Timely detection of system threats, 
Ill. Error tolerance, 
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IV. Interrupting the erroneous application and applying reconfiguration. 
The analysis of these levels of action is given in Chapter 4. 
1.2.4 Design and implementation of a hardware monitor component 
7 
This thesis focuses on design and implementation issues for building an efficient 
hardware monitor component, which is passively configured in an embedded FPGA-
based PC platform. One of the fundamental concerns of the monitoring system is the 
concurrent detection of errors (e.g. protocol and application) in order to prevent their 
propagation to other system areas and their interference with system performance and 
dependability. The errors were grouped in two categones; PCI protocol errors and 
application errors related with misuse of local resources, "bugs" and execution of 
malicious code. 
The application, which is configured ID the FPGA of the PCI board, could 
potentially act as a master PCI agent across the PCI bus; this means that it could access 
various system services and sensitive areas in almost a concurrent way. It is clear that 
this case is highly undesirable because it can result in system malfunctions, degradatIon 
of services and system-processes, application hijacking, breaching of secunty policies 
and data-integrity policies. In the worst case scenario "hard" -restart of the PC that 
carries the PCI-FPGA board might be needed (e.g. when an iIIegal memory write is 
attempted, PCI bus contention etc). Re-booting a PC with high availability and 
operability requirements, breaches the specifications and design requirements of most 
reconfigurable FPGA-based computers, used within dependable systems. 
For this reason it is required a carefully designed monitor component capable of 
identifYing and intercepting iIIegal or unauthorised activity in a concurrent way. The 
sequential nature of software monitors make them unsuitable for concurrent monitoring 
of FPGA-based applications. However, even by using hardware monitors, the technical 
and research challenge of concurrent (or nearly concurrent) application monitoring of 
the PCI-based FPGA board, still remains to be met. The monitoring component has to 
examine the application transactions as well as the interaction of the FPGA application 
with the host. Although the main operational and design issues are related with the 
activity of the FPGA application, the monitor component should also check the host's 
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transactions (e.g. when the FPGA is a target PCI agent); a bidirectional monitoring 
policy is applied by this way. A series of signals has to be monitored each clock cycle 
acquiring by this way several qualitative and quantitative data. Various problems 
related with contention (e.g. PCI-FPGA board local bus) or reuse of system-signals 
make the concurrent monitoring a difficult task to deliver. Details for these issues will 
be given in chapter six. Additionally, the fact that the FPGA-based processing system 
has to be monitored online increases the degree of complexity, as far as the research 
challenge is concerned. This means that the FPGA-based reconfigurable PC cannot 
afford to stay omine due to misuse of local resources from the configured application, 
since it will be part of a dependable system. Poor quality in the services and processes 
delIvered by such systems is also an unwanted event. 
1.3 Target arcbitectures and contribution 
The platform could be used in several different application examples and 
architectures. It can be adapted to fit the specific needs of various application-
topologies, when applying simple modifications in the specifications: 
• Configuration bitstreams can be stored at a known network location and then 
upgrade the PCI-based reconfigurable FPGA platform, once it is shipped and 
installed for instance in the PC of a final customer. The goal of the error detection 
core is to ensure that the operation of the PC will remain stable. 
• Design Corrections - In the event that a flaw appears in a commercial IP after it is 
shipped and configured to the PCI-based FPGA board of a final customer, the error 
detection core provides operability without the need for recalls and field service. 
• Performance Upgrades - a company or a service provider intends to upgrade the 
FPGA-based end station performance without putting at risk the availability and 
operability of the system after the upgrade. 
• End users, system administrators or service providers are able to reconfigure 
remotely the FPGA devices of host-based Active Routers within an Active 
Network, offering new application services or reprogramming the whole network, 
changing for instance the IP routing tables (Active Node). The context of this 
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topology implies the need of a monitoring mechanism that secures the constant 
operation of the Active Router. 
• The platform can be used for testing, evaluation and cross-technology integrations 
since it offers a reliable and failure resistant framework for upgrades of FPGA-
based reconfigurable systems (Pcr boards). 
• In stand-alone mode the platform can also be used for online testing and as a pcr 
bus protocol checker. 
• On-line verification of the pcr protocol for dependable applications which are 
configured in FPGA-based PC systems. 
The research contribution of this thesis is related with a unique hardware monitor 
and control component (i.e. Error Detection Monitor Unit - EDMU), which is 
embedded in a FPGA-based reconfigurable PCI board. EDMU delivers concurrent 
monitoring of application transactions and acts as a "firewall" when predefined policy 
rules are violated, satisfying by this way the reliability and operability requirements of 
dependable FPGA-based computer systems. 
1.4 Summary 
The introductory chapter briefly covered the reasons that inspired this research and 
also included a short description of terms like monitoring, reconfigurable computing 
and programmable networks. The implementation lImItations and the specific topology 
requirements were also discussed in this chapter, together with the specifications and 
the projected target topologies. The second chapter gives an outline of the terminology 
context related to the research domain. This general theoretical background intends to 
assist people who are outsiders to the field in order to identify and understand 
fundamental concepts. At the same time, the information quoted in Chapter 2 aims to 
transform this thesis to a self-contented research document. The next chapter includes a 
classification of the relevant literature in different areas: i) Monitoring and error 
detection, ii) Reconfigurable computing and programmable networking and iii) Remote 
FPGA reconfiguration. 
Chapter four describes the policy framework which decisively shaped the research 
and development efforts of this work. The security issues and the security framework 
Using embedded hardware monitor cores in critical computer systems 10 
that initiates countenneasures for confronting the effect of errors are also analysed. 
Chapter five introduces the policy framework for the error detection core with specific 
reference to the particular group of errors that were identified in chapter four. This 
chapter also includes infonnation about the system architecture as well as design and 
implementation issues with specific code examples and design details. Chapter six 
presents the simulation and real time results of the embedded monitor hardware core. 
Finally, a discussion of the contributions and the potential future enhancements of this 
research are given in the last Chapter. 
The background infonnation of the first two chapters is reasonably extended 
because the intention throughout the research and development process was to present 
this work in a self-contained way. In most of the cases the potential target platfonns are 
either networked or they follow strict real time constraints and thus this fonnulates a 
practical problem: On the one hand, it is quite difficult for the hardware designers (i.e. 
FPGA-ASIC deSIgn) to comprehend issues related with the requirements and operation 
of a critical system (i.e. the dependability problems in progranunable networks, field 
upgrade of network reconfigurable systems, security and safety issues etc). On the other 
hand it is quite difficult for the people who work on software-based critical real time 
systems to understand hardware concepts related to FPGA design. 
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CHAPTER 2 
C .. itical .. eal tizne systezns 
and FPGAs 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the theoretical background aspects 
that are related to the research goals of this work. Therefore, the reader can familiarise 
himseWherself with terms that are very useful for the thorough understanding of the 
design and development concepts that are presented in the following chapters of this 
dissertation. 
2.1 Field Programmable Gate Arrays 
The consumer electronic market is offering nowadays a wide range of different 
Integrated Circuits (ICs), in order to satisfy the dIfferent requirements for applications 
and services (figure 2.1 includes some relevant information). 
Integrated Circuits 
"'1 
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FIgure 2.1: The world of Integrated CIrcuits. 
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A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) can be configured in the field to 
implement a desired logic function. Many different architectures exist, but Figure 2.2 
shows the basic structure of a typical FPGA: a matrix of configurable logic blocks 
(CLBs) and interconnection resources surrounded by 110 blocks. 
Configurable 
Logic 
Blocks 
1/0 
Programmable 
-.jtt---.: interconnect 
Figure 2.2: A general representation of a SRAM-based FPGA device. 
The CLBs (figure 2.3) are often complex but are likely to contain one or more 
function generators followed by flip-flops: 
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Figure 2.3: The CLB contains two slices. Each slice contains two 4-input look-up 
tables (LU1), carry & control logic and two registers. There are two 3-state buffers 
associated With each CLB, that can be accessed by all the outputs of a CLB {J OJ. 
Made using either look-up tables (LUTs) or multiplexers, function generators are 
capable of producing any k-mput Boolean function where k is usually four. LUTs are 1-
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bIt wide memories and essentially store the truth table of the Boolean function they 
generate. They often can be used for general storage when not acting as a function 
generator. The output of a function generator can serve as part of combinational logic 
or can be directed to a flip-flop to create a latched signal. The CLBs provide functional 
elements for combinatorial and synchronous logic, including basic storage elements. 
Interconnection resources are composed of horizontal and vertical wires that can 
form connections with each other through programmable switches. There are also 
programmable switches that connect wires to CLBs. 110 blocks can be progranuned to 
allow their associated pin to operate as either an input or an output. Current FPGAs 
often include additional components such as clock managers, RAM, and dedicated 
circuitry for common arithmetIc operations. 
A user can specify a logic function and then use a specific software to map the logic 
function to a network of CLBs, which are then placed and routed. The end result is a 
particular configuration for the FPGA that implements the logic function. 
While industrial work with reconfigurable hardware has primarily utilized the 
technology for verification of and sometimes a replacement for ASICs, researchers 
have explored the use of FPGAs as a means of improving computational performance 
in scientific and multimedia applications. The appeal of this technology for researchers 
is that an FPGA can be configured on-the-fly with customized computational circuits 
that provide hardware acceleration for end applications. Unlike single-purpose ASICs, 
FPGAs can be reconfigured and re-used for a number of diverse computational tasks. 
The hardware in such systems can be reconfigured multiple times at run-time in order 
to adapt to different computing requirements for different applications. Reconfigurable 
systems offer higher computational density and higher throughput for many 
applications compared with conventional fixed hardware systems. Reconfigurable 
computing is an active area of research. 
Emerging commercial FPGA architectures are supplementing traditional 
programmable logic with multiple hardware units for increased design fleXIbility and 
computational power. The most attractive feature in these new architectures is the 
inclusion of high-speed transceivers. The Xtlinx Virtex 11 Pro architecture (11) contains 
multiple 3.125 Gbps transceivers for use with networks such as 10-Gbps Ethemet and 
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OC-192c. A second feature of emerging FPGA architectures is the inclusion of 
powerful embedded processor cores. Altera's Stratix includes the NIOS "soft" 
embedded microprocessor (12). while Excalibur FPGA devices include a dedicated 32-
bit 200 MHz ARM core. Likewise Xilinx includes in the Virtex IT pro architectures 
multiple PowerPC cores. Finally, modern FPGA architectures contain dedicated 
hardware such as internal SRAM memory and high-speed multiplier array cores to 
accelerate FPGA computational performance. 
The trend to implement entire systems on an FPGA is creating a market for 
intellectual property 'cores'. These are designs created by third parties, which are sold 
to FPGA users to incorporate into larger systems. Examples of cores include bus 
mterfaces such as PCI bus, signal processing functions such as Reed Solomon 
Decoders and communications interface functions such as Serialiser / Deserialiser 
(SERDES). Leading FPGA manufacturers offer access to a catalogue of cores and 
customers expect to be able to create a large part of the functionality of their system 
using cores. 
2.1.1 Single Context FPGAs 
A single context FPGA is programmed using a serial stream of configuration 
information. Because only sequential access is supported, any change to a configuration 
on this type of FPGA requires a complete reprogramming of the entire chip. Although 
this does simplify the reconfiguration hardware, it does incur a high overhead when 
only a small part of the configuration memory needs to be changed. This type of FPGA 
is therefore more suited for applications that can benefit from reconfigurable computing 
without run-time reconfiguration. Most current commercial FPGAs are of this style. In 
order to implement run-time reconfiguration using a single context FPGA, the 
configurations must be grouped into contexts, and each full context is swapped in and 
out of the FPGA as needed. Because each of these swap operations involve 
reconfiguring the entire FPGA, a good partitioning of the configurations between 
contexts is essential in order to minimize the total reconfiguration delay. If all the 
configurations used within a certain time period are present m the same context, no 
reconfiguration will be necessary. However, if a number of successive cqnfigurations 
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are each partitioned into different contexts, several reconfigurations will be needed, 
slowing the operation of the run-time reconfigurable system. 
2.1.2 Partially Reconfigurable FPGAs 
In some cases, configurations do not occupy the full reconfigurable hardware, or 
only a part of a configuration requires modification. In both of these situations a partial 
reconfiguration of the array is required, rather than the full reconfiguration supported 
by a single context device. In a partially reconfigurable FPGA, the underlying 
programming bit layer operates like a RAM device. Using addresses to specify the 
target location of the configuration data allows for selective reconfiguration of the 
array. Frequently, the undisturbed portions of the array may continue execution, 
allOWIng the overlap of computation with reconfiguration. This has the benefit of 
potentially hiding some of the reconfiguration latency. When configurations do not 
require the entire area available within the array, a number of different configurations 
may be loaded into unused areas of the hardware at different times. Since only part of 
the array is changed at a given point in time, the entire array does not require 
reprogranuning for each incoming configuration. Additionally, some applications 
require the updating of only a portion of a mapped circuit, while the rest should remain 
intact. For example, in a filtering operation in sigual processing, a set of constant values 
that change slowly over time may be re-initialized to a new value. But the overall 
computation in the circuit remains static. Using this selective reconfiguration can 
greatly reduce the amount of configuration data that must be transferred to the FPGA. 
Unfortunately, since address information must be supplied with configuration data, the 
total amount of information transferred to the reconfigurable hardware may be greater 
than what is required with a single context design. A full reconfiguration of the entire 
array is therefore slower than with the single context version. However, a partially 
reconfigurable design is intended for applications in which the size of the 
configurations is small enough that more than one can fit on the available hardware 
simultaneously. Plus, the fast configurations methods presented in a previous section 
can help reduce the configuratIon data traffic requirements. 
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2.1.3 Reconfigurable Computing 
One common use of a FPGA is for prototyping the design of an ASIC. In this 
scenario, the FPGA is present only on the prototype hardware and is replaced by the 
corresponding ASIC in the final production system. However, many system designers 
are choosing to leave the FPGAs as part of the production hardware. Such systems 
retain the execution speed of dedicated hardware but also have a great deal of 
functional flexibility. The logic within the FPGA can be changed if or when it is 
necessary, which has many advantages. For example, hardware bug fixes and upgrades 
can be administered as easily as their software counterparts. In order to support a new 
version of a network protocol, the intemallogic of the FPGA can be redesigned sending 
later the enhancement to the affected customers by email. Once they have downloaded 
the new logic design to the system and restarted it, they will be able to use the new 
version of the protocol. This is configurable computing; reconfigurable computing goes 
one step further. 
Reconfigurable computIng involves manipulation of the logic within the FPGA at 
run-time. In other words, the design of the hardware may change in response to the 
demands placed upon the system while it is running. Here, the FPGA acts as an 
execution engine for a variety of different hardware functions - some executing in 
parallel, others in serial - much as a CPU acts as an execution engine for a variety of 
software threads. FPGA could be considered as a reconfigurable processing unit. One 
theoretical application is a smart cellular phone that supports multiple communication 
and data protocols, though just one a time. When the phone passes from a geographic 
region that is served by one protocol into a region that is served by another, the 
hardware is automatically reconfigured. Reconfigurable computing has the following 
advantages: 
• Performance: Configurable computing can be highly optimised for a specific data 
set or specific applications. 
• Cost Effectiveness: Configurable computing can be used to reduce system costs 
through hardware reuse. Any new features or can be easily updated to the system 
and due to the field programmability, any problems with the design can be 
corrected without any changes to the on board resources. 
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• System prototyping: Large systems (either ASICs or boards) can be built on single 
or multiple FPGAs that makes system testing and debugging more easier than 
testing the real system and even cheaper. 
• Custom 110: FPGAs provides a flexible set of programmable I/O signals. That 
gives the designer the opportunity to reuse existing hardware and to add new 
changes to it easily. New FPGAs supports Different types of IOs levels and 
standards. One important use of this feature is matching different families. 
• System density: Confignrable computing "specially Run-time configurable logic" 
increases the system density and can deliver functionality of the device many times 
more than its size by dynamically reconfiguring the system and increase resource 
utilization through loading and unloading different system modules. 
• Fault-Tolerance: System reliability can be increased through redundancy by 
duplication or building some testing circuits. Dynamic reconfiguration technique 
can destroy old circuits and build new ones after detecting any error. 
2.2 Integration of programmable logic devices in critical systems 
The spread of programmable reconfigurable devices in various different technology 
applications domains, targeting either consumer electronics or electronics used from 
service providers, scientific organisations and state bodies have made their use highly 
important. The constant increase in the integration of reprogrammable chips in systems 
has enforced the inter-dependence relation for the services and the applications that 
these systems deliver. There is an intensive research in a world wide scale that tries to 
address the challenges that FPGA (or similar reprogrammable devices) pose because of 
their high penetration to critical systems. There are several conceptual requirements for 
such systems related with terms like reliability, availability, dependability, testability, 
maintainabihty and operability. These terms could be referred as critical system 
requirements. The different critical computing systems have different levels of 
requirements for the above mentioned features. Critical computing systems are found in 
air transport systems, in the rail industry, in space engineering, in medical equipment, 
in information systems (i.e. servers, routers, switches), in power and nuclear energy 
systems, in military systems etc. 
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are subject to failures due to different types of reasons. An 
ct that typically more than half of the errors in a system are 
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industry segment. Clearly reliability is a huge asset but at 
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is given in Table 2.2. Current systems are being designed 
minutes or less per year. Critical computing systems are 
ntained and must sattsfy some or all of the previously 
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expensive, regardless of the 
the same time it is a conc 
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for minimal downtime of 5 
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mentioned critical system re quirements. 
Industr 
En 
Teleco mmunications 
acturin Manuf1 
Fmancial Institutions 
Informatto n technolo 
Loss Revenue er Hour 
$2.8 mIllion 
$2.0milhon 
$1.6 million 
$1.4 million 
$1.3 million 
Insu rance $1.2 mIllion 
Re tail $1.1 mIlhon 
Pharma ceuticals $1.0 million 
Ba nkin $996,000 
Table 2.1: Rev enue loss per hour, by business segment {16J. 
System Avai labili Yearl Downtime 
9 5 438 hours 
99 .0 88 hours 
99 .5 44 hours 
99 .9 8.8 hours 
99. 95 4 hours 
99. 99 53 minutes 
99.9 995 5.3 minutes 
99.9 999 32 seconds 
99.9 9999 3.2 seconds 
Table2.2P ercentage Availability and Downtime {16J. 
To avoid confusion be tween "reliability" as a precisely defined statistical measure 
qualitative attnbute of systems and computations, use of [17[ and "reliability" as a 
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"dependability" was proposed to convey the second meaning (18), resulting in the name 
"dependable computing". Thus, dependable computing deals with impairments to 
dependability (defects, faults, errors, malfunctions, degradations, failures, and crashes), 
means for coping with them (fault avoidance, fault/error tolerance, design validation, 
failure confinement, monitoring etc.), and measures of success in designing dependable 
computer systems (reliability, avaIlability, performabIlity, safety, security etc.). 
A computer system can have three different types of assessment depending on the 
interest of the external viewer. The maintainer's external view consists of a set of 
interacting subsystems that must be monitored for detecting possIble malfunctions in 
order to reconfigure the system or, alternatively, to guard against hazardous 
consequences (such as total system loss or crash). The operator's external view consists 
of a black box capable of providing certain services and is more abstract than the 
maintainer's system-level view. Finally, the end user's external view is shaped by the 
system's reaction to particular situations or requests. 
A dehberate or unintended error (e.g. hardware bug, misuse of local services etc) 
results in information errors within a system. Consequently, the system may 
malfunction resulting in service degradation, which finally can result in system failure. 
A five-level view of the impairments to dependability could be deducted according to 
this approach (figure 2.4). 
Hardware "b~"lLogU: Errors, 
Deliberaie misuse of allocated re.murces, 
Protocol violations 
Information Error 
System Malfunction 
Service Degradation 
Result Failure 
Figure 2.4: The sequence steps that result in system failure. 
Ensuring the reliability of critical computing and electronic systems has always 
been a challenge. As the complexity of systems increases the inclusion of reliability 
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measures becomes progressively more complex and often a necessity for VLSI circuits 
where a single error could potentially render an entire system useless. 
2.3 Embedded Real-time critical systems 
An embedded system IS typically a product which includes a computing system. 
The product is said to "embed" the computing system inside. Embedded systems do not 
necessarily look like computers, however it is typical that embedded systems interact 
with their environment. For instance, a mobile phone is regarded an embedded system: 
it reacts on incoming calls, user input, cell roaming, etc. 
A real-time system is a system that interacts with its environment in a time 
constrained manner. The real-time system must produce results within specified time 
limits. A computation result (or actuation) must be delivered neither too late, nor too 
early. The criticality of violated timing constraints, or missed execution deadlines, 
classifies real-time systems into hard or soft real-time systems [19]. Timing failures in a 
hard real-time system are considered hazardous and very critical and should never be 
allowed. Examples on hard real time requirements can be found in automotive and 
avionic systems, medical equipment, military systems, energy and nuclear plant control 
systems. On the contrary, the requirements in soft real-time systems are not so critical 
and may tolerate timing constraint violations, either by discarding the produced results 
or by allowing a degraded quality. Soft real-time requirements can be found in 
telecommunication systems, audio and video applications, streaming media, airline 
reservation systems, etc. 
A typical real-time system consists of a controlling subsystem (the computer), and 
the controlled subsystem (the physical environment). The interactions between the two 
subsystems can be described by three main operations: 
-Sampling 
- Processing 
- Responding 
The computer subsystem samples data from the physical environment. Sampled data is 
then immediately processed by the computer subsystem, and a proper response is sent 
to the physical environment. All three operations must be performed within the required 
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timing constraints. For example, it is imperative that an air bag control system in an 
automobile responds within set timing constraints in the event of a crash. The response 
must neither be too late (being non-effective), or too early (risking hazardous 
manoeuvring of the car). 
This section includes further evidence for the importance of critical systems by 
examining the timing-related restrictions as an indicative property of reliabIlity, 
dependability and availability. Because of the central role of time constraints in critical 
real-time systems, these systems are classified according to the type of time constraints. 
The first class of critical real-time systems is the soft real-time systems. This class 
covers those systems where a miss of a deadline results in degraded performance, 
and/or the increasing of costs. The second class is the firm real-time systems. In these 
systems, the miss of a deadline leads to the result becoming worthless. An example of 
such a system is a weather forecast system, where the result becomes void no later than 
when the forecasting horizon has passed. The hard real-time systems build the third and 
last category. A miss of a deadline here is followed by more or less catastrophic 
consequences. The consequence is usually loss of hfe or, at the very least a serious 
amount of money. This usually regards X-by-wire systems in vehicles and planes, or 
simple things like the destruction of a machine and the following halt of a complete 
production line. Line 3 in Figure 2.5 shows the enormous jump in costs while line 1 and 
2 show a more controllable loss of cost. A deadline VIOlation is considered fatal and 
cannot be tolerated especially in dependable systems. 
Cost 
Hard Real-Time 
Constraints 
3 
Deadline 
2 
Response Time 
Figure 2.5: CostfonctlOn of real time tasks [20J. 
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2.4 Faults. errors and failures 
A very important design requirement in dependable systems is to define the 
sequence that creates system failures. A typical sequence of this kind is shown in figure 
2.6. 
Fault ~ Error ~ Failure ~ Fault ... ~ 
FIgure 2.6: Cause consequence diagram of fault, error and failure. 
Definition: A failure is the non-performance or inability of the system or component to 
perform its intended function for a specified time under specified conditions [21]. That 
is, an input, X, to the component, 0, yields an output, O(X), non-compliant with the 
specification. 
Definition: An error is a design imperfection, or a deviation from a desired or intended 
state [21]. A program can be viewed as a state machine, whereas an error (bug) is an 
unwanted state. An error can be also thought as a corrupted data state, caused by the 
execution of an error (bug) but also due to e.g., physical electromagnetic radiation. 
Definition' A fault is the adjUdged (hypothesized) cause for an error [22]. Generally a 
faIlure is a fault, but not vice versa, since a fault does not necessarily lead to a failure. 
2.4.1 Systematic and physical failures 
Failures are usually divided into two categories: 
I. Systematic failures which are caused by specification or design flaws, i.e., 
behaviours that do not comply with the goals of the intended, designed and 
constructed system. Examples of contributing causes are erroneous, ambiguous, or 
incomplete specifications, as well as incorrect assumptions about the target 
environment. Other examples are failures caused by desIgn and implementation 
faults. Wear, degradation, corrosion, etc. do not cause these types of failures, all 
errors are built in from the beginning, and no new errors will be added after 
deployment. 
A systematic failure occurs if and only if: 
1) the location of an error is executed in the program, 
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2) the execution of the error leads to an erroneous state, and 
3) the erroneous state is propagated to the output. 
This means, that if an error is not executed it will not cause a failure. If the effect of 
the execution of the error (infection) is indistinguishable from a correct system state 
it will not cause a failure. If the system's state is infected but not propagated to the 
output there will be no failure. 
H. Physical fazlures which are the result of a violation upon the original design. 
Environmental disturbances, wear or degradation over time may cause such 
failures. Examples, are electromagnetic interference, alpha and beta radiation, etc. 
A physical failure occurs if and only if: 
I) the system state is corrupted or infected, and 
2) the erroneous state is propagated to the output. 
Fault-tolerance mechanisms usually try to prevent (I) by applying robust designs, 
and (2) by applying redundancy, etc. 
2.4.2 Failure modes 
Depending on the architecture of the system, different degrees and classes, of 
failure behaviour could be assumed. Components can fail in different ways and the 
manner in which they fail can be categorized into failure modes. The failure modes are 
defined through the effects, as perceived by the component user. Several categories will 
be presented i.e. failure modes, (I to 6) ranging from failure behaviour that sequential 
programs, or single tasks in solitude, can experience, to failure behaviour that is only 
siguificant in multitasking, distnbuted systems and real-time systems, where more than 
one task is competing for the same resources (e.g. processing power, memory, 
computer network, etc). 
Failure modes: 
1. Sequential failure behaviour: 
• Control failures, e.g., selecting the wrong branch in an if-then-else statement. 
• Value failures, e.g , assigning an incorrect value to a correct (intended) variable. 
• Addressing failures, e.g., assigning a correct (intended) value to an incorrect 
variable. 
Using embedded hardware monitor cores In critical computer systems 24 
• Tennination failures, e.g., a loop statement failing to complete because the 
tennination condition is never satisfied. 
• Input failures, e.g., receiving an (undetected) erroneous value from a sensor. 
2. Ordering failures, e.g., violations of precedence relations or mutual exclusion 
relations. 
3. Synchronization faIlures, i.e., ordering failures but also deadlocks. 
4. Interleaving failures, e.g., unwanted side effects caused by non-re-entrant code, and 
shared data, in pre-emptively scheduled systems. 
5. Timing faIlures. This failure mode yields a correct result (value), although the 
procurement of the result is time-wise incorrect. For example, deadline violations, 
too early start of task, incorrect period time, too much jitter, too many interrupts 
(too short inter-arrival time between consecutive interrupt occurrences), etc. 
6. Byzantine and arbitrary failures. This failure mode is characterized by a non 
assumption, meaning that there is no restriction what so ever with respect to which 
effects the component user may perceive. Therefore, the failure mode has been 
called malicious or fail-uncontrolled. This failure mode includes two-faced 
behaviour, i e. a component can output "X IS true" to one component user, and "X is 
false" to another component user. 
The above listed failure modes build up a hierarchy where Byzantine failures are 
based on the weakest assumption [23[ (a non-assumption) on the behaviour of the 
components and the infrastructure, and sequential failures are based on the strongest 
assumptions. Hence, Byzantine failures are the most severe and sequential failures the 
least severe failure mode. The Byzantine failure mode covers all failures classified as 
timing failures, which in turn covers synchronization failures, and so on ( Figure 2.7). 
Btzantlne 
Figure 2 7: The relation between the failure modes. 
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The component user can also characterize the failure modes according to the 
viewpoints domain. A distinction can be made between primary failures, secondary 
failures and command failures [211: 
Primary failures: A primary failure is caused by an error m the software of the 
component so that its output does not meet the specification. This class includes 
sequential and Byzantine failure modes, excluding sequential input failures. 
Secondary failures: A secondary failure occurs when the input to a component does 
not comply with the specification. This can happen when the component is used in an 
environment for which it is not designed, or when the output of a preceding task does 
not comply with the specifications of a succeedmg task's input. This class includes 
interleaving failures, sequential input failure modes, as wen as changed failure mode 
assumptions. 
Command failures: Command failures occur when a component delivers the correct 
result but at the wrong time or in the wrong order. This class covers timing failures, 
synchronization failures, ordering failures, as wen as sequential termination failures. 
2.5 Security issues 
The philosophy of opening the network to be programmable raises many 
administrative issues. In particular, safety and security are points of increasing concern. 
Programmable networks al10w system admmistrators and router vendors to deploy 
wel1-tested router software that provides the required service functionality. Such a 
model might later migrate to a ful1y open programming platform as proposed by the 
active networking community. 
The word security suggests protection against malicious attack by outsiders. 
Security also involves controIIing the effects of errors and equipment failures. Anything 
that can protect against a deliberate, inteIIigent, calculated attack wiII probably prevent 
random misfortune as well. Before going into specifics (Chapter 4), it will be very 
helpful to understand the some basic concepts that are essential to any security system. 
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2.5.1 The security challenges 
Know your "enemy" 
Architecting platforms based on reconfigurable programmable logic devices 
demands a careful consideration of who might want to circumvent the security 
measures and identify also the motivations that are hidden behind such aCTIons. 
Determine what the attackers or intruders might want to do and the damage that they 
could cause to the network as weIl as to the network components and services. Security 
measures can never make it impossible for a user to perform unauthorized tasks with a 
computer system. They can only make it harder. The goal is to make sure the network 
security controls are beyond the attacker's ability or motivation. 
Security cost 
Security measures almost always reduce convenience, especiaIly for sophisticated 
users. Security can delay work and create expensive administrative and educational 
overheads. It can use significant computing resources and require dedicated 
hardware. Designing security measures involves understanding of the costs and weigh 
of the costs against the potential benefits. In order to achieve that, there must be a 
thorough understanding of the costs and the measures themselves and the costs and 
likelihoods of security breaches. Incurring security costs out of proportIOn of the actual 
dangers, results in a disservice. 
Identify the assumptions 
Every security system has underlying assumptions. For example, one might assume 
that the network is not tapped, or that attackers know less than you do, that they are 
using standard software. A good practice is to examine and justIfy all the assumptions. 
Any hidden assumption is a potential security hole. Another important consideration is 
to understand the areas that need to be protected. Security systems should be designed 
so that only a limited number of secrets need to be kept. Many security procedures fad 
because their designers do not consider how users wiIl react to them. If the security 
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measures interfere with essentIal use of the system, those measures will be resisted and 
perhaps circumvented. 
Security weaknesses 
Every security system has vulnerabilities. A programmable logic system designer 
should be aware of the platform's weak points and also know how these could be 
explOIted. The areas that present the largest danger should be secured in a more robust 
way in order to prevent access to them. Understanding the weak points is the first step 
toward turning them into secure areas. Therefore, appropriate barriers should be created 
inside the system so that if intruders access one part of the system, they do not 
automatically have access to the rest of the system. The security of a system is only as 
good as the weakest security level of any single host in the system. Understanding how 
a system normally functions, knowing what is expected and what is unexpected, and 
being familiar with how devices are usually used, helps to detect security problems. 
Unusual events can help to identify intruders before they can damage the system. 
Security is pervasive 
Almost any change that is being made in a system may have security effects. This 
is especially true when new services are created. Administrators, programmers, and 
users should consider the security implications of every change they make. 
Understanding the security implications of a change is something that takes practice. It 
requires lateral thinking and a willingness to explore every way in which a service 
could potentially be manipulated. 
2.5.2 Embedded systems design and security issues 
In the past, embedded systems tended to perform one or a few fixed functions. The 
trend is for embedded systems to perform multiple functions and also to provide the 
ability to confignre new hardware and software in order to implement new or updated 
applications in the field, rather than only in the more controlled environment of the 
factory. While this certainly increases the flexibility and useful lifetime of an embedded 
system, it poses new challenges; embedded systems often provide critical functions that 
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could be sabotaged by malicious entities. An embedded system should ideally provide 
required security functions, implement them efficiently and also defend against attacks 
by malicious parties. It is also important to note that there are many entities involved in 
a typical embedded system manufacturing, supply, and usage chain. Security 
requirements vary depending on the different perspectives that are considered (i.e. 
users, service providers, administrators, companies, government services). 
Embedded systems, which will be ubiquitously used to capture, store, manipulate, 
and access data of a sensitive nature, pose several unique and interesting security 
challenges. Security is often misconstrued by embedded system designers as the 
addition of features, such as specific cryptographic algorithms and security protocols, to 
the system. In reality, it is an entirely new metric that designers should consider 
throughout the design process, along with other metrics such as cost, performance, and 
power. Several security processing architectures targeting embedded systems, 
(presented in Chapter three) implement basic security functions like confidentiality, 
integrity and authentication, but do not provide protection from software or physical 
attacks by malicious entities. Furthermore, architectural features that accelerate 
cryptography and security protocols do not protect against Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attacks. A secure embedded system should also incorporate appropriate attack-resistant 
features. Figure 2.8 is a graphic synopsis of the issues stated in the previous sections: 
A....uablllty. Dependability. Operability 
requfrements 
Real-tune system 
requlremenis 
SecurIty 
requirements 
Demandf'br thnely detecdonorerrors 
andpollcy-based cOJ.\1rol ofappUcatJons 
Figure 2.8: Cntical systems and the mherent design requirements. 
Using embedded hardware monitor cores in critical computer systems 29 
The requirements quoted in each rectangle shape can be either separate design demands 
of a critical system or it can include a combination of the nested rectangles (i.e. 
reliability mayor may not require security). 
2.6 Testing debugging and monitoring 
ThIs section includes useful background information for the usefulness of testing, 
debugging and monitoring in real time systems. Special interest exists for the 
monitoring function of critical real-time computer systems. 
2.6.1 Testing and debugging 
Debugging is defined as "the process of locating, analysing, and correcting 
suspected faults" [24]. A fault is defined to be the direct cause of some error. Since the 
occurrence of errors can have different reasons, they are usually not predictable, and 
therefore they must be located them using debuggers. A debugger is a tool which helps 
the designer to examine suspected errors in a program, and eventually also remedy the 
errors. Cyclical debugging is commonly used to describe debugging as an iterative 
process, in which the debugger is repeatedly used to find and correct errors, untIl no 
more errors can be found. 
Testing and debugging are similar activities with respect to finding errors. 
However, testing is more of an automated process of exposing different input to the 
system under test, and evaluating its results (output). The objective is to find input data, 
or patterns of data, that cause erroneous results [25]. The faults that are found during 
the testing process are then put under observation in a debugger. 
In real-time systems, errors may also occur in the time-domain. Real-time systems 
are therefore harder to debug than non-real-time systems. The ability to track down 
timing-related errors was largely an unexplored area until the early 1980's. Today, 
various debugging systems and methods have been developed in order to address 
timing-related issues [26], [27]. 
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2.6.2 Monitoring 
Monitonng is the process of gathering information about a system [28), [29). This 
information cannot normally be obtained by studying the program code only. The 
collected information may be used for program testing, debugging, task scheduling 
analysis, resource dimensioning, performance analysis, fine-tuning and optimisation of 
algorithms. Monitoring is also important in state-of-the-art critical computing systems 
in order to control the results of errors and prevent system failures. The applicability of 
monitoring is wide, and so is the spectrum of available monitoring techniques. This 
section includes a generic presentation of a monitor and describes different monitoring 
systems, the type of information collected by monitors, and the problem-related issues 
with monitoring. 
In essence, a monitor works in two steps: detection (or triggering) and recording. 
The first operation refers to the process of detecting the object of interest. This is 
usually performed by a trigger object that is inserted in the system; the object indicates 
an event of interest for recording when it is executed or activated. Recording, is the 
process of collecting events and saving them in buffer memory, or transfer them to 
external computer systems for the purpose of further analysis or debugging. An event is 
a record of information which usually constitutes the object of interest together with 
some additional meta data regarding that object (e.g. the time when the object was 
recorded, the object's source address, task/process ID, etc.). The types of momtored 
objects depend on the level of abstraction which the user is interested in. The trigger 
object can be inserted in the target hardware platform as an instruction, a function, or a 
module that is formed by several signal assertions. It may also be a physical sensor, or 
probe, connected with physical wires in the hardware, such as CPU address, data, and 
control busses. 
An important issue regarding the monitoring process is the amount of execution 
interference that may be introduced in the observed system due to the involved 
operations of a monitor. This execution interference, or perturbation, is unwanted 
because it may alter the true behaviour of the observed system, in particular such 
systems that are inherently timing-sensitive such as real-time and distributed systems. 
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2.6.3 Types of monitoring systems 
Monitoring systems for system-level analysis are typicaIly classified into three 
types: 1) software monitoring systems, 2) hardware morutoring systems, and 3) hybrid 
monitoring systems. A short description of each type of monitoring system follows. 
Software Monitoring Systems 
In this category of monitoring systems, only software is used to instrument, record, 
and collect information about software execution. Software monitoring systems offer 
the cheapest and most flexible solution where a common technique is to insert 
instrumentation code at interesting points in the target software. When the 
instrumentation code is executed the monitoring process is triggered and information of 
interest is captured into trace buffers in target system memory. The drawback of 
instrumentation is the utilisation of target resources such as memory space and 
processor execution time. 
Hardware Monitoring Systems 
In this category of monitoring systems, only hardware (custom or general) is used 
to perform detection, recording and collection of information regarding the system. The 
primary objective of hardware monitoring is to avoid, or at least minimize, mterference 
with the executIon of the target system. A hardware monitoring system is typically 
separated from the target system, and thus, it does not use any of the target system's 
resources. The target system is monitored using passive hardware (or probes) connected 
to the system busses and signals. Hardware monitoring is especiaIly useful for 
monitoring real-time and distributed systems since changes in the program execution 
time are avoided. 
In general, the operation of monitoring hardware can be described by the three steps 
(see Figure 2.9): event detection, event matching, and event collection. 
( 1. Detect ]I---{. 2. Match ] ... - __ {. 3. Collect ) 
FIgure 2.9: Hardware monztoring steps. 
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In the first step the hardware monitor listens continuously to the signals. In the 
second step, the signal samples are compared with identified patterns that define the 
system events. When a sample matches an event-pattern, the process triggers the final 
step, collection, where the sampled data is collected and saved. The saved samples may 
be stored locally in the monitoring hardware, or be transferred to a host computer 
system where usually more storage capacity can be obtained. 
This type of hardware monitor avoids target interference and has the advantage of 
precision and accuracy. Since the sole duty of a hardware monitor is to perform 
monitoring activities (usually at equal or higher system speed than the target's) the risks 
of loosing samples are minimized. A disadvantage of hardware monitors is their 
dependency on the target's architecture. The hardware interfaces, and the interpretation 
of the monitored data must be tailored for each target architecture. Thus, monitoring 
solutions using hardware are more expensive than software alternatives. Moreover, a 
hardware monitor may not be available for a particular target, or takes time to 
customize, which may increase the costs further in terms of delayed development time. 
Another problem with hardware is the integration and miniaturisation of components 
and signals in today's chips which renders difficulties in reaching information of 
interest, e.g. cache-memory, internal registers and busses, and other on-chip logic. To 
route all internal signals out from a chip may be impossible because of limited pin 
counts. 
In general, hardware monitoring is used to monitor either hardware devices or 
software modules. Monitoring hardware devices can be useful in performance analysis 
and finding bottlenecks in e.g. caches (accesses/misses), memory latency, CPU 
execution time, 110 requests and responses, interrupt latency, etc. Software is generally 
monitored for debugging purposes or to examine bottlenecks, load-balancing (degree of 
paraIlelism in concurrent and multiprocessor systems), and deadlocks. The current 
trend of making application specific hardware using FPGAs and VHDL (an early 
example of this type is given in (3~)) gives an opportunity to conveniently integrate 
non-intrusive monitoring mechanIsms in the hardware for single node systems. 
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Hybrid Monitoring Systems 
Hybrid monitoring uses a combination of software and hardware monitoring and is 
typically used to reduce the impact of software instrumentation alone. A hardware 
momtor device is usuaIly attached to the system in some way, e.g. to a processor's 
address/data bus, or on a network, and is made accessIble for instrumentation code that 
is inserted in the software. The instrumentation is typically realised as code that extracts 
the information of interest, e.g. variable data, function parameters, etc., which IS then 
sent to the monitor hardware. For instance, if the monitor hardware has memory-
mapped registers in the system, the instrumentation would perform data store 
operations on the monitor's memory-addresses. The hardware then proceeds with event 
processing, filtering, time-stamping, etc., and then communicates the collected events 
to an external computer system. This latter part typically resembles the operation of a 
pure hardware monitor. The insertion of instrumentation code also resembles the 
technique used in a software monitoring system; i.e. it can either be done manually by 
the programmer, automated by a monitoring control application or by compiler 
directives. 
The complexity of the capabilities of a monitor varies vastly from detection of a 
simple combination of a number of input signals, the combination of input signals to 
numerical values and tracking of the, for example, less, greater, between limits type, to 
the congregation of rather complex signal patterns over time. In older systems the 
hardware momtors were basically plug boards, or a combination of probes and bus 
analyzers. The idea of using embedded programmable logic devices like FPGAs for 
monitoring and controlling critical real time systems is introduced in this research 
work. Hardware monitors are often built on the basis of personal computers. This frees 
the developer of a hardware monitor from having to design the basic system which 
usually consists, besides other less important things, of a user interface, storage 
facilities and memory space (i.e. series of registers). 
Figure 2.10 is a representative way to show the impact of the different monitoring 
schemes during the time that the execution of the application is suspended. The 
hardware monitor does not introduce such an impact, whereas hybrid momtors generate 
a rather small suspension time on the application software and software monitors suffer 
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considerably from this effect. It should be noted that the actual suspension time is 
strongly correlated to the amount of data gathered in the software part of the monitor. 
The arguments so far manifest the need of a concurrent hardware monitor embedded in 
the target architecture for meeting the reliability, dependability and maintainablhty 
requirements of a real time system. 
Hardware Monitor Software Monitor Hybrid Monitor 
Application Monitor Application Monitor Application Monitor 
(Code) (Code) 
Event --- --- --- -t--..... -------- .L.---r-ITD;;~;"- --~A~tr1_-::':-::':-::-~---
At Storage 
t 
Figure 2.10: Temporal impact of monitor types {31J. 
With today's highly integrated hardware, encapsulating complete systems on a chip 
(SoC), the traditional hardware monitors (i.e. hardware probes) are facing severe 
difficulties. Processor cores, 110 components, cache memories, and even standard 
memory, are all integrated on the same reprogrammable chip (i.e. FPGA). Given also 
that chip packages can be obstructive (as in Ball-Grid Array packages) and have limited 
pins, it has become almost impossible for external hardware to probe internal signals. 
For real-time systems built on these premises there is a need to access execution 
information residing on-chip, as well as to avoid interference with the system's 
execution behaviour. 
Observability into SoC designs is today mostly supported for RTL verification. As 
SoC designs tend to increase in size and complexity, the verification process need also 
to take place at the system-level. Support for system-level verification already exists for 
the software part of a SoC, where a common technique is the use of software monitors. 
These monitors are typically found in RTOS (Real-Time Operating System) 
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development tool envIronments, and provide the developer with process-level 
infonnation such as task-scheduling events start/stop, block/resume, taskswitch, etc.), 
inter-process communication events (e.g. send and receive messages), synchronisation 
and resource utilization (CPUs, semaphores, I/O), external interrupts, etc. On the other 
hand, the available commercial or academic on-chip monitoring solutions commonly 
operate with a user interface and a software API, giving the opportunity to the 
developer to debug the design and achieve a satisfactory degree of robustness. 
However, the observability of systems is not limited to debugging, testing and 
validation purposes. 
The outcome of the research regardmg embedded monitoring support of dependable 
systems is evident of the fact that the available time for reacting to potential threats (i.e. 
hardware application bugs, misuse of vital system resources and protocol violations) 
exercised within such systems is considerably limited. Software monitoring and control 
solution are therefore excluded in this context because of the significant delay that they 
introduce in their response (see also figure 2.10). The system/application monitoring 
function, the error detection and the applied control have to operate in a timely, if not 
concurrent, manner. This attributes can be satisfied with an embedded, passive 
hardware monitor that is built with the help of an HDL language and it is 
inserted/integrated on a permanent basis in the target critical system topology. 
2.7 Active Networks 
Active Networks [32) are a relatively new concept, where a network is not just a 
passive carrier of bits but a more general computation model. Active Network may be 
simplistically viewed as a set of "Active Nodes" that perfonn customized operations on 
the data flowing through them. Traditional data networks provide a transport 
mechanism to transfer bits from one end system to another, with a minimal amount of 
computation (e.g., header processing and signalling). In contrast to that, a 
programmable network consists of programmable routers that have general-purpose 
processing units in their data path. These processing units can be programmed to 
perfonn various protocol operations as well as complex payload processing. Unlike 
traditional routers, deployment of new protocols can be achieved by reprogramming the 
/ 
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system rather than exchanging expensive hardware. This programmability of the data 
plane extends the traditional store-and-forward paradigm of routers to store process-
and-forward. The processing step is where interesting new services and protocols can 
be integrated into the network. 
Active networks not only allow the network nodes to perform computations on the 
data but also allow their users to inject customized programs into the nodes of the 
network, that may modify, store or redirect the user data flowing through the network. 
These programmable networks open many new doors for possible applications that 
were unimaginable with trachtional data networks. For example, there may be a video 
multicast session where at every node the video compression scheme is modified, based 
on the computation done by that node and depending on the network bandwidth 
available. The research community has realized the potential of Active Networking and 
a lot of work is underway at different research sites. 
Various approaches on solving current networking problems use a part of the 
Active Networking concept. Applications including packet filtering [33) in firewalls 
(also routers) where the filters in the firewall decide which packet should go through 
and which should be blocked. Other examples would be congestion [34), web proxies 
[35), multi cast routers [36) and video gateways [37) etc. that perform user driven 
computations "within" the network. For example web proxies provide a user 
transparent service to serve and cache web pages. Nomadic Routers determines the 
means by which a host is connected to a network (e.g., a modem or a high speed 
network connection) and adapt to the conditions. For example It might perform link 
compression and perform more file caching when connected through a modem. Also, it 
would enable for example encryption when user is remotely connected. The list goes on 
and on. A lot of recent trends and developments in networking are a subset of the 
Active Network Architecture. 
2.7.1 Active Network usage 
From the point of view of a network service provider, actIve networks have the 
potential to reduce the time required to develop and deploy new network services. The 
shared infrastructure of the network presently evolves at a much slower rate than other 
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computing technology. One consequence of being able to change the behaviour of 
network nodes on the fly is that service providers would be able to deploy new services 
quickly, without going through a lengthy standardization process. 
At a finer level of granularity, active networks might enable users or third parties to 
create and tailor services to their particular applications and even to current network 
conditions. Though it seems likely that most end users would not write programs for 
the network it is easy to imagine individuals customizing services by choosing options 
in code provided by third parties. Indeed, this prospect should appeal to network 
providers as well, because It enables them to charge more for such value added 
services. 
Networks are expensive to deploy and administer. For researchers, a dynamically 
programmable network offers a platform for experimenting with new network services 
and features on a realistic scale without disrupting regular network service. 
2.7.2 Basic concepts 
An active network is a kind of store-and-forward network. A store-and-forward 
network consists of a set of nodes interconnected by transmission links. The purpose of 
the network is to support the sharing of these transmission facilities. The basic unit of 
multiplexing of transmission facilities is the packet. Nodes receIVe packets from users 
and other nodes, perform a computation based on their internal state and the control 
information (header) carried in the packet, and as a result of that computation may 
forward one or more packets toward other nodes or to users. The nature of the network 
service is defined by the behaviour of the individual nodes of the network, and how 
users can control that behaviour through coded information placed in their packets. In 
today's Internet, for example, routers examine the destination address field of the 
Internet Protocol header along with internal routing tables to determine to which 
neighbour they should forward the IP packet. The extent of user control over the 
network's behaviour is limite~ to the range of values that can be placed in that field 
(and a few others) in the IP header; other services can, however, be envisioned. One 
example, which has been proposed for the Internet is a ''premium'' service in which 
certain nodes classify packets based on information contained in all of their headers 
Using embedded hardware monitor cores In critical computer systems 38 
(Tep or UDP port numbers as well as source and destination IP addresses) and then 
route and schedule them for transmission on the basis of that classification. In this case, 
it has to be identified the term user (or end user) with the originators and recipients of 
the packets actually carried by the network. Users are, in general, different from 
node/network administrations, which control the configuration and interconnection of 
network nodes. Often the relationship between user and network administration is that 
of service provider and subscriber. 
2.7.3 Active Networks and Programming Interfaces 
One way to think about active networks is that they proVIde a programmable 
network API. The IP header in the traditional network could be considered as the input 
data to a virtual machine, whereas packets in the active network containing programs 
could be considered as input data. In the context of this model, a variety of active 
networking approaches can be characterized by the following attributes: 
Language Expressive Power: The degree of programmability of the network API may 
range from a simple list of fixed size parameters that select from predefined sets of 
choices, to a Turing-complete language capable of describing any effective 
computation. The advantage of a less powerful language is that it constrains the 
pOSSible node behaviours and so simplifies correctness analysis. It IS also more likely to 
admit fast-path optimization, e.g. through special purpose hardware. Many active 
networking projects, however, have opted for more powerful languages that use typing 
and other mechanisms to help ensure correctness. Most of these languages feature some 
form of restriction on their expressive power, order to guarantee that the effect of any 
packet sent into the network is bounded. For example, a language may admit only 
straight-line programs, without loops or branches. 
Statefulness: Another important characteristic of the network API is the ability to 
install state in the interior nodes of the network, and to refer to state installed by other 
packets. Some active network APls provide this capability, while others do not. Where 
it is present, the API must include control mechanisms to protect users' state from 
unauthorized access. 
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Granularity of Control: This mainly refers to the scope of node behaviour that can be 
modified by a received packet. One possibility is that a single packet can modify the 
, 
node behaviour seen by all packets arriving at the node, and this change persists until it 
is overridden. At the other extreme, a single packet modifies the behaviour seen only by 
that one packet. Between these extremes, modifications might apply to a flow, which 
could be defined to be a set of packets sharing some common characteristic, such as 
temporal locality and/or a particular source and destination address in the headers. In 
general, the active network API must include security mechanisms that ensure that 
packets affecting the node behaviour have localized effect and/or come from authorized 
users. 
2.7.4 Using existing network protocols and technologies 
The fundamental idea of Active Networks is to utilise the current infrastructure of 
lP-based networks (e.g. the Internet), without having the need to change a part of the 
network, nor interrupt its operation nor evolve its current technology. Active Networks 
do not require any changes in the standard communications protocols used in the IP-
based networks. Active Networks offer added services and programmability either to 
the network nodes or to the Active end-stations of the currently available lP-based 
networks. This is accomplished through a transparent operation on top of the current IP 
networks infrastructure, utilising the current features of the communication protocols. 
Considering the above concept, the reconfigurable hardware platfonn can be smoothly 
integrated in a host-based router and serve the Active Applications. 
2.7.5 Active Networks based on PC routers 
The ability to not only forward packets through a network, but also process them on 
a router, is the key to implementing new services and protocols without changing the 
underlying hardware infrastructure. Such processing can range from simple routing and 
queuing decisions to complex payload modifications. Perfonning such processing in 
software rather than custom logic opens the possibility to adapt and deploy new 
services by simple changes in the software. The crucial challenge in such a system is 
not only to be able to provide the functionality to dynamically change the forwarding 
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loop for selected data streams. It is equally important that the performance of the 
system be comparable to custom logic solutions despite the fact that software. 
General-purpose workstation processors that perform packet routing and forwarding 
in software were common router configurations in the 1980's. Typical link speeds of a 
few kilobits per second did not exceed the processing power of such a system. As 
performance demands for communication changed in the 1990's towards link speeds of 
several megabits per second, software-based routers were not able to keep up with this 
trend. As a result, ASIC-based routers were developed to provide basic protocol 
processing functionality at high speeds. The majority of current Internet routers are still 
ASIC-based. Their limitations in supporting new protocols led to efforts to re-introduce 
the flexibility and extensIbility of software-based systems. 
General-purpose processing as part of the data path and deployment of processing 
code via the packet itself was initially proposed by Tennenhouse and Wetherall in 1996 
(38). From this idea, numerous research projects have spawned to develop 
infrastructure that can process packets in the data path and dynamically deploy the 
processing code. The majority of these projects were and are aimed at investigating and 
implementing software-based "active routers". Key questions are how to dynamically 
install protocol-processing code in the data path, how to deploy code modules, and how 
to safely and securely execute arbitrary code on a router. 
High-end routers are designed around special-purpose hardware: they use a 
SWItched interconnect (e.g., a crossbar) rather than a shared bus, and they implement 
the performance-cntical forwarding function in hardware (e.g., an ASIC) rather than 
software. As a consequence of this hardware-intensive design, high-end switches are 
able to forward packets at a very high rate (on the order of l-lOMpps) and scale to 
fairly large sizes (on the order of 128 100Mbps ports), but they provide virtually no 
programmability. In addition to the highly optimised forwarding path, high-end routers 
also have a network processor-usually connected to the one of the switch's I/O 
ports-that handles exceptional cases lIke IP options and routing updates. Low-end, 
routers can be built using a standard workstation running a conventional operating 
system. The host-based forwarding (39) is implemented with the use of the general-
purpose computers with two or more network interfaces to act as a router. Because they 
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are implemented in software, such routers could be programmed to support nearly 
every imaginable function, but they offer very limited performance; they can forward 
10-100Kpps and support only a handful of 100Mbps ports. These routers offer certain 
advantages over the use of a high end router, allowing open, public source code access 
to the forwarding, queuing, and routing algorithms, and the use of more flexible, 
commodity host interfaces and host CPUs. 
2.7.6 Active Networks processing requirements 
As already stated, the Active Networks are packet-switched networks in which the 
packets can contain code fragments that are either executed on the intermediary nodes 
of the network (in the switches, routers, flexible servers) or in the users end station. The 
execution of programs can be requested and delivered either by the Active Network 
users or the network operator: 
• Routers within the network act on user data flowing through them. 
• Users can configure the network by supplying their own programs that perform 
computations. 
This demands that the Active Host (e g. a router) has sufficient processing resources. 
The Active Host has to be built having the capability to execute customisable code; the 
extra processmg and security requirements increase the complexity and raise concerns 
that are far more difficult to be addressed compared with the common header 
processing and signalling requirements of a standard PC-based router. The processing 
of bit intensive applications, which are carried in the payload of the packets, underlines 
the need for using a dedicated programmable logic device. 
In real world application of active networks, an important aspect of usability is the 
degree of fleXIbility offered by an active network node. The degree of flexibility on the 
one hand depends on the manageability of a node but on the other hands it depends on 
the execution environments since these provide the run-time environments where the 
code can be installed and run. The installation and execution of code must be 
achievable neither resulting in a compromised node nor in an interruption of service of 
an active node. The execution environment of the Active Applications can be a 
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combination of hardware components and software interfaces. It is a host platfonn for 
applying computational processes and implementing algorithms. 
FPGAs can be the optimal candidate either for implementing efficiently the routing 
and forwarding of the Active Packets or for the processIng of the Applications that are 
carried in the payloads of the Active Packets. More details for the flexibility, the 
perfonnance and the suitability of the FPGAs for the purposes of this research are given 
in the section 4.1. 
Summary 
This Chapter was a detailed description of background infonnation and definitions 
regarding aspects of programmable devices, real time systems, critical embedded 
systems and Active Networks. The analysis was extended in order to prove the 
connection and interdependence of this research work with the above mentioned topics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Background in lI'lonitoring 
and prograll'lll'lable 
networks 
This chapter is a synopsis of the related literature background, which is necessary -
together with chapter 2- for reading and understanding the discussion, analysis, system 
architecture and results presented in the remaining chapters. It is assumed that the 
reader has a general knowledge of digital systems, computer hardware and networking. 
Several concepts are explained (hardware monitoring, reconfigurable computing, 
programmable logic architectures, network reconfigurable programmable devices, 
programmable networks) and at the same time a summary of the related work in similar 
fields is provided. 
3.1 Monitoring and error detection 
As it has already been described in the previous chapter, there are traditionally three 
methods for applying monitoring to systems: non-intrusive/passive hardware, intrusive 
software instrumentation, and hybrid where the software instrumentation is minimized. 
However, this research is mainly focusing on hardware monitors for the reasons that 
have already been quoted in the previous chapter. A transparent non-intrusive approach 
towards monitoring is the application of special hardware, e.g. hardware that allows bus 
sniffing, or non-intrusive access to memory via dual-port memories, etc., but also 
through the use of hardware CPU emulators. 
3.1.1 Hardware monitoring domains 
Hardware monitoring has been applied for performance measurements [40J, [41J, 
[42J, execution monitoring of multiprocessor systems [43J. [44J, and real-time systems 
[45J. [46J. [47J. Since the monitoring hardware is interfaced to the target system's 
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hardware via the CPU socket (emulator) or via the data and address busses, it can 
observe the target system without interfering with its execution, and thus not introduce 
any probe-effects. Information processing provided by monitoring can be categorized 
into three functional components according to (48): an event trigger, an event handler 
and an accumulation or sampling storage facility. 
Computation observability received a lot of attention as weJI from the major silicon 
vendors. Attention was given to embedded monitor cores for microprocessors. Philips' 
real-time observability solution, SPY [491, aJIows the non-intrusive output of internal 
signals on 12 chip pins. The internal sIgnals are grouped in sets of 12 signals and are 
hierarchicaJIy multiplexed on the 12 pins. The observed signals are a design-time 
choice. ARM's embedded trace macrocell (ETM) [501 offers real-time information 
about core internal operations. It is capable of non-intrusively tracing instructions and 
data accesses at core speed. The trace is made available off-chip by means of a trace 
port of up to 16 bits. The NEXUS standard [511 proposes a debug interface for real-
time observability of standard defined features. It proposes a standard port while 
leaving the implementation details to the users. 
Discussion 
The work accomplished in the above academic and commercial solutions is mainly 
focused on performance and execution monitoring of microprocessor systems. Their 
contribution concerns testability, verification and debugging issues. Although It can be 
claimed that the context of these monitoring mechanisms shares common grounds the 
research goals of this thesis, none of them covers issues like concurrent error detection, 
application control and stable reconfignration. 
3.1.2 Hardware monitoring using logic analvzers 
Xilinx ChipScope Pro [521 inserts logic analyzer, bus analyzer, and Virtual 110 low-
profile software cores into the design. These cores allow the user to view all the internal 
signals and nodes within the FPGA In more detail, that after place and route the user is 
able to access the cores and capture signal data on-chip, in real-time. Captured data is 
sent off-chip for analysis, via either a high-speed parallel or USB programming cable. 
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The ChipScope Pro tool consists of three components: the Core Inserter, the Core 
Generator, and the ChipS cope Pro Analyzer. 
SignalTap 11 [53) from Altera is a system tool that captures and displays real-time 
signals in a system-on-a-programmable-chip (SOPC) design. By using a SignalTap 11 
Embedded Logic Analyzer (ELA) in systems generated by SOPC Builder, designers 
can observe the behaviour of hardware (such as peripheral registers, memory busses, 
and other on-chip components) in response to software execution. 
Another major player in this area is Agilent who offers a big variety of hardware 
and hybrid monitoring solutions. The Agilent FPGA dynamic probe [54), used in 
conjunction with an Agilent logic analyzer, provides access to internal signal of the 
FPGA. It is possible to measure up to 128 internal SIgnals for each external pin and 
measure a dIfferent set of internal signals without design changes. FPGA timing stays 
constant when you select new sets of internal signals for probing. 
The TA-700 [55) PCI bus analyzer/exerciser from Catalyst is another logic analyser 
that applies performance, workload and timing analysis of the PCI bus. The PCI850 
System AnalyserlExerciser [56) bus-analysis diagnostic tool from Silicon Control and 
the PI-PCI32E PCI Bus Analyzer [57) from Corelis are similar type oflogic analysers 
with small differentiations in their GUIs. The DiaLite Platform [58) (Temento Systems) 
allows the designer to embed system assertions and conditions written along with the 
system specifications before synthesis and check them in real tIme. While the system 
design is running, the assertion checker venfies the properties in real-time. A property 
faIlure will trigger a process and open the corresponding debug interface with all 
properties verification details. 
MAMon [59) is a system that integrates a small hardware component into a SoC 
topology. It works like a probe, either by listening to logic- or system-level events in a 
passive manner, or by being activated by software that writes to a specific register. 
Detected events are time-stamped and sent via a link to a host-based tool environment 
where the events are stored in a database. The tool environment includes a set of 
facilities to view, search, and analyse the events in the database. 
Using embedded hardware monitor cores In critical computer systems 46 
Discussion 
All these tools are specifically designed for verifying, testing and debugging system 
behaviour as well as for detecting and fixing bugs throughout the design process, rather 
than for run-time system monitoring. The work presented in this thesis is related to the 
implementation of a hardware on-chip module, embedded in a PC architecture for 
monitoring the transactions activity and detect potential erroneous conditions. The 
module does not interfere with system performance and ensures timely detection of the 
errors without requIring manual intervention. The goal is to prevent the propagation of 
an error in the system and thus to prevent possible system failures, by using passive 
(and occasionally active) control and reconfiguration of the execution environment. 
3.2 Reconfigurable computing and programmable networkine 
As it is obvious from the discussion which was made in the previous chapter, 
FPGAs can deliver various tasks as parts of embedded systems in telecommunication 
platforms; they are able to adapt hardware in response to changes in processing 
environment and to develop processmg elements for network protocols that change 
frequently. One very wide spread idea is to use FPGAs for implementing fleXIble and 
performance competitive routers or switches for computer networks. 
3.2.1 The P4 architecture 
The Programmable Protocol Processing Pipeline (P4) (60). [61) exploits the 
dynamic re-configurability of RAM-based FIeld Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 
to provide both hardware performance and dynamic functionality to network 
components. Forward error correction (FEC) was used as an example of a protocol 
processing function. The measurements showed that the P4 improVed TCP performance 
in a noisy environment. Another import aspect of the P4 research concerns the -first 
ever- definition of the possible security threats of a networked FPGA-based system 
[62]. The security analysis focuses on attacks at the electrical signals level and sets the 
foundations for the discussion about the hardware equivalents of viruses (FPGA 
viruses). 
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Discussion 
This early work in the P4 project is the initial step in the "new world" of the 
networked reconfigurable computing. This project envisions the future potential 
security threats for the FPGA-based critical systems, as far as the low-level signal 
attacks are concerned. Hardware bugs, application-level errors and resources misuse are 
not included in this study. The mechanism that will counteract against the signal-level 
secunty threats includes only standard computer network security precautions. P4 
project does not propose a permanent embedded monitoring solution to prevent system 
failures. 
3.2.2 The Field-programmable Port Extender (FPX) 
Significant work in the area of reconfigurable computing applied to Active 
Networks and other similar network topologies has been accomplished in the Applied 
Research Laboratory at Washington University (St. Louis). Numerous publications 
were produced using the FPX as the test platform. The Field-programmable Port 
Extender (FPX) [63]. [64] is a general-purpose, reprogrammable platform that performs 
data processing in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGAs) hardware. Data packets 
can be actIvely processed by user-defined, reprogrammable modules as they pass 
through the device [65], [66]. The hardware-based processing allows the FPX to 
achieve multi-Gigabit per second throughput, even when performing deep processing of 
the packet payload. Results have also been delivered [67], [68]. [69] using the partial 
reconfiguration features of Xilinx [70]. The FPX project has also offered recently a 
number of publications concerning FPGA-based TCP-IP packet processing for security 
purposes (TCP flow processing, header processing, payload scanning) [71]. [72]. In 
more detail the work involves standard network security countermeasures implemented 
in FPGAs including encryption, data integrity checking and sequence number 
venfication, integrity and authentication of control messages sent over the public 
Internet etc[73]. [74]. 
Discussion 
The thriving Applied Research Lab has a considerable contribution in the 
reconfigurable computing field with extensive applications in the programmable and 
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active networks. Their work is built around the Field Programmable Port Extender 
aiming to accelerate the network functions of a switch/router with the help of FPGA 
devices. The results therefore concern this specific custom-buIlt platform. The security 
framework is limited to standard computer network security methods and algorithms 
that are implemented in hardware. Thus, it enforces the intrusion prevention 
mechanisms but without any reference to concurrent error detection techniques. 
3.2.3 ANN - Active Network Node 
ANN is a hardware-based reconfigurable router designed to support high 
performance active applications (75). The platform uses a general purpose 
microprocessor and a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) on every port of a 
switch backplane (ATM gigabit switch). The microprocessor and FPGA architecture is 
caIled the processing engine and it can be programmed on-the-fly. The microprocessor 
task is to manage the packet functions, while the FPGA implements performance 
critical functions in hardware. Functional details concerning the execunon environment 
(DAN) and the operating system kernel are given in (76) (77). The system is tested with 
an active multicast video application. 
Discussion 
This project demonstrates practical evidence for the performance acceleration of an 
FPGA-based reconfignrable platform. The system is used as part of an Active Network 
and therefore it is a useful source of information that helps us understand the 
performance and security requirements of such a critical computer network 
3.2.4 AMnet 
The goal of AMnet (78), (79) is to provide customized multi cast services on 
demand, thus to provide a framework for a flexible open communication platform. 
AMnet is based on active and programmable networking technologies and uses active 
nodes (AMnodes) within the network. These AMnodes execute on-demand loadable 
service modules to enhance the functionality of intermediate systems without the need 
of long global standardization processes. An error control policy is applIed for 
preventing network overload conditions. 
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Discussion 
This project is another example of how FPGAs are used in a networked 
reconfigurable system. The error handling features of this system provide QoS and 
error control in a communication link of an Active Network . 
. 3.2.5 Further similar research 
This paragraph is a synopsis of the remaining research concerning FPGA-based 
configurable computing targeting various network topologies. PLATO configurable 
architecture [80] has been desigued and built in order to serve as a platform for 
experimentation with active networks. This architecture provides 4 physical bi-
directional connections for ATM networks with large reconfigurable resources. 
Detection of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and real-time load balancing for 
ecommerce servers were the most interesting applications tested in PLATO. Another 
interesting reconfigurable architecture is presented in [81]. Active networks are used as 
the host platform and performance evaluation quantify the overheads of the system 
throughput. The researchers in [82] introduce a fully-automated fault recovery 
system for networked systems which contain FPGAs. If a fault is detected that can not 
be addressed locally. fault information is transferred to a reconfiguration server. 
Following design recompilation to avoid the fault, a new FPGA configuration is 
returned to the remote system and computation is reinitiated. Although this research has 
many abstract similarities with the work undertaken in this thesis. the main target is to 
locate speCific permanent interconnect and logic faults in an FPGA devices. 
3.3 Remote FPGA (re)configuration 
The ability and the implications of implementing a system for network-based FPGA 
reconfiguration has been attempted in a number of projects. Early work in 
programming reconfigurable hardware through the Intemet is presented by G6mez et al 
[83]. In [84]. an FPGA in a remote system takes the place of a standard network 
interface. The FPGA is capable of downloading new services and upgrades from the 
network. In [85]. a centralized job management system for reconfigurable computing 
systems is described. These systems are reconfigured over a network using job 
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scheduling. A series of standard job management systems and monitor of the resources 
are analyzed. In (86), an FPGA-based system is directly connected to the Internet. Both 
FPGA configuration and application data are transferred to the FPGA via the network. 
In (87) the research effort focuses on the implementation of an Active Network with 
programmable logic support in order to accelerate the applications. The framework 
includes software modules scheduling and real-time resource monitoring. Also, the IP 
stack has been modified in order to comply with the Active Networks concept. This 
project received considerable support from the writer of this thesis and thus more 
information concerning its specific details are given in Appendix I. 
3.3.1 XiIinx - Internet Reconfigurable Logic URL) 
The major programmable logic manufacturers have also introduced system 
solutions for the remote reconfiguration of FPGAs. Internet Reconfigurable Logic 
(IRL) (88) is a system design methodology that enables modification and upgrading of 
hardware and software in a target system across a network without the need for a 
service technician or user to directly perform the change. This methodology, when 
applied to the design process, creates products that are IRL-enabled. IRL can enable 
upgrades of multiple systems simultaneously, and the ability to go back to a previous 
configuration if necessary. This interesting rollback! property of IRL provides 
reconfiguration to a stable state. The system includes a fully customisable API called 
PAVE (88) which is part of the VxWorks real-time operating system. 
3.3.2 Altera - Remote system configuration 
Altera has developed a similar concept for the Stratix FPGA family devices. Using 
remote system configuration (89), a Stratix or Stratix GX device can receive new 
configuration data from a remote source, update the flash memory content (through 
enhanced configuration devices or any other storage device), and then reconfigure itself 
with the new data. On power-up in remote configuration mode, the Stratix device loads 
! Rollback IS the ablhty to revert to a previous upgrade (pOSSIbly the Default). In a system that has space 
for more than two configuratIOns, (e g uSing a commodIty flash chip), It could rollback to a known good 
upgrade that was preVIously Installed 
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the user-specified factory configuration file, located in the default page address 000 in 
the enhanced configuration device. After the device configures, the remote 
configuration control register points to the page address of the application configuration 
that should be loaded into the Stratix or Stratix GX device. If an error occurs during 
user mode of an application configuration, the device reloads the default factory 
configuration page. 
3.3.3 Triscend E5 - Secure remote updates 
Tnscent (which was acquired from Xilinx) has implemented a secure remote update 
system using configurable System-on-Chip devices. The Triscend E5 Configurable 
System on Chip (CSoC) [90) device is able to host downloadable applications from the 
internet; it contains both programmable hardware and an industry standard 
microcontroller. The system is equipped with integrated cryptography techniques 
providmg by this way tools that help to prevent accidental or malicious installation of 
incorrect updates via download. 
3.3.4 Hardware Objects Technology Manager 
The HOTMan platfonn [91) enhances the development, design and control of 
bitstreams in an embedded system. HOTMan enables bitstream management and 
remote hardware upgrading using C++ and JAVA programming languages on 
WindowsIDOS or LinuxlSolaris Operating Systems. HOTMan treats the programmable 
hardware as an object within the system, similar to software objects used in C++. As a 
result, applications that are written using C++ tend to be object oriented, modular, and 
upgradeable. The remote FPGA configurations are capable of total or partial 
reconfiguration of single or multiple FPGAs via SelectMAP or IT AG ports. HOTMan 
represents a method for flexible and reliable remote upgrades including features like, 
secured and compressed bitstream files. 
Discussion 
The remote hardware configuration platfonns introduced concepts that are related 
to the security aspects, as described in Chapter 4. Useful specification concerning 
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requirements and architectural implications were also considered (Le. the roll-back 
mechanism for safe reconfiguration of the FPGA device in the Xilinx IRL system). In 
most of these projects there is reference to the security issues that are raised (Le. mainly 
reverse engineering, intrusion detection, misuse of the local and network resources etc). 
However, there is a limited or inefficient implemented work that provides answers to 
these problems (Le. the security countermeasures are limited only to the secure 
downloads of a bitstream in the FPGA device). Moreover, these systems/projects touch 
only a relative small portion of the spectrum that concerns error detection, concurrency 
issues, availability, operability etc. 
3.4 Relation to the work ofthis thesis 
The different research efforts presented in this chapter, focus on different aspects of 
FPGA-based reconfigurable computing. Various projects use FPGAs in order to 
accelerate the performance of systems and some particular aspects of security and on-
chip monitoring of real-time systems are covered. There is also significant research that 
proposes methods and tools for confronting transient errors, errors that are produced 
from radiation or other random factors in the Iow-level wire connections of the FPGA 
[92). [93). However, there is no previous work on the application-layer -monitor and 
control- domain of critical FPGA-based systems (Le. a robust monitoring and control 
mechanism for achieving the reqUIrements of security, fault tolerance and failure 
prevention). Table 3.1 is a summary of the indicative research work that is related in 
different contexts with the research and implementation targets presented in this thesis. 
The research goal in this work is different and at the same time complementary to 
the general context that was formed so far by the academic research and the 
commercial solutions/platforms. The aim is to confront the errors that are caused by the 
non-predicted behaviour of the configured application in FPGA devices. This can 
include inherent programming bugs, misuse of the available resources, security 
violations, illegal accesses etc. The implementation of the monitor and control 
component targets dependable computer-based systems (Le. pes). The foundations of 
an Active Network were used as a real-world system of this type, in order to obtain the 
necessary architectural design requirements and limitations. 
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Table 3.1: Overview of the related research. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Motivation and F:ralDewo:rk 
This chapter describes the motivation for carrying out research in the emerging field 
of concurrent on-chip monitoring and control of critical FPGA-based applications. It 
includes a general discussion of how to design a computer system, taking into account a 
variety of general security concerns. Also it provides a complete analysis of the 
particular components (i.e. security framework, policy framework) that have to be 
integrated in the system or in similar topologies, in order to provide maintainability. 
The main goal of this research is the timely detection of errors, in order to prevent 
system failures. For this reason, it was decided that the monitoring and the control of 
the configured applications has to be realized through an embedded module; the latter 
should be integrated passively in the execution environment (PeI-based FPGA board) 
and should also be able to apply a per-cycle, policy-based monitoring. The selection of 
the appropriate type of monitoring (i.e. software, hardware or hybrid), the need for 
concurrent detection of errors and other implications are also discussed in this Chapter. 
4.1 Processing power versus flexibility 
A significant introductory goal of the implementation stage was not only to propose 
a processing platform for delivering efficiently the research results, but to justify this 
selection as well. Hence, it was fundamental for the research deliverables of this work 
to define an architecture that WIll both satisfy the research goals and the need for 
innovation and originality. The research scenario that was adopted is not limited in the 
selection of a dependable computing system, but also in the use of a state-of-the-art 
processing platform for the applications. Both performance and flexibility requirements 
had to be satisfied. Therefore, many different solutions were analysed; FPGAs were 
from the beginning the obvious candidate. The reasons for using an FPGA-based 
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platfonn as the execution environment for the applications are stated in this chapter. It 
is clear that this section is based on common issues concerning application processing 
and computational complexity. The short review that follows underlines the 
significance and the potential of the FPGAs in application processing systems. 
A system for processing applications has efficient computational power if it could 
be identified, among all typical and reasonable applications, the one that requires the 
most computational power. If a system can accommodate data traffic of this application 
at full link speed, one can safely assume that there is enough computational power to 
host any other reasonable application. The link speed between peripheral cards and the 
host microprocessor in a PC is restricted from the throughput of the PCI bus. The PCI 
bus can have one of the following modes of operation: 
• 32 bit 133 MHz, link speed = 132 Mbytes/sec 
• 
• 
• 
• 
32 bit 166 MHz, link speed = 264 Mbytes/sec 
64 bit 133 MHz, link speed = 264 Mbytes/sec 
64 bit 166 MHz, link speed = 528 Mbytes/sec 
64 bit/133 MHz, link speed = 1064 Mbytes/sec 
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are specially built ICs optimised 
for achieving maximum perfonnance under certain conditions and for executing certain 
computations, and thus they are very fast and efficient. However, once the circuit is 
fabricated it cannot be altered. To alter a functionality of a given ASIC, redesign and 
re-fabricate the chip is required. Although the unit cost of an ASIC is fairly cheap, the 
fabrication process is very expensive and time consuming. Another drawback is the fact 
that all the existing ASICs, which are to be upgraded, have to be replaced. Traditional 
network nodes (e.g. routers, switches) are based on ASICs. 
A more flexible solution is the use of software-programmed microprocessors. 
Processors perfonn a computation when they execute a set of instructions. Changing 
the instructions the system is altered without changing the hardware. However the cost 
of the flexibility is lower performance, if not in the clock speed then in the work rate. 
An inflexible feature of microprocessors is that their instruction set is defined at their 
fabrication time. 
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In order to adapt to new protocols, services, standards, and network applications, 
many modern routers are equipped with general purpose processing capabilitIes to 
handle (e g., route and process) data traffic in software rather than dedicated hardware. 
The implementation of network processors is a quite chaIlenging area. Network 
processors distribute the computational processes over several processors (e.g. from 
two to sixteen). The advances of VLSr technology resulted in network processors, 
which have multiple processors, with cache and DRAM on a single chip, reducing by 
this way considerably the memory access latency. The network processing of 
applications is divided in two categories. The first include header processing 
applications and the second payload processing applications. Payload-processing 
applications access and possibly modify the contents of a packet during network node 
processing. Therefore they have a considerable computational complexity as is shown 
, 
in figure 4.1. Computational complexity can be defined, as the number of instructions 
per byte required for an application operating on a given packet length. 
Computalional 
(,om Xlty 
encryptlon 
media 
transcodmg 
automatIC protocol 
deployment 
rehable multicast 
TypKal 
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Figure 4.1: Bandwidth and computational complexity of some applications [94J. 
For a bit intensive application like on-the-fly encryption, with a link bit rate ofRlmk 
= 132 MB/sec (the slowest pcr throughput), the computational complexity N can be 
204 instructionlbyte according to [95). The header-processing ovedtead for the data 
stream can be ignored since payload processing dominates the computational 
. mstr 6 bytes 
compleXIty. Hence: M = N *Rlmk= 204 --* 132* 1 0 --= 26,928 MIPS 
byte sec 
Using embedded hardware monitor cores in critical computer systems 57 
It is clear that a standard RISC processor by itself is sufficient for header processing 
at link speed, but will not provide adequate computational power for tasks that perform 
payload processing. The use of vector processing techniques for streaming applications 
(Le., embedded vector processors) or multiple parallel superscalar or VLIW processors 
on a chip are promising approaches to achieve link-speed payload processing. 
However, FPGAs stand in the middle of hardware and software solutions and can 
be considered the optimal candidate for a series of applications. While processors 
divide computations across time, the programmable logic devices like the FPGAs 
divide them across space (figure 4.2). Being far more flexible than hardware platforms 
like ASICs, and having considerably better performance than software, FPGAs give an 
answer to the technology gap. 
tt-x 
t2-x·A 
a-t2+B 
u=u*t1 
)=t2+c 
y=Ax'+Bx+C 
Temporal computation Spatial computatIOn 
x 
y 
Figure 4.2: temporal versus spatial computation 
c 
"Hard-wiring" a variety of IFs that are closely coupled with a microprocessor and 
programmable logic as well, the advantages of hardware and software platforms are 
combined. The result is a System-Qn-Chip (SoC). Hence a technology fusion is 
accomplished. It is obvious from both figures that the bit-intensive applications should 
be implemented in a hardware-based solution. 
As the VLSI technology progresses, the capacity and the performance of the FPGAs 
increases, making them even more attractive for a variety of applications and 
architectures. FPGAs performance increases in a pattem that follows Moore's La~. 
2 Moore observed an exponentIal growth m the number of tranSIstOrs per integrated cirCUIt and predIcted 
that thIS trend would continue. Moore's Law, the doubhng of tranSIStors every couple of years, has been 
mamtained, and stdl holds true today. 
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The FPGA constraints are related to the area utilization, the in-system programming 
times and the liD requirements. The table that follows is a synopsis of area utilisation, 
performance, and I/O metrics, taken from several applications notes from XIiinx: 
Application Family example device Fmax (Mllz) Slices lOB 
ADPCM, 1024 Channel SImplex Vlrtex-II Pro, XC2VP20-7 56 2753 69 
[961 Vlrtex-II, XC2V3000·6 51 2824 69 
e·Dlscrete Cosme Transform (97) Vtrtex, XCV200-6 66 1,772 23 
Virtex-E, XCV200E-8 83 1,769 23 
Virtex·II, XC2VI 000-5 83 1,802 24 
Spartan-II, XC2S200-6 76 1,772 23 
Spartan·IIE, XC2S300E-7 63 2,220 23 
JPEG Encoder (98) Spartan-3, XC3S40004 54 6192 151 
Virtex-II Pro, XC2VP20-6 106 6146 151 
Vlrtex-Il, XC2VI500-6 95 6153 151 
MPEG·2 HDTV I & P Encoder Vlrtex-II, XC2V3000-5 111 6508 113 
[991 Vlrtex-II, XC2V3000-5 111 5540 58 
MPEG4 VIdeo CompressIon Spartan-3, XC3S1 0004 58 2997 235 
Encoder (100) Vlrtex-II Pro, XC2VP7-7 85 2991 235 
Virtex-II, XC2VlOOO-6 78 2979 235 
MPEG4 VIdeo CompressIOn Spartan-3, XC3SlO004 62 1351 215 
Decoder (101) Vlrtex-II Pro, XC2VP7-7 82 1352 215 
Vlrtex-II, XC2VI 000-6 75 1350 215 
Tnple DES Encryptton (102) Spartan-3, XCV3SIOOO4 101 790 301 
Spartan-lIE, XCV2S300E- 117 790 301 
7 165 705 301 
Virtex-Il Pro, XC2VP7-7 182 705 301 
Virtex-II, XC2VlOOO-6 125 790 301 
Virtex-E, XCV300E-8 
AES Fast Encryptton (103) Spartan-3, XC3S1500-5 119 447 391 
Spartan-lIE, XC2S400E-7 79 499 391 
Virtex-Il Pro, XC2VP20· 7 217 447 391 
Virtex-II, XC2VIOO0-6 170 447 391 
Table 4.1: Implementation details for several FPGA-based applicatIOn implemented. 
Even the most bit intensive applications, such as media transcoding, can be 
efficiently implemented in the available FPGA devices as it is proved from the results 
of table 4.1. The parallel and concurrent nature of the FPGA processing ensures high 
performance (figures 42,4.3 and table 4.1). It can be claimed that hardware platforms 
based on FPGAs enable packet processing at link speed. As a general conclusion (and 
with reference to the previous figures), it can be claimed that it is more "profitable" to 
implement bit intensive applications and algorithms in FPGA devices rather than in 
ASICs or general purpose and special purpose microprocessors. 
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To summarise, it is important to point out that there is a constant increase in the 
demand of processing power in order to meet the challenges of the ever-growing 
electronic market. Some indicative reasons are given below: 
• The growth of the internet [104). 
• The increasing use of electronic equipment and especially computers, mobile 
phones and other electronic "gadgets". 
• The increasing number of users of high technology products. 
• The continuous introduction of new complex application and technology services. 
• The constant demand for applications, systems and services that deliver higher 
performance. 
The increasing number of users, applications and services that are open in the public 
domain creates security risks and thus new processing-consuming security policies and 
protocols have to be introduced. 
4.2 Active Networks - a critical computing system 
The theoretical background of Active Networks was covered in Chapter two. This 
section is an analysis of the apparent security implications which are involved with the 
definition and connotation of Active Networks. 
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Active networking supplies the users with the ability to download and execute code 
within a node. That is by its nature a security critical activity. In such an infrastructure 
the security implications are far more complex than in current static environments. In 
Active Networks the author of the active code, the user who deploys it, the owner of the 
nodes' hardware and the owner of the execution platform can be different entities 
governed by different security policies. In such a heterogeneous environment security 
becomes an extremely sensitive issue. The possibility of loading and executing active 
code in Active Network Nodes imposes considerable threats on the expected operation 
of the nodes and/or the network due to flaws in active code, malicious attacks by 
unauthorized users, conflicted code execution etc. Thus, security in Active Networks 
deals mainly with protecting the system (in~structure) from malicious (unauthorized) 
and erroneous use. The objective for the security architecture in this work is to 
guarantee robust/secure operation of the computing infrastructure despite the 
unintentional or intentional misbehaving of the applications. Fulfilling these objectives 
is fundamental for the usability, integrity and trustfulness of the system. Furthermore, 
an unintentional error in the design of a new network service, its implementation 
(active code), or its configuration can degrade performance of the critical system. 
Finally, a malicious or unintentional misbehaving of an application can severely 
degrade or even disable the network services perceived by other user(s) of the critical 
system. It is clear therefore that the Active Nodes (Le. Active Router) are more 
susceptible than those in current passive networks. Several scenarios of misuses 
concerning applications or services could be realised in Active Networks: 
• Misuse of an active network node by an active application. 
• Misuse of an active application by other active applications. 
• Misuse of an active application by an active network node. 
• Misuse of an active application and/or execution environment by the underlying 
network infrastructure. 
• Misuse of the Active Network as an entity 
Finally a combination of the above categories is possible. These kinds of attacks 
(the complex and collaborative ones) are very difficult to detect not to mention prevent 
or be effectively tackled. Classical examples include the co-operation of various hosts 
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against another Active Node or Active Application. Threats can also be analysed from 
the perspective of a single Active Network Node, and from the network-wide 
perspective. Of course, threats to a single node apply also to the whole Active Network 
(domain). However, network-wide threats can be more subtle and harder to combat, 
since they are based on the global, distributed nature of network protocols, and thus, 
their respective active codes. The scope of the initial security framework is hmlted 
mainly to the first and last category. 
The standard design flow for providing security to Active Networks (actually to 
Active Nodes like an Active Router) is given below. 
When a packet containing executable code arrives at a node, the system must: 
• Accept the authenticity of the credentials of the packet, 
• Identify the sending network element, 
• Identify the sending user, 
• Authorize access to appropriate resources based on these identifications and 
credentials, 
• Allow execution based on the authorizations and security policy, 
• Momtor and control access to system resources throughout the execution, 
• If needed, encrypt the packet to protect its code and data in transit. 
A reference monitor may be used to restrict the information, system resources and 
servtces that active applications are allowed to access and use. The reference monitor 
consults a security policy to determine if access is to be granted. Since access-level 
monitoring places restrictions directly on what an application can do, it is an effective 
method. However, the decision of granting permission for using some resources is 
based upon some credentials whIch are not able to gnarantee that a packet is harmless. 
The contribution of this thesis focuses in the monitor and control domain, which so 
far has only been implemented in software space. For the reasons quoted in sections 
2.2, 2.3, 2.4.4, and 2.6.3 it is apparent that the monitoring and control in a system like 
an Active Network must be delivered in a concurrent mode, especially when the 
execution enviromnent of the application is a FPGA device. This is secured by using a 
dedicated, embedded hardware monitor. 
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The general research requirements were already quoted in section 1.1. One of those 
was to select and study the properties of a real world critical system, based on a 
computer architecture. Active Networks are subject to "firm" time deadlines; they also 
demand that the Active Applications practice a fair utilisation of the host resources, 
they require high levels of integrity, availability and reliability and they have also 
security as well as performance requirements (see section 2.7.5). Their basic 
experimentation platform can be based on PC hosts. Therefore an Active Network or 
better a PC-based Active Router satisfies the above research/design property. 
Considering also the current mfrastructure, expertise and the know-how at 
Loughborough University [87) as far as the Active Networks are concemed, this 
particular system was an appropriate selection. The structure, properties and 
requirements of an Active Router were studied in order to deduce useful design 
demands that will enable the implementation a robust monitor and control module that 
it can be reused as a generic component in various critical computing systems. 
4.2.1 The security context 
The target topology, which will be examined comprises of an Active Router (or 
Active Node). This is a PC-based router that carries a PCI board with one FPGA device 
dedicated for applications that need a bit intensive processing environment (figure 4.4). 
Code 
.... 
• 
: Active 
Processing 
• Engine 
----_# 
Figure 4.4: An Active Network WIth a reconfigurable processmg engine. 
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Following the Active Network design approach, the Active Packets [87[ may have 
one of the following operation modes: 
1. In the first scenario the Active Packet has a pointer to a certain applicatIOn (IF 
core). The requested application is stored either in the Active Router or in a 
different location (e.g. a Code Server [105)). The Active Router detects and 
processes the Active Packet so as to serve the request. The requested application is 
then configured in the hardware platfonn. The Active Router forwards the user's 
data to the PC! card, so as to be processed by the Active Application. 
2. In the second approach, several Active Packets carry a configuration bitstream and 
data in their payloads. The Active Router detects and processes the Active Packets 
so as to serve the request. This processing stage includes authentication of the user, 
and integrity checks. The application is then configured in the target FPGA board 
and in the following stage the host transfers the user data. 
The Active Packets are identIfied as active when the Active Router processes their 
header infonnation (see also Appendix I). The Active Router then decides whether to 
download the new configuration bitstream in the FPGA device or not, depending on the 
current activity on the FPGA board. Apparently, as already stated in the previous 
sections, the new configuration can potentially extend and modify the network 
infrastructure. The routing and the forwarding of the packets are vital processes of an 
Active Router and must not be mterfered with, by any means since their maintenance is 
important for the viability of the network. Moreover, the operability of the routers is 
critical to the proper and correct running of many other important systems and services. 
Therefore, an Active Network system designer should consider new possible threats on 
top of the already existent network security issues. 
The security threat model has to be identified, considering all the platfonn-specific 
characteristics and requirements. The analysis of the security context that applies to the 
platfonn used for this research is based on how the basic packet functions of an IF 
network could affect the services, integrity and perfonnance of the system (or simply, 
the dependability of the system). Therefore, a set of potential threats (and their possible 
impact to the host computer) was identified. 
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4.2.1.1 Packet replication 
Replication of packets occurs in many different instances inside the context of a 
computer network in order to deliver specific services (i.e. multicasting). If an 
application that is configured in the FPGA device of the platform replicates packets in 
an uncontrolled manner or with malicious intentions, then as a consequence a side-
effect could result in contention of the PCI bus; thus leading to degradation of the 
services that the Active Router offers. Although this function is not necessarily 
considered to be malicious, it can even result in Denial of Service (DoS)3. Hardware 
versions of "hoaxes" and "viruses" could deliberately replicate packets. 
4.2.1.2 Packet corrnption 
There are various situations that can result in the production of corrupted packets 
(i.e. packet loss, communication channel noise, congestion, low QoS etc). The impact 
of packet corruption on the reconfigurable platform could be multiple PCI retries, 
aborts, disconnects and terminations. In a similar way to packet replication, these 
events are not necessarily treated as malicious. However, deliberately corrupted packets 
may lead the system in a computational loop. In the worst case scenario a configuration 
bitstream that targets the FPGA platform, could be intercepted and modified when it is 
sent through a public computer network. Packet corruption may result in retransmission 
of packets and therefore in delays for system functions and in an extreme scenario it 
can cause the hang-up of the system. 
4.2.1.3 Packet damage 
This type of failure can either be the result or the cause of a system misuse. Packet 
damage can be realised when an active packet destroys or changes the resources or 
services of a node by reconfiguring, modifying, or erasing them from the memory. 
Hence it can be connected with illegal accesses to restricted memory areas. A node may 
3 DenIal of Servtce· An acttve packet may overload a resource or servtce due to constantly consunnng 
network connecttons or usmg a great portion of the CPU cycles avatlable or by causmg bus contentton. 
The node cmmot functton properly under these circumstances and another acttve packet cmmot be 
executed or forwarded 
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also erase an active packet before the completion of its job in the node. Finally, active 
packets that share the same computational environment may attack each other. 
4.2.1.4 Packet theft 
An active packet may access and steal private information from a node. On the 
other hand, active packets can be manipulated and violated when they anive in an 
Active Node. Even if it is encrypted, it is not totally safe because it usually has to be 
decrypted in order to execute. Packet theft may also result in application hijacking. 
Hardware versions of "worms" as well as hardware version of spyware programs may 
attempt illegal memory reads and memory writes. Reverse engineering may also be the 
goal of packet theft. 
4.2.1.5 Packet transformation 
The packet transformation can be part of the processing sequence of many different 
Active Applications (encryption, compression, coding etc). The impact of packet 
transformation in the PCI-based reconfigurable platform is limited to PCI retries, 
aborts, disconnects and terminations if the core that is configured in the FPGA device 
fails to deliver a service successfully. All the previous PCI transactions events do not 
necessarily constitute errors but they should be treated with suspicion because if they 
exceed some limits they can degrade the performance and affect various services of the 
PC. 
4.2.1.6 Packet fission and fusion 
Packet fission can result in PCI bus contention and DoS, since a fissional node has 
the potential of forwarding more packets than it receives (e g. data decompression). 
Packet fusion is in a way an opposite packet function. It involves the merging of 
different data into a union. It is possible that the application that is configured in the 
PCI-based FPGA board, exercises fusion functions in data; this may result in several 
undesirable PCI events such as persisting disconnects, retries and in the extreme it can 
cause performance degradation of the whole node as an entity. 
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4.2.2 Hardware "bugs" and malicious attacks 
A system fatlure can also be realised by the logic failures of a digital design (or 
hardware bugs), which generate invalid computational cycles. A hardware bug may 
have analogous effects with a software bug; it may lie dormant within a rarely used 
block for a long time until a particular sequence of events satisfies the condition 
required for its activation. Hardware bugs can monopolise the PCI bus, try to read an 
empty memory, try to write to a full memory etc. Moreover iIlegal cycles can violate 
certain rules of a protocol specification and lead the system to "hang up". 
Malicious attacks can also take place. For example an application, which is 
configured in the PCI-based FPGA platform, deliberately activates a mechanism that 
adds noise to the output signals of the core. This could cause PCI protocol errors and 
generate random delays. Malicious attacks can also take place with hardware versions 
of viruses, hoaxes, Trojan horses and spyware programs (as already mentioned in the 
different Active Packet event properties). If the latter malicious attacks are 
Implemented in the heart of the reconfigurable system (i.e. PCI FPGA board) they can 
even have catastrophic results for the node and possibly for other computer entities that 
are dependent on the critical services that the host delivers. Considering also the fact 
that these malicious applications are implemented in FPGAs that have inherent 
parallelism in their operation, it is easy to understand that is even more difficult to 
confront and eliminate the consequences of their activity. 
4.2.2.1 A generic hardware attack scenario 
An application configured in a PCI FPGA device can have full access to the system 
and can communicate with any part of the address space. This means, among other 
things, that an attacker can read or write to the BIOS memory on the motherboard or in 
peripheral hardware. In earlier times, BIOS memory was stored in ROM or in EPROM 
chips which could not be updated from software. These older systems require the chips 
to be replaced or manually erased and rewritten. Since this is not very cost effective, 
new systems employ EEPROM chips, otherwIse known as Flash ROM. Flash ROM can 
be re-written from software. Modem embedded systems often include Flash ROM. A 
given computer can have several megabytes of Flash ROM on various controIler cards 
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and the motherboard. These Flash ROM chips are almost never fully utilized and leave 
lots of room to store backdoor information and viruses. To an attacker, the compelling 
reason for using these memory spaces is that they are hard to audit and almost never 
visible to software running on a system. To access such hardware memory" requires 
driver level access. Furthermore, this memory is immune to re-booting and system re-
installation. If someone suspects a viral infection, restoring the system from tape or 
backup will not help. EEPROM memory is fairly common on many computer systems. 
Ethemet cards, video cards, and multimedia peripherals may all contain EEPROM 
memory. The hardware memory may contain flash firmware or may just be used for 
data storage. 
4.3 Counteract framework 
The threats mentioned in section 4.2.1 do not constitute the complete and absolute 
security threat model for the platform. However, they can be thought as a solid 
introduction and a pathway that helps us to build a robust defence system in an 
incremental way. Table 4.2 is a summary of all the identified Active Application 
functions that can lead the reconfigurable PeI-based FPGA platform to a failure mode, 
as well as the effects and the causes of these failures. Although the causes of these 
faIlures or security "holes" in different critical computing systems may differ from each 
other, the effects of these failures are sharing common grounds between several similar 
computer architectures (i.e. the example systems quoted in section 1.2.5). 
For each of the functions in column 1 of table 4.2, a corresponding effect (or 
effects) were identified and listed in column 2. A failure effect is what the user of the 
critical FPGA PC platform will experience or perceive once the failure 
occurs. Examples of effects include: inoperability or performance degradation of the 
system or process, illegal memory accesses, contention, etc. Aside from its effect(s), the 
potential cause(s) of every listed failure mode must also be enumerated (column 3). A 
potential cause should be something that can actually trigger the failure to occur. 
Examples of failure causes include weak or inefficient design, hardware bugs, hardware 
version of ''viruses'', "warms", ''hoaxes'' and spyware programs, incompatible software 
or hardware functions etc. A severity rating was assigned reflecting the importance 
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effect of each error. Each critical system has its own severity rating system, dependmg 
on the nature of its operation and the degree of dependability that it would like to apply. 
The error were grouped in a scale of 1-5, with '1' corresponding to 'no error effect' and 
'5' corresponding to maximum error-severity, such as the breakdown of a public or 
private critical computing system (Le. cost and loss of availability impact). The last 
column presents the event detection effectiveness which the monitoring system intends 
to apply, with reference to the time that is needed in order to prevent the propagation of 
the error and hence a potential failure. 
Application Failure effect Potential failure Severity Detection 
function cause ratillgll-S effectiveness 
Packet • PCIbus Bad design, Event driven 
replication contention network demand, 4 data monitor, 
• Services hardware version gradual 
degradation of "hoax", detection 
• Denial of Service 4'virus" 
Packet • PCI retries, aborts, Packet loss, Concurrent 
corruption disconnects, noise, 4 detection, 
terminations congestion, low event driven 
• System delays QoS, malicious timer 
• System hang-up interception 
Packet • reconfiguring, Malicious attack, Concurrent 
damage modifying, or hardware "bug", 5 detection 
erasing resources hardware "virus" 
from the memory 
Packet • Loss of private Hardware Concurrent 
theft information versions of 5 detection 
• Unauthorised "worms" and 
memory accesses spyware 
• Application programs, 
hijacking reverse 
engineering 
Packet • PCI retries, aborts, Bad design, Concurrent 
transformation disconnects and improper use of 3-4 detection, 
terminations the resources, gradual 
• Loops and System hardware "virus" detection 
hang-up 
Packet • PClbus Hardware "bug", Gradual 
fission/fusion contention hardware version 3-4 detection 
• Denial of Service of "hoax" 
Table 4.2: A synopsIs of the Active AppllcatlOnjimctlons and their effects. 
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Considering the Active Application effects as these are stated in section 4.2.1 and 
the sequence of events that results in a system failure (figure 2.8), all the Active 
Application functions quoted in table 4.2 are treated as potential errors; hence they are 
defined as the sources of instability, low security and low reliability. In critical 
computer systems (i.e. public network systems, private corporation networks etc), a part 
of which could be the Active Networks, dependability and security issues are raIsed and 
thus measures must be taken to overcome the effects of potential failures. The field 
programmable reconfigurable platform that was used applies a set of measures, which 
are divided into four levels of action: 
• Policy-based monitoring, 
• Timely detection of system threats, 
• Error tolerance, 
• Erroneous application removal and stable reconfiguration. 
4.3.1 Policy-based monitoring 
Dependable computer systems demand a policy-based (embedded) monitoring 
component because the standard failure avoidance techniques cannot ensure the high 
dependability requirements of such systems. Failure avoidance techniques aim to 
prevent errors from entering the system during the design stage. A way to apply this is 
to use applications that have already been verified and tested. Failure avoidance is also 
provided if the configuration bitstreams are encrypted with a standard encryption 
algorithm. Custom built cores (i.e. like the ones that Active Networks are supposed to 
host) may realize any circuit that can even physically destroy the target FPGA or other 
embedded components. Therefore, commercial application cores or open source cores 
are considered to be a much safer option compared to the applications implemented by 
unknown users. However, all the applications are subject to failures and hence none is 
considered to be bug-free. This last statement is proved to be true in our everyday 
experience, when verified and tested software or hardware components are 
malfunctioning. 
For this reason, a set of policy rules has to be designed and implemented in order to 
deal with the effects of errors. The policy based monitoring of a critical computing 
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system should be implemented in hardware for the reasons quoted earlier in this chapter 
two. The observability of the target hardware topology is achieved eIther by tapping a 
subset of crucial signals or by tapping all the signals if this is required. These signals 
can be used to form macros and complementary signal groups which are necessary in 
order to build the individual policy blocks. Each one of these blocks is feeding the 
overall policy framework. Next, the signal states are checked for validity according to 
the implemented policies. Comparator logic has to be developed for satisfying this 
design requirement. 
4.3.2 Timely detection of system threats 
The detection of potential threats or errors in critical computing systems should be 
realised while a service is being delivered. In this way, the effects of the failures are 
minimized or eliminated within the operational system. In such systems the pattern of 
monitoring, matching and collecting is impractical and inefficient because these steps 
involve a considerable and very crucial delay for the detection of the potential errors. In 
most of the cases these critical systems require a more solid, efficient and concurrent 
approach for providing protection against application bugs, protocol errors and misuse 
of resources. Therefore, the collecting of data is replaced with a concurrent application 
control mechanism while monitoring and matching are kept intact. The time that an 
error is detected is a critical factor especially if the severity rating of this partIcular 
error is high. An error with severity rating 5 should not propagate to other system 
components because in this case the stability, integrity, security and hence the 
dependabilIty of the whole system is endangered. Therefore, concurrent methods of 
error detection with parallel processing of signal states have to be applied. The most 
common techniques for error detection are: 
• Replication checks: In this case, multiple replicas of a component perform the same 
service simultaneously. The outputs of the replicas are compared, and any 
discrepancy is an indication of an error in one or more components. 
• Timing checks: Typically a timer is started and set to expire at a point at which a 
given service IS expected to be complete. If the service terminates successfully 
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before the timer expires, the timer is cancelled. However, if the timer times out, 
then a timing error has occurred. 
• Run-time constraints checking: This involves detecting that certain constraints, such 
as boundary values of variables not being exceeded, are checked at run time. 
• Diagnostic checks: These are typically background checks that determine whether a 
component is functioning correctly. In many cases, the diagnostic consists of 
driving a component with a known input for which the correct output is also known. 
A concurrent monitor detection component can be designed borrowing features of 
the above mentIoned error detection techniques. Indeed, as it will be described in the 
next chapter, the monitoring mechanism is integrating different controls and methods 
for error detection (Le. applying concurrent or timely detection of errors,) preventing 
the propagation of errors to other functions or services of the system. This requires a 
very good understanding of the flow of information in the system/component that is 
under monitor. 
4.3.3 Error tolerance 
Error tolerance is based on the fact that many digital systems exhibit acceptable 
behaviour even though they contain defects and occasionally output errors. A circuit is 
error-tolerant with respect to an application, if it contains defects that cause intemal and 
may cause external errors, and the system that incorporates this circuit produces 
acceptable results (106). 
In short, a class of errors may only have either local effects or minimal impact to 
the system operability. Thus thIS type of errors at the system outputs and their presence 
in the system can be easily tolerated. The policy exercised in this thesis follows the 
rule: when the severity rating of the failure is lower than five (see table 4.2), then error 
tolerance policy is applied in a realistic basis. Nonetheless, the presence of such errors 
should be detected to evaluate invisible degradation and to make reconfiguration 
decisions in a timely manner. Many digital systems -critical as well as low-end- carry 
out computations where the results do not always have to be "exactly" correct at all 
times. Examples of such systems include signal and image processing, voice and image 
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communication, and robust control systems. In such systems errors either cause no 
degradation or only cause acceptable degradation in the system outputs. 
4.3.4 Erroneous Application removal 
The monitoring mechanisms attempt to isolate a potential system error before this 
enters a service. Some of the errors may endanger the stability of the system. Therefore, 
when a configured application produces errors with high seventy rating, it is considered 
as a potential threat for the operability of the Active Router. As a first defensive step 
the monitoring system should attempt to stop the illegal/unauthorised/erroneous output 
of the configured application locally upon the detection of a predefined error. If the 
erroneous condition is persisting then the monitoring and control mechanism should 
safely reconfigure the FPGA device with a stable application. This should take place 
considering a minimal risk scenario for avoiding contention conditions either in the 
system bus (i.e. the PCI bus) or in a local bus interface. Therefore, it is highly desirable 
to employ dedicated system ports or interfaces, instead of utilising system resources 
(i.e. host handshake, memory transfers), which could lead in a deterioration of the 
erroneous conditions4• 
Summary 
ThIs chapter presented the development research framework which is the "substrate" 
of the work presented in this thesis. The functionality of dependable computing system, 
such as Active Networks and Active nodes, was studied and a forensic analysis was 
delivered. Thus, the forming of policies and rules was based on architectural 
requirements and speCIfication of programmable networks. 
4 The use of. wrong .ppHcanon-removal and reconfiguranon method of the erroneous apphcation that IS 
configured In • PC!-based FPGA board, could accelerate the potennal system fatlure. ThtS could h.ppen 
tffor example. packet rephcallon error generated by the configured apphcation results In PC! bus 
contention condtnons; USIng. dedicated PC! Interface to remove the erroneous apphcanon and re-
configure the FPGA device WIth • stable one could make the system to ''hang up". 
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CHAPTERS 
Systeln A:rchitectu:re &: Design 
This chapter is a detailed description of how the four-level set of countenneasures 
were actually implemented in hardware. An initial definition of the requirements of the 
hardware platform is given, justifying the decisions for the selection of the individual 
components. The programming and design structure of the policy based monitoring 
together with the predefined rules is given next. A detailed presentation of the internal 
components and modules is also analysed in this chapter. 
5.1 Design issues 
This section reports the reasons for the selection of the hardware platform, 
including an explanation of the requirements and the system limitations, according to 
the available resources. It is also a discussion on the decisions that were made, in order 
to deliver the research results and meet the challenges for building a high-performance 
platform WIth FPGA support that satisfies high level of dependability. 
5.1.1 The hardware platform 
The selection of the appropriate software and hardware for achieving the goals of 
this research was a complicated issue, since many different considerations and 
dependencies had to be taken into account. The selection of the execution environment 
was the first main concern; FPGA devices were selected as the processing environment 
of the apphcations in order to satisfy the performance requirements of the system. For 
this reason, section 2.2 was deliberately extended in order to give a sufficient answer to 
one of the research targets that was set in section 1.1 (Le. define a flexible and high 
performance application-processing platform). The classification of FPGA-based 
custom computing systems includes the following two categories: 
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• FPGAs systems which communicate with general-purpose computers through 
standard serial or parallel communication interfaces 
• FPGA systems which are using a high speed multiplexed data/address/control bus 
in order to communicate with the host. 
Though the implementation of the system can work with both, the second category 
was the specific FPGA system targeted by this research. This type of reprogrammable 
FPGA systems are designed to support a variety of computing applications through 
providing designers FPGA resources, memories, and sometimes other hardware such as 
crossbars, speciabzed interfaces (video, audio, etc.), and even general-purpose 
processors. This type ofFPGA-based custom computing systems are hosted by general-
purpose computers which provide them with programming data and, usually, data to 
process through a peripheral bus such as PCI or SCSI. In addition, they frequently 
provide designers and users with development environments for designing applications 
and controlling the FPGA-based custom computing systems. Early examples ofFPGA-
based custom computing systems include: Splash [107), Splash 2 [108), DecPerLe-l 
[109), Teramac [110), Pamette [111), the Wildforce and Wildstar family of boards 
[112), and the SLAAC family of boards [113). Nowadays the market is flooded with 
several different types of FPGA-based custom computing systems that can satisfy 
almost any design need. 
A PCI board was chosen in order to deliver the required field programmable 
features. An autonomous FPGA development board (i.e. working without the help of a 
host PC) [114) was rejected because of the major issues that were introduced: 
communication link overhead, cross-compatibility with the existent available 
infrastructure, as well as development problems and added developing cost. However, 
the implemented monitor component can be used in this particular FPGA-based custom 
computing system since it can be part of a PCI plug-in card (i.e. many ARM-based 
Excalibur boards have PCI slots). This can be achieved either when a similar 
development board uses an embedded Real Time Operating System (RTOS) or when 
additional logic is implemented in order to add operating functionality. A proof of the 
reusability and the portability of the platform is given by this way. It is clear, from what 
is mentioned so far, that the decision to use a PCI board followed the decision to use a 
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PC as the system host. Although the original idea for taking the above design decisions 
was made having in mind to implement an FPGA-based network-reconfigurable 
embedded system, it is clear that the hardwired monitor and control core, which was the 
outcome of this research, can also be used ID a variety of other PC-based systems. 
5.1.2 The specific properties ofthe PCI board 
Next, the remaining components that will comprise the FPGA-based PCI board had 
to be defined according to additional factors and requirements that constrained the 
implementation options. Thus, the selection of the individual hardware and software 
components had to be justified with reference to the target topology. After careful 
consideration of the design issues, the available resources and the technology reuse 
considerations, a commercial PCI board was chosen. Therefore, the system was 
selected in such a way in order not to depend on a custom-built prototype but in free-to-
access commercial boards. Moreover, as it will be explained later in this Chapter, the 
design of the system was kept simple. This can help the easy adaptation and integration 
of this work on currently available commercial products. It is also a practical way to 
reuse the current technologies without the need to improvise or design solutions that fit 
only to the exact specifications of this implementation. 
A final important task was to define the specifications of the PCI board as far as the 
needs for programmable logic are concemed. The PCI board has to carry two FPGA 
devices in order to comply with the following requirements: 
• The user applications must be able to use as large FPGA area as possible. 
• The physical separation of the hardware modules (i.e. PCI core, monitor core, user 
applications) is needed in order to apply more distinctively the security and error 
detection policy as well as manage the system without complex overheads (i.e. 
scheduling mechanism for partial reconfiguration). 
• The application monitor core has to be hardwired in an FPGA and should not 
interfere WIth the system processes. 
• A PCI-based board with one FPGA that hosts both the PCI core and the user 
application will result in rebooting the host computer each time the user application 
needs to be reconfigured. This can be avoided either by using partial 
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reconfiguration features of modem FPGAs or by using a multiple FPGA board. The 
use of partial reconfiguration, apart from the many other overheads that introduces, 
it would have made the research and development work dependent on this particular 
technology, which is promoted only in specific Xilinx FPGA devices. 
• Both the local side signals of the PCI core and the registered versions of the PCI 
bus signals should be accessible. The PCI core has to be a soft-core in order to 
enable us to integrate the monitor core, without interfering with its operation. 
Obviously this is not possible if the PCI core is implemented as an ASIC. The soft 
PCI core has also the advantage of being more flexible having a reasonable degree 
of customisation. 
Also, the PCI board is required to have a flash type of memory in order to store 
locally an application that can play actively the role-back mechanism; in case of an 
error detection the application can be used in order to reconfigure the system and 
resume a stable condition for the critical computing system. Reconfiguration has also to 
be achieved via the JTAG port, which anyway is considered to be a standard 
communication interface in almost all the FPGA-based boards. The choice of the entity 
to be monitored was made bearing in mind the following issues: 
i) When the application that is configured in the target FPGA device produces an 
error, which may lead to a system failure, there must be enough time available 
(clock cycles) for counteracting, 
ii) The monitoring of the transactions should utilize a well-known communication 
standard, protocol or topology. 
hi) The security model of the Active router requires a per-cycle basis monitoring 
(software based solutions are insufficient in this context). 
iv) The monitoring realisation must be as SImple as possible and should not interfere 
with the operation of other functional components (i.e. other configured IPs) or 
applications. 
FPGA-based hardwired logic can be developed to monitor the functionality of the 
system components in real time. 
There are many different available commercial boards (115), [116), [117) in various 
configuration topologies that can satisfy all the design needs described so far. 
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Considering all the requirements and restrictions that critical systems have, the FPGA 
board environment could be realized with the potential board layout shown in figure 
5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: The reqUIred reconfigurable target components. 
An embedded component, permanently configured in one of the two FPGAs of the 
PC! board (i.e. service FPGA), acts as the system Error Detection Monitor Unit 
(EDMU). As already mentioned, the specification of the components (Le. number of 
FPGAs, communication interface, flash memory) was identified after taking into 
account many practical aspects concerning the effective implementation of the 
reconfigurable platform. The board has one FPGA that hosts the PC! core and the 
EDMU, and a second FPGA that hosts the user applications. The idea of implementmg 
the error detector monitor unit in the user application FPGA is not practical, because in 
this case every IP core (application) must integrate the error detection monitor unit as 
part of its design. Furthermore, the smgle-FPGA implementation of such a system will 
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imply the hard restartS of the hosting PC every time a new application configures the 
FPGA device; this, obviously, is the result of reconfiguring the PCI core of the board 
together with the new application.6 Therefore, this design scenario does not meet the 
scopes and the goals of this project. It would be a different way to apply the same 
scheme but it introduces an undesirable design and structure overhead. 
The implementation of a novel core, embedded in a PCI-based FPGA platform is 
the basic outcome of this research. The Error Detection Monitor Unit (EDMU) satisfies 
features like policy-based monitoring, timely detection of system threats, error 
tolerance when a low severity error occurs and finally stable reconfiguration. The 
EDMU operates in a "passive" way without interfering with the host functions. The 
implemented module works as a "firewall" preventing the communication of the 
configured apphcation with the host, only when an error occurs. 
5.2 The policy-based monitoring framework 
The monitoring policies were implemented in VHDL (VHSIC Hardware 
Description Language) as a conjunction of propositional formulas or properties, 
auxiliary state variable assignments, and other complementary assignments. The 
properties are used to specify correctness of states and not an explicit behaviour. There 
is no conversion of this to a state machine; this is precisely the code for the momtor. 
The policy formation is based on many small rules and intentionally avoids large state 
machines (i.e. state machine with actions specified for each state), because designing 
such state machines is a complex and error-prone task. The adopted design approach 
instead, relies on many small and generic state machines that track one thread of 
information; the bulk ofthe poliCIes is done using compact rules. 
An example is a 2-state, set-and reset machine which becomes set when a certain 
event happens and stays set until it is no longer needed. It is used to record certain 
information such as whether the transaction is a read or a write. Another example is a 
counter which counts the number of cycles from a certain event, or counts the number 
SA slnct requlfement of the system IS to be aVaIlable and operate uncorrupted, offenng by this way 
mamtaJnablhty and operablhty; hence it IS hIghly undeSIrable to restart the PC system. 
6 Tlus comphcation could only be aVOIded usmg the partial reconfiguratJon feature ofXdmx FPGAs 
[95]. 
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of occurrences of a special event. Only these two types of state machines (i.e. see figure 
5.2) were needed in order to implement the monitor for the two identified error 
categories. 
Figure 5.2: The two state machine types usedfor the monitor logic. 
Therefore, the structure of the monitor was intentionally kept simple in order to be 
maintainable, low error-prone, and simpler to extend, since a basic research goal was to 
provide a monitoring element that can be reusable and could be extended in an 
incremental way. This means that the hardware monitor was built with the inherent 
ability to be easily ported to similar critical computing architectures, having at the same 
time the ability to add more policies that fit to the particular needs of the system. 
Moreover, the architecture is flexible enough to allow changes in counter based 
events/policies~ This gives the advantage to apply a stricter version of the policy if the 
design needs of the target critical system require such a thing. For example, creating 
counter-based events that set shorter deadlines from the ones that a communication 
protocol specifies (i.e. the rule that an initiator in a PC! transaction must not keep 
IRDY# deasserted for more than seven PC! clocks during any data phase, can become 
more firm according to the specific needs of the critical computing system). 
The monitor logic is supported by a number of auxiliary signals. These are formed 
using the basic set of the PC! core signals combined in Boolean expressions. The 
auxiliary signals form the backbone design of the monitor. Although several of these 
signals can be taken directly from the ports of the PC! core (i.e. command register), it is 
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preferable for the needs of the system to build them from the basic PC! core signals. 
Table 5.1 is an overview of these signals. A generic version of the PC! signals is given 
figure 5.3 [118); the particular version of the PC! core signals that were used for the 
actual implementation of the monitor logic are given in the diagram in Appendix II. 
One basic functionality of the monitor logic is to hold in registers the state of the 
signals that occurred one clock prior of their current state' (including PC! core signals, 
auxIliary structure signals and state machines output signals). This is crucial for the 
whole operation of the policy generation component. Several other states of the internal 
monitor logic were formed by the above mentioned signal groups using simple 
multiplexers and encoders. The state machines are triggered from a combination of all 
the types of signals mentioned so far that form Boolean expressions. 
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7 The name of these sIgnals IS fonned byaddmg a ''p'' m front of the original sIgnal name. 
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Table 5.1: Auxiliary signals and their respective Boolean expression. 
The monitoring policies were also fonned using Boolean algebra expressions 
combining all the signals that were described so far. The policies define the correct 
status of the signals in a given clock instance (examples of these expressions will be 
_ given in the next section). In other words, the monitored signals are supplying with 
their values the Boolean expressions of the policies and they are compared for 
correctness in a given time-instance as it is shown in figure 5.4 (i.e. the comparator is 
not included in this diagram because its operation comes after the generation of the 
policies). Synchronous logic is used for this purpose. To sum up, a policy is fonned by 
using a Boolean expression containing a combination of the following input signals: 
• Registered versions of PCI core signals, 
• Auxiliary signals (as they are presented in table 5.1), 
• Previous state signals, 
• The state machines output signals. 
8 All the signals have negallve logic. 
9 ThIs is needed because of the delay ID slale machmes. Namely, m_abort can only become true a cycle 
after the occurrence of m_abort buI thIS vanable turns true in the same cycle as when a masler abort 
happens. 
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A more detailed explanation of the diagram of figure 5.4 follows. The PC! core 
signals (e.g. registered versions of local PC! core and PC! interface signals) are the 
source for the creation of the auxiliary signals through Boolean expressions. Both 
categories of signals give input to the previous state signals module. Various PC! core 
signals, auxiliary signals and previous state signals are forming the state machine 
triggers through Boolean expressions. Finally, the outputs of the state machine together 
with the other signal categories (e.g. PC! core signals, auxiliary signals, previous state 
signals) are forming the monitoring policies through Boolean expressions. An 
alternative representation of figure 5,4 that depicts in a different way the same 
information, including the specific signals that are the inputs of the policy generation 
component is given in figure 5.5. This figure has details for the PC! core which were 
initially monitored and reused in order to form the signal categories and internal 
structure of monitoring core. 
A monitor is an observer in a group of interacting modules, or agents which 
communicate via a set of protocol rules. In this context, the Error Detection Monitor 
Unit is a ''hardwired'' core that detects violations in the communication of a configured 
IP core WIth the host, over the PC! bus. The 62 identified errors were grouped in two 
sub-classes. This policy grouping was made according to the current number of 
identified errors that can potential result in a system failure, as these were stated in the 
previous chapter (section 4.3). 
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5.2.1 PCI Protocol Errors 
The PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus protocol was used as the basis 
for forming rules written initially in behavioural VHDL. The PCI Local Bus 
Specification (revision 2.2) (118) includes the protocol, electrical, mechanical, and 
configuration specification, but the monitor covers mainly the protocol definitions. 
There are several versions of the PCI specifications which could be used for achieving 
the research goals of this work. Table 5.2 provides a comparison and justifies the 
selection that was not made with the present criteria (i.e. the selection of the 
specification to be studied was an early decision of this research). PCI Specification 2.2 
was adopted based on the current market demand. The decision is made based on the 
majority PC motherboard and PCI device manufacturers. However, the selection of the 
board was made taking into consideration the research target of extendibility. 
Therefore, the board was selected to be PCI-X compatible. 
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Specification Advantage Disadvantage 
r-~P~C=I~2~.~1 __ +-'_M~a~hrr~e~t=~~hn~0=10~ __________ -+ __ ~~==~~~~ __ ~ 
PCI 2.2 • Widely use, 
r-~~~ __ ~'~M~ahrr~e~t7~~hn~0=10~ ____________ +-~~~~~~~~~~ 
PCI-X • New technology, 
• Fast, 
• backward co atible with PCI 2.X ~------~~~~~ Table 5.2: PC! specification comparison. 
The PCI bus protocol is being used inside millions of personal computers for 
communicating video, graphics, and networking data to the processor. A number of 
these computers are part of a critical system. The protocol is used to interconn~t 
peripheral add-in boards such as audio cards and graphic cards, and controller 
components such as LAN and SCSI controllers, with the processor/memory system. 
There are several different configurations for the bus architecture as was first stated in 
Chapter 4: 32-bit or 64-bit address/data path at 33MHz, or 32-bit or 64-bit address/data 
path at 66Mhz. 
Contradictions are a common problem with multiple-property specifications (Le. 
PCI protocol specifications), as two or more properties may unexp~tedly place 
conflicting requirements on signals under certain conditions. The EDMU applies PCI 
Protocol tracking and also checks for illegal signal changes in order to verify PCI 
specification compliance. For every clock cycle, the monitor defines protocol 
correctness instead of defining behaviour. The crucial observation is that a single 
propositional formula can describe a range of acceptable behaviour. The example 
property, "an acknowledge must happen sometime between three to eight clocks", can 
easily be specified in propositionallogic with a simple counter and a set-reset variable. 
In case of PCI protocol errors, the PCI core will respond according to its internal state-
machine logic. However, the outcome of this response cannot be considered a ''healthy'' 
condition, smce the side effects of the PCI protocol errors can threaten the operability, 
the throughput and thus the dependability of the critical computing system. 
The PCI protocol error ch~king logic acts as a bus analyser that is used to verify 
compliance of user-designed PCI interfaces. The PCI bus protocol properties were 
10 The majonty of the PC! deSIgns are budt for 33 MHzI32 bIt targets, thus addItional development is 
needed in order to be adapt them In the PCI-X speclficallon. 
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transformed into monitoring rules, according to the PC! bus specification. The 
representative PC! protocol policies are followed by the respective description in 
VHDL. 
• Master must raise irdy within 8 cycles of the assertion of frame. 
process ( elk, rst) 
begin 
1£ rstn = 'I' then 
correct~tr(6) <='1'; 
elsif elk'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
If «(eorreet_mntr(6) and «not master1s) and 
p_irdyn»)='l') and (p_~initial = "00111") 
eorreet~tr(6) <= '0'; 
correct_mntr(6) <= 'I'; 
end l.f: 
end if; 
end process; 
• Master must raise irdy within 8 cycles of the last data completlon. 
process (elk, rst) 
begin 
1£ rstn = 'I' then 
correct~tr(7) <=11': 
elsif elk'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(7) and «not masteris ) and 
p_irdyn»)='l')and (p~_subseq= ·00111") 
correct_mntr(7) <= '0'; 
correct_mntr(7) <= '1'; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
• Once irdy# is asserted, frame# can never change its state from de-asserted to asserted 
until the data phase completes. One data phase transaction is also considered. 
process ( elk, rst) 
begin 
if rstn = '1' then 
correct~tr(5) <='1'; 
elsif clk'event and elk = 'I' then 
if «(eorreet_mntr(S) and «(not masteris and not p_irdyn) and 
not (not p_stopn or not p_trdyn» and «(not p_devseln or not 
p_devseln~1story) or p_initial_data-phase»» and not «not 
irdyn_e and not irdyn_o) or not ~abort»='l') or (p_framen_7 >= 
"00100") 
then 
correct_mntr(S) <= '0': 
else 
correct_mntr(S) <= '1': 
end l.fiend if: 
end process: 
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• Once irdy# is asserted, frame# can never change from deasserted to asserted until the 
data phase compl etes. 
process ( elk, rstn) 
beg~n 
if rstn = '1' then 
correct_mntr(9) <='1': 
elsif elk'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(9) and «(not masteris and not p_irdyn) 
and p_framen) and p_dphase_done») = '1') 
eorreet~tr(9) <= '0'; 
correct~tr(9) <= '11; 
end 1.f; 
end if; 
end process; 
• irdy must be deasserted the clock following the completion of the last data phase. 
process ( elk, rstn) 
begin 
if rstn = '1' then 
correct_mntr(15) <='1'; 
els~f elk'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(15) and (not masteris and not 
p_final_dphase_done»)= '1') 
eorreet~tr(15) <= '0'; 
correct~tr(15) <= '1'; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
• There must be an idle after a transactIon terminated by a retry or disconnect 
process ( elk, rstn) 
begin 
if rstn = '1' then 
eorreet~tr(17) <='1'; 
e1s~f e1k'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
~f «(eorreet_mntr(17) and ««not master~s and not 
p_devse1n) and not pp_stopn) and not 
p_fina1_dphase_done»» = '1') 
correct~tr(17) <= '0'; 
eorreet~tr(17) <= '1'; 
end 1.f: 
end if: 
end process; 
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5.2.2 Common application errors 
The EDMU goes beyond a typical validation of the PCI bus protocol at run time. 
Issues like bus ownership, latency, amounts of data that are transferred from and to the 
host are also considered in the policy framework. The goal is to control the above 
transaction events as well to prevent DoS, intended/unintended misuse of the resources 
and other undesirable events. 
The monitor logic allows the analysis of general events hke the count of actual data 
transfers, the matching of specified addresses, measuring and reporting bus utilization, 
latencies and retries, on-the-fly. In this category of errors the focus is not on PCI 
protocol-related errors but on PCI transactions and events that are considered either 
undesired or premature signs of anomalies that affect the dependability of the system. 
The auxiliary signals (i.e. table 5.1), the PCI core signals and the previous state signals 
are used in conjunction with the simple state machines in order to acquire useful 
information or metrics concerning the basic behavioural functions of the reconfigurable 
platform. An overview of these is given in table 5.3. 
• 110 ReadIWrite Commands 
• Memory ReadIWrites 
• ReadIWrite 
• Read 
Abort • 
• 
• with data 
Table 5.3: Monitoring events. 
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The monitoring events quoted in this table are the inputs in most of the policies that 
try to address potentially erroneous conditions of the configured FPGA applications of 
the system. Several of them are dependent exclusively to the auxiliary signals and 
simple timing state machines. 
A general grouping of the conditions that were defined as erroneous or error-prone 
is given next. It is clear that the following application events are caused from 
transactions that cannot be considered "officially" or fonnally as errors. However, the 
finn requirements of a dependable computing system (Le. as were described in Chapter 
4), create the need to monitor, record and control such events because their impact 
affects the stability of the reconfigurable system. For example the PC! interface can 
signal an abort (Le. target abort); this event often occurs due to incorrect programming 
or serious system errors. It can also signify that the initiator has incorrectly attempted to 
burst data beyond the address space of the target. The user application (or in thiscase 
EDMU) must respond appropriately. A list of potential error-events initiated by 
configured applications is quoted next (with reference to the hardware topology shown 
in figure 5.1). 
• Continuous request for bus ownership. A back-up latency timer (apart from the one 
that is implemented as a PC! configuration register) was implemented in order to 
deal with the above-mentioned issue. The value of this timer defines in a more 
custom way, the mimmum amount of time (in pcr clock periods) that the bus master 
is pennitted to retain ownership of the bus each time that it acquires bus ownership 
and initiates a transaction (see also the third block ofVHDL code that is given next). 
• Access of host's memory areas, which are out of the predefined range, is not 
allowed. This violation could either cause an error to other computational processes 
that are running in the host (e.g. memory writes) or can be related to packet theft 
(e.g. memory reads) and application hijacking (see also the second block ofVHDL 
code that is given next in this section). 
• Data corruption resulting in delays (figure 5.6), multiple requests for retry, 
disconnect or abort. These events are treated as potential errors. The activity is 
traced because in the extreme it could result in loops and system "hang-up". 
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Figure 5.6: A delayed transaction exampleIl [119}. 
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• System must inevitably return to the idle state; if there are any deadlock states which 
forbid this from happening, checking for this characteristic should find such a 
problem. In other words, the system must always force the interface to reset to idle 
eventually. This characteristic has to hold because only when the bus is idle, can a 
new agent start a transaction. If the bus is never idle because one agent is constantly 
driving it, this agent has effectively taken over the bus never allowing other agents to 
use it. To avoid such a situation, the system must force an agent to eventually 
relinquish the use of the bus as a master and let the bus state be idle. The FPGA 
application can remain in a non·idle state and not relinquish the bus in various cases. 
Essentially such cases occur when a frame is de-asserted while irdy# is asserted by 
the configured application (i.e. the FPGA application while being in idle state, it can 
assert irdy# and remain in this non-idle-bus state forever12) • 
•• Theoretically, .f a target is always very slow, a delayed transaction would never take place. 
" Also, during the data phase of a smgle data phase transaction, frame is deasserted and mly# is asserted. 
Ifa target doesn't respond WIth a trdy# or a stop, the master can remam m th.s non-idle-bus state forever. 
Another case could be dunng the last data phase of a transaction; frame IS deasserted and lrdy# .s 
asserted If a target does not respond WIth a final trdy# or a stop, the agent can remam ID th.s non-.dle-
bus state forever. 
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• Generating illegal read or write cycles. One example of this application error occurs 
when multiple writes to the same location are perfonned as a single wnte on the 
other side of the bridge. Collapsing is defined as reducing multiple writes posted to 
the same location to only one write that delivers the final data to the location. 
Although collapsing is not allowed for any type of write transactions, a bridge may 
allow collapsing within a specific range when a device driver indicates that this will 
not cause operational problems. This event is monitored and controlled within the 
system. 
• When the user application requests the bus for an initiator operation, it may not be 
granted the bus for quite some time. In the meantime, another agent may mitiate a 
target access to the user application. Denying the other agent access by forcing a 
target retry will be disastrous in a system with priority-based arbitration. The 
initiating agent may keep retrying the transaction because it has higher priority, and 
the user application will never access the bus. This results in deadlock. (However, in 
a round-robin system, forcing a target retry is a good way for the user application to 
perfonn its pending transaction first. It can then respond to the target access when it 
is later retried by the other agent) 
• Bus contention is realised when the PCI bus reaches its throughput limit. This 
problem is not considered to be exactly an error. However, it can result in Denial of 
Service, or in crashing the operating environment of the PC. In such cases hard re-
booting of the PC is needed. This state is highly undesirable for the system. Thus, a 
mechanism that monitors the transactions was implemented to prevent such 
incidents. This comprises monitoring events (i.e. table 5.3) combined with dedicated 
timing state machines. 
• Slow targets result in delayed transactions. A target that cannot transfer the first data 
item within 16 clocks from the assertion of fi'ame#, must issue a retry. Thus, the 
transaction is rejected and the master must retry the transaction on a periodic basis 
until the target is able to transfer the first data item within 16 clocks. Theoretically, if 
the target is always slow, the transaction will never take place. Obviously, this is not 
allowed because it can end up to a loop. 
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An indicative number of policies and concerning erroneous events is given next. The 
policies were written in synthesizable VHDL. 
• If frame# does de-assert and irdy was not asserted on the same clock and a data 
phase has not just completed, a master abort condition must hold. 
process ( elk, rst) 
begin 
if rst = '1' then 
correct_mntr(4) <='1'; 
e1sif e1k'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(4) and ««not masteris and not (not 
p_stopn or not p_trdyn)} and not p_framen} and not 
p_irdyn} and «(not p_devse1n or not p_devse1n_h~story) or 
p_initia1_data-phase}}}}}='1'} or (p_frame~7 >= "00100") 
correct_mntr(4) <= '0'; 
correct_mntr(4) <= '11; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
• The user application is not allowed to access host memory areas that are out of the 
predefined memory range. 
process ( elk, rst) 
begin 
if rst = '1' then 
correct_mntr(l) <='1'; 
e1sif e1k'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
if (eorreet~tr(l) and (masteris and in_addr-phase)}= '1' 
and (ad >= "XXXXXXXX" or "YYYYYYYY" <= ad) 
correct_mntr(l) <= '0'; 
correct_mntr{l) <= '1'; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
• It has to be either a read or write command. 
process ( elk, rstn) 
begin 
if rstn = '1' then 
correct_mntr(24) <='1'; 
e1sif e1k'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(24) and (p_framen}) or (not 
rea~eommand or not write_eommand)}='l'} 
correct_mntr(24) <= '0'; 
correct_mntr(24) <= '1'; 
end if;end if; 
end process; 
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• If gnt# is deasserted before the natural completion of the transaction and there is a 
timeout, continued use of the bus is not allowed. 
process ( elk, rstn) 
beg1n 
1£ rstn = '1' then 
eorreet_mntr(lO) <='1'; eorreet~tr(ll) <='1'; 
correct_mntr(12) <='1'; 
els1f elk'event and elk = '1' then 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(10) and ««(not masteris and not 
p_timeout) and p_gntn) and not p_dphase_done) and not 
p_framen) and not p_irdyn») = '1') 
eorreet_mntr(10) <= '0'; 
correct_mntr{lO) <= '1'; 
end if; 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(ll) and ««not masteris and not 
p_timeout) and p~tn) and not p_framen) and p_irdyn») = 
'1' ) 
correct_mntr(11) <= 'Q'; 
eorreet~tr(ll) <= '1'; 
end if; 
then 
else 
if «(eorreet_mntr(12) and «««not masteris and not 
p_timeout) and p_gntn) and not p_framen) and not p_1rdyn) 
and p_devseln_history») = '1'» 
correct_mntr(12) <= '0'; 
correct_mntr(12) <= '1'; 
end J.f; 
end if; 
end process; 
5.3 The Error Detection Monitor Unit 
The policy generation was a significant part of the research and development time 
spent in this work. The reconfigurable platform was enforced with a policy framework 
that defines erroneous conditions, which were written in synthesizable VHDL code. 
However, another fundamental goal was to detect the errors in a timely (if not 
concurrent) manner, as well as to provide error tolerance and prevent the propagation of 
high-severity rated errors in the system. This additional functionality is essential for the 
reconfigurable platform, if it is going to be used as part of a critical computing system, 
as the one described in Chapter 4. This section includes information for the remaining 
important components that form the Error Detection Monitor Unit (EDMU). 
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The actual implementation of the policy generation, (as this was presented earlier in 
section 5.2) uses a particular version ofaXilinx PCI core (120). However, the design of 
EDMU can be easily extended in order to include the PCI-X core features, by applying 
minor modifications and additions in its structure. The number of the formed policies is 
just a representative sample; the design structure of the EDMU was kept simple in 
order to be able to add more policies in an incremental way. 
A basic finding during the implementation and testing of EDMU is that several 
signals of the PCI core are not accessible (i.e. any attempt to monitor them obviously 
causes contention). However, it is still possible to access the functionality of the PCI 
core signals by using their registered versions, while many signals were still not 
accessible. The solutton was to indirectly produce these signals after studying the 
internal behaviour of the PCI core. A representative block with VHDL code for this 
type of signals is given next: 
--reqn ~s defined 
process (rst, request, request64) 
begin 
if rst = '1' then 
reqn_ds <= t l' ; 
elsif (request or request64) = 'I' then 
reCItl-ds <= I 0 f ; 
elsif (request= '0' and request64= '0') then 
reCItl-ds <= '1'; 
end if; 
end process; 
reqn <= reqn_ds; 
--gntn ~s defined 
process (elk, rst, ~ADD~) 
begin 
if rst = '1' then 
gntIl.-ds <= 11'; 
elsif ~ADDR~ = '0' then 
gntn_ds <='0'; 
els~f elk'event and elk = '1' then 
if irdyn = 'Q' then 
gntn_ds <= 11'; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
gntn <= gntn....ds; 
The architecture of the momtor component does not depend on the way that the two 
(or more) FPGAs of the board are interfaced. This means that the EDMU is 
independent of the type of local bus that is used to interconnect the two (or more) 
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FPGAs. That is because every PCI board manufacturer that uses "soft" PCI cores, 
provides a wrapper that maps the signals of the local bus with the signals of the PCI 
core local side. Therefore the monitoring activity is triggered first by the local side 
signals and next by the registered version of the PCI interface signals. 
PCI core FPGA 
Local Bus User PCI 
Application applicatioD core PCI 
• FPGA local side Loeal interface 
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FIgure 5.7: The EDMU is passively integrated WIth the PC! core. 
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The design of the EDMU as a plug-in component of soft PCI cores was 
implemented considering all the sensible requirements and constraints of the PCI bus 
functionality. The hardware monitor can be thought as a hardware firewall that operates 
passively and does not interfere with the vital services that a PCI core delivers (figure 
5.7). The selection of the PCI board components was decided according to this 
property. The applications are running in a dedicated FPGA device and thus the 
monitor module does not introduce any realistic intrusiveness to the resources that are 
allocated to the application FPGA. The EDMU is integrated with the PCI core in a 
second FPGA of the board, occupying a particular area of it, and therefore it does not 
interfere with the area of the application FPGA. 
Figure 5.8 represents a more detailed view of the EDMU with all its sub-
components and modules. As it is seen, both the PCI interface signals (i.e. registered 
version of the signals) and various local side PCI signals are monitored. Next, the 
monitored signals are supplying the inputs of the state machines (i.e. timing and set-
reset state machines) as well as the inputs of the auxiliary signals block. The outputs of 
these three discreet blocks are activating the (static, predefined) policies as they were 
described in the two previous sections. The following stage includes the data values 
collection and the consequent policy checker. The output of this block supplies the 
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input to a component that is responsIble to trigger an alert whenever an error is 
detected. The classification of the error importance takes place on the following block 
based on predetermined assumptions (see also section 4.3). The comparator and error 
classifier blocks are the inputs of an encoder that forms a vector which in the next block 
is memory-mapped with an area of a PCI register (Le. BARD). This register together 
with the control component (interrupt generation and application abort) are the outputs 
of the EDMU that can be sampled by the host (i.e. PCItree [121] or any other dedicated 
API). The control component takes immediate action, issuing an interrupt as well as 
initiating an abort sequence of the error (with high importance rating). 
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Application ~ Local Bus User PCI 
FPGA application core PCI local side Local interface 
wrapper Side 
Interrupt Application Memory mapped Signal 
-generation abort PCI register Monitoring 
Control component t 
t Output vector Event-based -. - timing state ~ encoding 
machines 
Error ~ t .. classifier 
Data collection I Event-based 
t - Policy checker - Set-reset .. (comparator) state machines 
Error detection t t alert 
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Figure 5.8: An "X-ray" of the EDMU. 
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An alternative way to describe the main functionality of EDMU is shown in the 
simple ASM chart of figure 5.9. The first three boxes are also the basis for the 
formation of each monitoring policy. The first state box is a Boolean expression of the 
monitored signals (i.e. PCI core signals); the decision box that follows (i e. the policy 
checking) compares the output of the first state box with the predefined policy rules. 
Finally, the conditional output box (i.e. error detection alert) flags the potential system 
error. The values of each monitored signal are checked for state correctness every clock 
cycle by using this design approach. 
Reset 
No 
Interrupt, 
eneration ':' 
Figure 5.9: An indicative ASM chart of the EDMU functlonalzty. 
As it is already mentioned, the monitored signals (together with all the auxiliary 
signals) are compared with the predefined policies in almost a concurrent mode of 
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operation; the inherent parallelism of the FPGA devices allows us to check for state 
correctness in every PC! clock. The outputs of the policy rules (i.e. correct_ mntr(x» are 
grouped in a vector. This vector is encoded into a 32 bit word and stored in an internal 
register (i.e out_reg) providing by this way the ''health'' status of the critIcal 
reconfigurable system for each clock cycle (see the block with the VHDL code that 
follows). 
process (elk, rst) 
begin 
if rst = '1' then out_reg <= "00000000000000000000000000000000'; 
elsif elk'event and elk = '1' then 
if eorreet~tr(O) = '0' then out_reg <= 
"00000000000000000000000000000001"; 
elsif eorreet_mntr(1) = '0' then out_reg <= 
"00000000000000000000000000000010"; 
e1sif eorreet_mntr(61) = '0' then out_reg <= 
"00000000000000000000000000111110"; 
else 
out_reg <= "11011110101011011011111011101111"; 
end l.f; 
end if; 
end process; 
As it will be shown in the discussion of the results in the next chapter, when a pcr 
transaction breaks a predefined rule, the value of the "out_reg" register is updated one 
clock after the actual policy violation takes place. This register is memory-mapped to a 
Base Address Register (i.e. BARO) of the PC! core. The host is able to read the value of 
the output register by sampling BARO (i.e. reading the BARO memory space). An offset 
value was chosen (i.e. Ox7C or "11111 00" in binary form), according to the 
specification of the pcr board that was used for implementing the EDMU in 
hardware13• The block of VHDL code that follows describes the above mentioned 
processes. A multiplexer is preventing contention when the "S_DATA_IN" signal is 
used. 
13 More detaIls for the board are gIven in Chapter SIX, whIle several board speClficaltons are quoted ID 
Appendix I11 
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proeess(rst, eLK) 
beg1n 
if rst = '1' then 
barO_rd <= I 0 I ; 
elsif (elk'event and elk '1') then 
if BAS~HIT(O) = '1' then 
barO_rd <= not S_WRDN; 
elsif S_DATA = '0' then 
barO_rd <= 'Q'i 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
barO_r~es <= barO_rd; 
oe_mntr_reg <= barO_r~es and S_DATA; 
98 
MY_S_DATA_IN <= ("11011110101011011011111011101111" & out_reg) when 
«oe mntr reg = '1') and ADDR(6 downto 0) = "1111100") ELSE S_DATA_IN; 
As soon as the Policy Checker (i.e. comparator) sets an alert for the presence of an 
error (or errors) an interrupt is generated (figure 5.8). The EDMU acknowledges the 
host asynchronously of an error that occurred, at the same clock cycle that the violation 
is detected (i.e. see the VHDL code that follows14). 
INT_N_S <- INT_N; 
INTER_N <= INTERJCS; 
int-p_S <= 'Q' when INT~_S ='1' else '1'; 
int_trg <= 'Q' when correct~tr = 
'11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111" else 
'1' ; 
INTE~_S <= '0' when (int_trg or int-p_s) = '1' else '1'; 
Following the interrupt event, the host can take a qualitative view of the potential 
errors by sampling BARO. This communication interface is a simple but at the same 
time a very efficient and timely way to pass the monitoring information to the host. 
There is a debate, regarding if this data has to be further processed by the host; such 
functionality is common in hardware monitors that are designed and used solely for 
system debugging and verification. However, the goal of the hardware monitor is to be 
integrated and used as part of a dependable system without overloading their operation 
with additional data processing. 
14 A multiplexer was used in tins case, In order to aVOId contentIon with the pOSSIble Interrupts that can 
be generated from the user apphcanon. 
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It is clear that each error has a different impact in the operability, avaIlability and 
maintainability of the system. Therefore, the system errors were grouped into different 
categories according to the severity of the threat; a scale from one to five indicates the 
importance of the error. This means that the system can tolerate an error when it poses a 
low level threat but will not tolerate an important one. Certain errors are identified at a 
very early stage before their activity becomes threatening to the system. This is 
achieved by monitoring some signals of the local side of the PCI core (i.e. the 
address/data bus of the local side). For example as already described before in this 
chapter, the error detection core prevents an erroneous application from making an 
illegal memory transfer (i.e. wnting to a memory space of the host that is allocated to a 
different application). In this case the illegal memory access is detected, exactly one 
clock cycle afterwards. The categorisation and classification of the errors according to 
their severity level (i.e. represented with an array) and the possible impact to the 
stability of the system gives this qualitative measure in the host. This SUb-component of 
the EDMU was implemented following the theoretical approach of the error 
classIfication that was descnbed in Chapter four (table 4.2). 
process (clk, rst) 
begin 
if rstn = '1' then 
correct_mntr(x) <='1'; 
sever~ty <= "111·; 
els~f elk'event and elk = '1' then 
if eorrect_mntr(x) = '0' then 
severity <= -101·; 
else 
severity <= -111-; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
Another critical task that the EDMU component delivers is to isolate the PCI-based 
FPGA board upon the detection of an error. EDMU acts in similar way that firewalls 
do, "locks" the reconfigurable PCI platfonn and forces the configured application to an 
abort. At thIS stage the host decides if the erroneous application is going to be removed 
from the FPGA device. The decision is taken according to the importance of the error. 
The recovery of the system is achieved when the FPGA device is configured with a 
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stable application, which has previously been exhaustively tested and verified. The 
abort sequence is implemented using registered versions of the local side signals of the 
PC! core. 
Summary 
This chapter is a description of all the implementation and development issues 
related to the design of Error Detection Monitor Unit. The functionality and structure of 
this core is analysed and VHDL code examples were given to illustrate the 
development stages and system components. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
This Chapter presents the behavioural simulation and the real time debugging results. 
Several details concerning the simulation and real time test-benches are given together 
with detailed description of the applications and the software that was used. 
6.1 Design validation 
Verifying the functionality of the EDMU was the capstone of the overall testing, 
debugging, and validation effort. It was important to ensure that the monitor policies of 
the design (especially the ones that check PCI protocol validity) are not error-prone 
themselves and that they are correctly implemented in accordance with the PCI bus 
specification. A thorough study of the PCI protocol was needed for this reason, as 
already stated before in chapter five. The validation ofEDMU was accomplished using 
very simple and exhaustively tested applications as well as dedicated hardware-
debugging tools (i.e. ChipScope Pro, freeware PCI core debugging tools). In more 
detail, during this stage, it was verified that within the correctly reachable state space, 
the antecedents of all the properties will each become true at some point during 
execution. If there is a property where the antecedent is always false, the property is 
never "fired" and is therefore vacuous. Since it is meaningless to have a property that is 
never in force, it can be safely assumed that the property is not stated correctly and 
requires modification. 
The open source applications that were used for simulation and real-time testing of 
the system provided a direct access to the source code as well as reliable simulation 
test-benches. The source-code level modifications of these applications had as a goal to 
produce erroneous conditions that will violate specific rules of the policy framework in 
order to validate through this way the response and efficiency of EDMU. For this 
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reason the application errors WIth high severity rating were exercised and applied to the 
system for verifying its functionality, while this was operating in real-time conditions. 
Proof of concept was provided in this way; nevertheless, there is undeniably plenty of 
(design) space for extensions and improvements of this hardware monitor and control 
core. However, the initial motivation and conception of the need for research has to be 
followed by realistic design and implementation targets; research without realistic 
development targets is not acceptable in today's engineering community. This is 
particularly important in the hardware design cycle where the implementation, 
simulation and verification of a system or application is significantly more demanding 
and time-consuming compared to the software design cycle. The development and 
validation stage is equally important and demanding with the research stage. 
6.2 Simulation results 
A pcr compliant simulation testbench was used in order to test the behaviour of 
EDMU and verify its functionality. Testing scenarios test the basic transactions 
between two agents on a pcr bus; one agent being the pcr device under test (OUT) and 
other being the behavioural model of a pcr Initiator. The behavioural model of EDMU 
was built to intervene passively among these two agents. The tests aimed to verify if the 
DUT and EDMU were pcr complaint or not. There are two types of testing that were 
performed in order to verify that EDMU design is functional: system-level testing and 
pcr bus protocol testing. System-level testing set up modules in order to transfer data 
back and forth within the system (checking to see if the data was actually sent and 
whether it arrived at the destination or not). However, the correct operating procedure 
was not checked in system-level testing. pcr bus protocol testing was used to determine 
if the modules of the system (together with EDMU) operated within the rules of the 
protocol. pcr protocol tests were performed by EDMU after verifying its pcr 
compliance. 
System behavioural simulation was a time consuming period of the modelling stage 
that required substantial effort. All the considerations and requirements were initially 
introduced in the simulation stage; the debugging required a very good understanding 
of pcr protocol issues as well as of reconfigurable hardware and programmable 
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network concepts. The intention during the initial design stage was to use Altera 
products for the final implementation of the system. However, technology issues that 
Xilinx FPGAs offer for further future development of this research project (i.e. partial 
reconfiguration of the FPGA device), made them a more suitable solution. Hence, 
Xilinx products were chosen for the realisation of the platform, although the EDMU 
was simulated for verification purposes with versions of Altera and Xilinx PCI cores 
using their respective PCI simulation test-benches. 
The EDMU was simulated with the Altera PCI megacore function [122) using the 
Altera PCI testbench as it is represented in figure 6.1. A number of applications were 
used in order to test the validity and efficiency of the rules. The Altera reference design 
[123) is an indicative example of how to establish communication between an SDRAM 
controller and the PC! MegaCore function; this was used as a guideline for constructing 
the testbench. The principal application was X-MatchPRO [124] which is a hardware 
implementation of a high-speed lossless data compressor/de-compressor. The available 
access to the source code allowed us to make some necessary modifications in order to 
use this application during the behavioural Simulation stage. Therefore, it was a suitable 
application for demonstrating the functionality of the system. 
r--------------------------------------, 
PCI bus 
Figure 6.1: The Altera PC! simulation testbench. 
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The EDMU was also simulated with the Xilinx PCI functional simulation testbench 
[1251 (figure 6.2). The validity and efficiency of the rules was tested using certain 
applications. For example, the PING6415 application was used to verify the design 
flow; PING64 design accepts data as a target PCI device and then uses the data to 
perform initiator transactions over the PCI bus. The simulation testbench contains HDL 
behavioural stimulus files and a top-level file, PCIM_TOP. The stimulus files contain 
behavioural models of an arbiter, two targets (one 32-bit target and another 64-bit 
target), and a central resource. These behavioural modules interface to PCIM _TOP 
through the PCI bus. The HDL wrapper, PCIM_TOP, combines three sub-modules. 
The first sub-module is PCIM_LC, a wrapper for the LogiCORE. The second is the 
PING64 application. The third is the CFG module, which configures the LogiCORE 
interface. The PING64 sub-module is an HDL design that interfaces to the user-
application signals from the PCIM_LC module. EDMU is also integrated in this 
simulation testbench monitoring the activity between the user application and the PCI 
core. Figure 6.2 shows a block diagram of the complete system. Modelsim was used for 
the modelling and behavioural simulation of the EDMU core. 
PCIBus 
STM ARB UUT TRG3Z TRG64 
FIgure 6.2: The Xilmx simulation testbench. 
IS The PING64 module takes Its name from the TCPIIP utIlIty named ping whIch al\ows network users to 
venfy that a partIcular machine IS on a network and "alIve". As such, PING64 IS deSIgned to proVIde 
'~ust enough" functIonalIty to venfy a design flow. 
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The access decode logic was used to generate configuration space, memory space, 
and 110 space select signals. This was achieved by monitoring the CFG _HIT and 
BASE_HIT signals which indicate that the current pcr transaction is dtrected at the 
pcr core configuration space or to an address space mapped by one of the Base 
Address Registers (BARs) in the PCI interface. In this design, BARO is configured as 
an 110 space, BAR! is configured as a 32-bit memory space, and BAR2 is configured 
as a 64-bit memory space. EDMU is using BARO register in order to transfer the output 
values of the monitor as it is shown in figure 6.3 (i.e. signals base_hit, barO_rd). 
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Figure 6.3: When the host sample BARO (i.e. signal barO Jd) the output data of 
EDMU are transferred to the my _s _data _in vector signal. 
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The simulation timing diagram of figure 6.3 lists a series of PC! interface signals 
(e.g. rstn, framen, irdyn, trdyn, devseln, stopn), local-side PC! core signals (e.g. addr, 
adio, addr_vld, request, request64, m_addr_n, s_wrdn, s_data, s_data_in, base_hit, 
barOJd, barOJd_cs, intr_n) and just few EDMU signals (e.g. my_s_data_in, 
correct_rule, int_trg). EDMU detects a PC! protocol error16 which has the decimal 
encoded number 38. The same instance that the error is detected (Le. change In value of 
correct_rule) BARO is sampled (the signal barO_rd is asserted), and an interrupt is 
generated (assertion of intr_n, int_trg) The EDMU output data, which contain error 
identification information, are transferred to the host using the S_DATA_IN and 
MY_S_DATA_IN signals through a multiplexer. This does not always happen the 
same clock cycle that an error is detected but when the host generally attempts to read 
the contents ofBARO register (Le. assertion ofbarO_rd signal). 
The application testbench was deliberately set to produce errors. Two different 
methods were used to test the core in simulation mode. In the first case the application 
was changed in order to produce simple but at the same time highly undesirable events 
(Le. PC! writes out of the predefined memory range). In the second case a simulation 
library was integrated (126] within the testbench in order to insert a degree of 
randomness in the system, generating random delays in the signals. This resulted in PC! 
protocol errors, which were detected by the EDMU. These two types of errors represent 
the two major categories that were mentioned in the previous chapter (i.e. PC! protocol 
errors and common application errors). 
Another indicative capture of simulation results is given in figure 6.4. This is also a 
PC! protocol related error (during the address phase for a non-b2b transaction, irdy# is 
not to be driven Immediately following an idle). The error severity rating for this policy 
violation is low and therefore EDMU is applying an error tolerance practice. This 
waveform capture of the system simulation provides additional evidence of a 
significant property of EDMU: the per-cycle basis monitoring of the configured 
application. When an error is detected (t=2948ns, figure 6.4), the "correct_rule" is 
instantly changing value. At the same clock an interrupt (int_ trig) is generated to signal 
16 Once target has asserted stop, It cannot change devsel, trdy, or stop unltl the data phase completes. 
Tlus IS rule is dIvided mto 3 sub-rules that descnhe each mdlVldual case. 
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the host. On the next clock the value is passed to the register (out_reg) that is memory 
mapped to BARO. The host at the same clock can sample BARO and get a view of the 
activity in the PeI-based FPGA platform as far as the policy framework is concerned 
(this is not taking place at this instance). This figure shows therefore the way that vital 
information concerning the output of the EDMU can be passed in an almost concurrent 
way to the host. 
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Im_cbe 
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Icorrectrule 
finUrg 1 
lout_reg 
Figure 6.4: The detection of a PC! protocol error in simulation (error tolerance). 
The response time of the control component ofEDMU during simulation time had to 
be tested as well. The ability ofEDMU to stop the configured application when an error 
is detected was an equally significant feature that had to be successfully implemented. 
The obvious goals of the control component are to prevent the propagation of the error 
in the system and also to prevent transactions (initiated by the configured application) 
that can later produce an erroneous condition. 
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Figure 6.5 is a simulation waveform-capture that represents the way that EOMU 
responds to an error with high severity rating (for example illegal memory read). Once 
the error is detected (t=533ns), an interrupt is generated in a similar way that was 
described in the previous waveform-capture example. The value of the output vector is 
also updated (the correct_rule vector signal) encoded and written to an internal register 
(the signal outJeg as it is shown in this waveform capture). 
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Figure 6.5: EDMU forces the con figured applicatIon to issue a target abort. 
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The host is able to sample the value of this register since it is memory-mapped in a 
memory area of BARO. However, in this case it cannot apply an error tolerance policy 
because the detected error was pre-classlfied as a serious one. Consequently the control 
component ofEDMU forces the application to an "abort" (i.e. target abort). As a result 
the user transaction cannot take place (trdy is not asserted) and the application issues a 
target abort. This is achieved by taking advantage of control signals on the local side of 
the PCI core (e.g. S _ABORT a ''registered'' signal of the local side of the PCI core). 
The signal mapping of the top-level vhdl file was also changed accordingly. An 
indicative description of a target abort sequence as this is described in the Xilinx PCI 
LogiCore user guide is given on Appendix IV. 
Considering the functionality of the system, it can be claimed that EDMU observes 
the outputs of the design under verification, flags behavioural errors and assigns blame 
to the appropriate module during a system-level simulation. The EDMU was original 
designed in order to be integrated in a real-time system for fast error detection, rather 
than for verifying other PCI-based applications. However, this fact reveals another 
important use of the hardware monitoring component. 
6.3 Real time verification of the Error Detection Monitor Unit 
Proof of concept for this work was established by constructing a real time testbench 
using commercially available network and FPGA components. Xilinx products were 
selected for the implementation of the system; various technology reasons related both 
with the features!7 of the Xilinx FPGAs and the Xilinx PCI core (i.e. the easier access 
to the local side signals) made us chose them at that specific time. The current version 
ofEDMU was synthesized with Synplify Pro together with the Xilinx PCI64 core (127) 
(version V3.0.137). The EDMU performance was tested at 66 MHz although in most 
application examples the maximum frequency was 33 MHz. 
17 The partial reconfiguration property ofX1hnx FPGAs and the vanety of embedded "hard-WIred" cores 
(I e. gtgablt tranSCeIvers, DSP modules) and speCIfically the 32bltl33MHz "hard-WIred" mIcroprocessor. 
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The selected FPGA family for the synthesis and implementation of EDMU was the 
Virtex 11 (XC2VIOOO). Table 6.1 summarises the relevant synthesis information for the 
Error Detection Monitor Core. The Xilinx ISE design tools were used for the place and 
route process18• 
After the implementation, the Xilinx simulation testbench was used once again for a 
back-annotated timing simulation. This simulation verified the functional and timing 
correctness of the behavioural model of EDMU. However, the final and most 
significant part of the EDMU development and verification is the testing of the system 
in the actual FPGA PCI board using a real time testbench. 
A Xilinx based PCI board (128) was chosen for the realisation of the platform. The 
selection of the board follows the analysis that was made in section 5.1 and as is shown 
in figure 6.6 this board satisfies most (if not all) of the design, implementation and 
futnre extension requirements. Various other commercial PCI board-level solutions 
were available at that time. However, It was the optimal choice considering the design 
requirements, the properties and the specifications of this board (e.g. double PCI FPGA 
board with a "soft" PCI core, various I/O interfaces and extendibility design options 
through the embedded microprocessor). 
The board (ADM-XPL) supports Xilinx Virtex-II PRO devices, which have a "hard-
wired" embedded PowerPC processor. The board utilises a FPGA PCI bridge that 
supports 64 bit PCI at up to 66MHz. With some enhancements it can also provide 
compatibility with PCI-X protocol. A high speed multiplexed address and data bus 
connects the bridge to the target FPGA. Memory resources provided on-board include 
18 Total number of shces. 4875 out of 5120 (95%) 
The average connection delay for thIs desIgn IS· 1.190 ns 
The maJ<lmum pm delay IS: 6 2 I 6 ns 
The average connection delay on the 10 worst nets is: 4.979 ns 
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DDR SDRAM, pipelined ZBT and flash, all of which are optimised for direct use by 
the FPGA using IP and toolkits provided by Xilinx. 
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Figure 6.6: The ADM-XPL board topology [129]. 
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The ADM-XRC SDK that comes along with this board is a set of resources 
including an application-programming interface. The API makes use of a device driver 
that is nonnally not directly accessed by the user's application. The API library takes 
care of open, close and device I/O control calls to the driver. A set of simple, open-
source applications is also [130) included within the above mentioned SDK. The 
following application list helped to build a real-time testbench and verify EDMU in real 
operating conditions . 
• The "DMA" application demonstrates demand mode DMA, using the DDMA19 
sample FPGA design. The application works as follows: it loads the DDMA bitstream 
into the FPGA, using a DMA transfer. Then it creates two DMA buffers; one for the 
'send' direction (host-to-FPGA), one for the receive direction (FPGA-to-host). In the 
next step it creates a 'sender' thread, which perfonns demand-mode DMA transfers 
from the host to the FPGA, using the host-to-FPGA DMA buffer. Finally, it creates a 
19 The DDMA FPGA deSign demonstrates demand-mode DMA WIth burstlOg. Data IS read from an 
apphcation buffer 10 host memory and then slInply wntten back to another apphcatIon buffer unchanged. 
In order to use demand-mode DMA, the host must spectfy the appropnate mode when perfonOlng DMA 
transfers. ThIs IS demonstrated by the DMA sample apphcatIon. 
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'receiver' thread, which perfonns demand-mode DMA transfers from the FPGA to 
the host, using the FPGA-to-host DMA buffer. The DDMA FPGA design simply 
perfonns a loopback operation, placing data from the send thread in a FIFO, to be 
read out by the receiver thread. The receiver thread checks the data received for 
correctness. 
• The "Master" FPGA design demonstrates direct master access by the FPGA to host 
memory. The design implements several registers for generating Direct Master 
transfers to and from host memory. The application allocates a user-space buffer. It 
then obtains a scatter-gather map of the buffer. Finally, it initialises the user-space 
buffer to contain known data and waits for the user to enter commands. 
• The "Memtest" application uses the ZBT FPGA design to test the SSRAM of the 
board. The ZBT FPGA design demonstrates how to implement a host interface to the 
SSRAM in an FPGA design. The design divides the 4MB FPGA space into a lower 
2MB region for register and an upper 2MB window for accessing the SSRAM. A 
page register is provided so that all of the SSRAM on a card is available to the host. 
• The "Simple" application, which demonstrates how to implement host-accessible 
registers in an FPGA design. The registers can be accessed via API caIls, or via a 
memory-mapped region. The user enters hexadecimal values, which the application 
writes to a register in the FPGA. The application reads the values back from the 
FPGA and displays them. The FPGA rubble-reverses the values before returning 
them. 
• The "DLL" application demonstrates the clock doubling capability of Virtex DLLs 
and Virtex-II DCMs. The user gives a frequency for the local bus clock on the 
command line. The application sets the local bus clock frequency to the value 
specified, which is doubled and used to clock a 32-bit counter. The application reads 
the counter once per second, displaying the difference between the current and last 
readings. 
The above set of applications was part of the testing environment of the PCI board. 
Having free access to the source code, their content was deliberately modified in order 
to produce erroneous outputs. ChipScope Pro was used in order to apply advanced real-
time debugging and verification of the system, by inserting soft debug cores into the 
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top-level design file. After place and route, these on-chip cores were used to capture 
real-time signal data. This hardware debugging tool was proved to be very helpful for 
validating the system functionality, operability and effectiveness. 
FIgure 6.7 is an indicative waveform capture of the monitonng process of EDMU. 
ChipScope Pro Analyzer was used for this reason. After applYIng some small changes 
in the design of the "master" application (that required re-compiling and re-
implementation of the application), a state that is classified as an error for EDMU was 
deliberately produced (i.e. an illegal access during a write cycle, whenever irdy# is 
asserted, and the bus is driven by the master). 
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Figure 6.7: PrOViding e"or-toierance in the system operation. 
An indicative notice is that the signal "error_detect" remains asserted because 
another error (PC! protocol this time) is detected after the detection of the first one (i.e. 
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for b2b transactions since the master needs to be the same for the second transaction). 
However, the severity rating of both errors is pre-classified as low. Therefore, no action 
is taken since an error-tolerance policy is applied for these specific errors. This 
waveform represents signal values captured when the system is operating in real-time; a 
careful comparison with the simulation results indicates that the EDMU is functioning 
in a very similar way. An interrupt is generated (assertion of signal INTER_N_S) at the 
same time when an error is detected ( error_detect). The next clock cycle the data are 
writeen to the outout register (out_reg) ChipScope Pro Analyzer also gave us the 
opportunity to venfY the correct functionality of the auxiliary signals of EDMU as well 
as of the monitor-event signals (i.e. in_addr"phase, data"phase, in_write_tran etc). 
A similar waveform that was captured from the ChipScope Analyzer is shown in 
figure 6.8. The different combination of events that IS signalled as an error, includes a 
"disconnect with data" monitoring event. 
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Figure 6.8: Another case of error tolerance. 
Using embedded hardware monitor cores in critical computer systems 115 
The reaction ofEDMU is the same with the one described above, applying an error-
tolerance policy. One of the auxiliary signals, is asserted indicating a "disconnect with 
data" PCI event. Disconnects with or without data is a common event during pcr 
transactions, but it has to be monitored in order to prevent undesirable consequences as 
these were described in Chapter 4. 
The value of the output interface register (namely out_reg) that is memory mapped 
at a certain memory area of BARO (i.e. Ox7C) can be sampled by the host. A freeware 
program was selected (from the various available), in order to apply this memory read. 
PCrtree (121) is a graphical Windows tool that allows access of all the hardware 
devices of the pcr bus. Information about the devices and its vendors is obtained from 
a separate database. PCltree allows read and wnte access to the configuration registers 
of each device and even to each device's memory given by the BAR. This tool was used 
as an additional debugging and verification aid for testing the custom PCI core. The 
BARO memory read gives us a qualitative view of the errors that are detected by the 
EDMU (figure 6.9). The memory read at location 07xC gave the hexadecimal value 
(x00000002) that appears also in figure 6.7. However, this BARO memory read takes 
place in a later stage; this hexadecimal value represents the same error, happening at a 
different time. 
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Fzgure 6.9· The PC/tree application "reads" the BARO memory space. 
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Figure 6.10 is another indicative capture of a wavefonn from ChipScope Analyzer, 
when a corrupted version of the "memtest" application is configured in the 
reconfigurable board. The application is trying to access a restricted memory area of the 
host (i.e. actually, it is the area that was predefined as restricted). This is considered to 
be an error with high severity rating. The reaction therefore is almost immediate (i.e. 
according to the details presented so far, the reaction comes one clock cycle after the 
actual occurrence of the error). Such errors need to be treated drastically, by limiting or 
ideally, completely stopping their effects. For this reason, EDMU forces the configured 
applicatJon to issue a target abort. 
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Figure 6.10: A data capture from the ChlpScope Analyzer. 
The control of several signals (i.e. the s_abort signal of the local PC! core side) with 
the appropriate signal mapping in the top-level file of the implemented system has as a 
result that trdy# remains de-asserted, because the EDMU is configured to prevent such 
an event. As a consequence, the application that is configured in the application FPGA 
, 
." 
' . 
-
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fails to transfer data in a given time, leading the PCI transaction to disconnect without 
data and issue at the same time a "retry". An additional indication of this is shown by 
an auxiliary EDMU signal (Le. data_tranfer remains de-asserted). This has, as an 
eventual result the detection of multiple errors (after the detection of the first one), 
which are related to the "abort" event. Nevertheless, these errors have lower severity 
ratings. An output vector (error_detect) updates an internal register (out_reg), which is 
memory mapped to BARO. An interrupt is generated (inter_n_s) when the errors occur, 
in order to signal the host. The interrupt line remains asserted during the detection of 
the consequent errors. It can be claimed that the particular error described above is not 
malicious, since its impact is not related with a fatal failure of the system. However, it 
could be connected with application hijacking or other illegal activities related to 
security issues as was described in Chapter 4. 
An example where the control component of EDMU applies both error tolerance 
and abort policy is shown in Figure 6.11. Violations of policies with different severity 
ratings are detected. 
! : DusISlgnoI , x 0 ;, ~-'~~",~, ~~1~?; ~;,:f;~~~;~~:\: '~/~:,i!~~~~,~ ,.:~:.~~ I <, ~c 1~' ~Ili?/~~?, '~\1 ." 
:-tl:91!! 1 1 I 
, 
-1rdy 1 1 J , 
-tIdy 1 1 
- - - ~ .- -, ,_A , 
-devsel 1 1 I I i 
- - -
r- stop 1 1 I 
- , ' 0 
-
f-cbeD._e 1 1 I 
-IIITER_"_' 1 1 L L 
0 
t1- error_detect III III 11111 ~OOI11 ~11111 Xl11111 ~11111 ~11111 
fj-ollt_reg DU DE> 00000032XDEADBEE~00000038XDEADBEE~00000002X00000032XDEADBEEF 
-
fj-JDDR rc. rc. Jc FC800090 
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rin _add!: ""phase 1 1 
00 
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,,-
_~~ __ T_ 
o 
r1n_wr1t!:_~en 1 1 J , 
f-1dle 0 0 
Figure 6.11: Multiple errors with different severity rating are detected by EDMU. 
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The most serious one comes last and as a result the execution of the application is 
interrupted because the application is forced to issue a target abort. As a result the 
application issues a "disconnect with data". Following the detection of an important 
error and the consequent target abort that is initiated by EDMU, the application FPGA 
is reconfigured with a stable application. 
Figure 6.12 is a representative screenshot that shows how the execution of the 
"memtest" application is affected by the way that EDMU is acting in order to stop a 
detected Illegal process. 
C:'ADMXHC_SDK4.5.1'bin>memtest 
Size !'cg 0x00000002 
Info I'eg = Ox01100000 
Status }'cg = 0x00000003 
PCl'fol'rlling memo.'y tc!>ts using DNA 
Testing 2048 kB in pipe lined mode __ _ 
Repetition 11 
\h'it ing 0xSS5SSS55 _ •• 
EI'I'OI' at index 0x000fJ0000: expected/actual 
El'}'OI' at index 0x00fZ100001: expected/actual 
EI'I'OI' at index 0x00000002: expected/actual 
EI'I'OI' at index 0x00000003: expected/~1.ctual 
EI'I'OI' at index 0x00000004: expected/actual 
EI'I'O}' at index 0x00000005: expected/actual 
EI'I'OI' at index 0x00000006: expected/actual 
Erl"OI" at index 0x00000007: expected/actual 
El"l"OI' at index 0x00000008: expected/actual 
El'I"OI" at index 0x00000009: expected/actual 
EI'I'OI" at index ~x0~011111111a: expected/actual 
El"I'OI" at index 0x0001101111b: expected/actual 
El"I'OI" at index 0x00000011c: expected/actual 
El"I'OI' at index 0x0000000d: expected/actual 
El'I'OI' at index 0x0000000e: expected/actual 
El"I'OI" at index 0x0000000f: expected/actual 
El"I"OI' at index 0x00000010: expected/actual 
El"l"Ol" at index 0x00000011: expected/actual 
EI"1"OI" at index 0x00000012: expected/actual 
El'I"OI" at index 0x00000013: expected/actual 
[pto)"e el"I'OI"S ___ ] 
- FAILED uith 521288 el"I'Ol'(S) 
Pel"fol"flIing byte enable tests using pl'ogl"dfllflled 
Testing byte enables in pipelined mode ••. 
pnSSED 
Measuring access speed ••• 
SSHAM to host tl11'oughput 72266.0MB/s 
Uost to SSHAM throughput = 711S9.0MB/s 
Ox55555SSS/0x00000000 
0xSSSSSSS5/0x00000000 
0xS55S5555/0x00000000 
0xS55S5555/0x00000000 
0x55555555/0x00000000 
0xSS55555S/flx00000000 
0xSS555555/flx00000000 
0xS5555555/0x000U0000 
0xS555SSSS/0x00000000 
0xSSSSS55S/0x00000000 
0x55~55S55/0x0011011111111 
OxSSSSSSSS/0x00000000 
OxSSSSS555/0x00000000 
0x5SS55S55/0x00000000 
0x5SS5S555/0x00000000 
0x55SSS555/0x00000000 
Ox5555S555/0x00000000 
0xSS555555/0x00000000 
0x5555S555/0x00000000 
0x55SS5555/0x00000000 
I/O 
FIgure 6.12: The execution of "memtest" is interrupted due to error detection. 
The reconfiguration of the application FPGA is accomplished either by using the 
ADM-XRC SDK application interface (i.e. building a C++ interface that includes SDK 
functIons in order to program the devices through the PC! bus) or through the ITAG 
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port using a parallel cable connecting the parallel port of the host directly to the IT AG 
connector of the board together with the XiIinx iMPAcr20 (figure 6.13). 
IUght chck deVIce to .elect oper.uon. 
1IC2vp7 
-F~e?·· 
.c2vl 000 
-File?-
.. 18v04 
··File?-
',. 
Figure 6.13: The JTA G chain shows the 3 programmable devices of the ADM-XPL 
board: the appbcation FPGA, the PC! corelEDMU FPGA and the EEPROM. 
The easiest and most straightforward solution is to use a script that initiates the 
JTAG chain. Once the chain has been fully described, it can be saved for later use in a 
file with .cdf extension. The choice of reprogramming the FPGA devices through this 
way is preferable (in similar dependable systems) compared to programming them 
through the PC! bus; the reason behind this selection is the fact that the (erroneous) 
configured application in the user FPGA is likely to produce errors (PC! protocol or 
application errors) that will prevent or harden this effort when application replacement 
is attempted. Although this could only happen under extreme erroneous conditions, it is 
still preferable to apply the reconfiguration of the FPGA devices through the IT AG port 
(bypassing the PC! bus), in order to satisfy the dependable computing features of the 
20 IMPACT enables you to configure PLD designs through four modes of configuration; Boundary-Scan, 
Slave Senal, SelectMAP, and Desktop Configuranon. 
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system (the ITAG pins are used for reconfiguring devices of a board or for 
communicating with embedded cores through hardware Analyzer software like 
ChipScope Pro). Bus contention conditions could also deteriorate while trying to use 
the PCI bus for downloading the new configuration bitstream. The reconfiguration 
through the ITAG port using the Xilinx Impact software is slower compared to the 
reconfiguration through the PCI bus; however it is reliable enough to serve the scope 
and the functionality of the EDMU. 
The effectiveness of the core was tested and verified using this real time testbench. 
A stable version was passively integrated with the Xilinx PCI core, offering a robust 
error monitoring reconfigurable platform. The simulation and real-time results prove 
that the outcome of this research satisfies the required and desirable system properties 
(as described in Chapter four) of a PCI-based reconfigurable hardware platform. 
6.4 EDMU and Active Networks 
Modem System-on-Chip and embedded FPGA-based systems are exhaustively 
tested and are built specifically for serving testability targets. Part of the evaluation of 
the system could also be its formal verification21 • Although formal verification is useful 
for static verification of system functionality or the validity of a protocol, there is a 
variety of critical systems that require online monitoring, control and debugging. The 
external interfaces that were once used extensively for development of System-on-Chip 
(SoC) based designs have moved on-chip, leaving few points to attach extemal tools 
such as logic analyzers. One approach to overcoming development challenges is on-
chip monitor support circuits that allow observation of critical system nodes, such as 
processor cores and buses. Important tools include on-chip trace and triggers. Many 
interactions within a SoC do not involve a processor core, making data tracing 
essential. One aspect of the delivered research as far as EDMU is concerned is the 
formation of a generic PCI-based approach that is compatible with many different 
system units, and supports design reuse. 
21 In the context of hardware and software systems, formal venfication is the act ofprovmg or dlsprovmg 
the correctness of a system WIth respect to a certaIn formal speCIfication or property, using formal 
methods. Formal methods refer to mathemancally based techniques for the speClficanon, development 
and venficanon of software and hardware systems. 
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Therefore, EDMU can be integrated in many critical computing environments due 
to the operation features and the advantages that offers. Various networking PC 
structures which make use of PCI boards for processing and/or forwarding of packets 
can take benefit of the EDMU. Online PC systems such as Active RouterslNodes which 
are part of programmable and/or Active Networks need to: 
• operate constantly, 
• operate uninterrupted (i.e. avoid "hard" re-starts), 
• operate under the presence of errors and 
• demand fast error detection and error isolatiOn/recovery. 
The experimental Active network that was implemented at Loughborough 
University [87] (as it is also presented in Appendix I), can integrate the EDMU in order 
to monitor and control erroneous and malicious applications. The active node is a 
fundamental unit of the Active Network which is also part of a standard IP network 
Thus, it is configured to WOlk as a router for the standard IP packets, applying at the 
same time active processing to these IP packets (Active Packets) that either carry 
executable code in their payload or request an application that is pre-stored (locally in 
the active router or in a dedicated application server). The Active Applications are 
downloaded and configured in a FPGA device. The EDMU can add observability in 
this system by monitoring these applications in real time or in a nearly concurrent way. 
The system can also continue to operate in the presence of detected errors, as long as 
the errors do not interfere with vital functions of the system. The EDMU can initiate an 
application abort sequence, during which the application is not able to communicate 
with the host microprocessor (the data transactions fail as it is shown in figure 6.12). 
Next, the erroneous application that is configured in the application FPGA could be 
replaced with a new configuration (i.e. bitstream). This could be achieved either 
through the Lmux interface presented in (87) (through the PCI bus), or through the 
JTAG chain as it was presented in the previous section (see also the indicative figure 
5.1). The use of JTAG port for reconfiguring the FPGA erroneous application is slower 
but more reliable and hence more preferable for guaranteeing system stability (i.e. the 
reconfiguration process overpasses the PCI bus functionality). 
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The EDMU can be considered as a very useful component of critical PC-based 
systems; Active Networks can become more robust ensuring the delivery of services in 
users and therefore provide maintainability and availability to the whole network 
operation. 
Summary 
This chaptered covered the simulation and real-time debugging results. The 
functionality of EDMU was verified and tested successfully and a stable version is 
running on a FPGA-based PC! board providing timely detection of PC! protocol and 
application errors. The monitor core is applying different policies to the erroneous 
application which are configured in one of the FPGAs of the PC! board. As a result, it 
could be claimed that the operation of EDMU resembles that of a "firewall". 
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CBAPTER7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Synopsis of achievements 
This work has followed the rationale that the convergence of the computing and 
communications fields applies to reconfigurable computing and reconfigurable 
networking. The increasing design-complexity of FPGA-based reconfigurable 
platforms (i.e. System-on-Chip) makes observability and controllability a significant 
factor for their proper and correct running, especially when such systems are integrated 
as part of cntical computing application or services. System vahdation methods such as 
omine testing, debugging and formal verification have to be complemented by online 
monitor and control functIons which are performed by embedded system components. 
The research motivation that supports this work claims that the critical computing 
systems, based on PC archltectures, should include in their infrastructure a permanently 
configured hardware monitor component. This should not introduce any additional 
costs (Le. area utilisation) as far as the execution environment of the application is 
concerned. Hence, it has to be integrated passively, consuming as few local resources 
as possible. The reasons for choosing a hardware monitor and control module for 
critical PC-based systems instead of a software or hybrid one, were stated in chapter 
two (sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6). The inherent process-parallelism of the FPGAs 
satisfied the requirement for immediate response to errors, in order to prevent their 
propagation (or their trespassing) to security sensitive domains and thus prevent system 
failures in this way. The concurrent system observability through embedded hardware 
components is an emerging research area that meets the needs of complex critical PC 
systems 
Although Active Networks were used as the source-model for buIlding the monitor 
and control core (essentially a PC-based Active Router with FPGA-based hardware 
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acceleration of the Active Applications), the policy framework can be considered non-
deterministic and platform independent. It is true that the hardware monitor logic was 
built according to the specifications, performance requirements, potential failure 
operation-modes and the security threats of an Active Router. However, there are many 
other conceptual domains that EDMU can be applied; similar architectural 
requirements are found in critical systems that are comprised not only by PCs but SBCs 
as well. The Error Detection Monitor Unit can be thought of as a monitor and control 
wrapper for the PCI core that achieves observability of the application transactions with 
the host. Several PCI-based environments can take advantage of the characteristics of 
EDMU and integrate it in their structure or even expand its current functionality and 
operation. EDMU also secures quality in the offered services of the PC-based critical 
system, since it provides maintainability, availability and dependability features. The 
constant and simultaneous monitoring (i.e. implemented in hardware) traces the activity 
between the configured application and the host. Suspicious or undesirable transactions 
are treated according to the policy framework and the host can maintain its operation; 
this was one of the main targets of the research and development effort. The following 
lines include a short description of the characteristics of the EDMU and the 
achievements that it claims: 
• Reliability: A PCI-based reconfigurable platform that can be integrated in several 
critical computing systems (i.e. remote upgrade of FPGAs, Active Networks) and is 
able to add reliability and operability features. 
• Reusability: A reusable plug-in module suitable for "soft" PCI cores that adds 
observability and control features to PCI-based applications. 
• Polzcy framework: A failure-resistant policy framework that includes an incremental 
list ofmles, applied to the configured applications ofa PCI-based FPGA board. 
• Interference: A hardware module configured permanently in the programmable logic 
platform that operates transparently without interfering with the host PC's 
computational processes. 
• Detection response: Detection of predefined erroneous conditions that can result in a 
potential system failure in a nearly concurrent mode of operation. 
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• PC] protocol mOnltormg: PCI bus transactions monitoring system, tightly coupled 
with the PCI core, detecting errors initiated by applications which misuse the PCI 
bus protocol. 
• Categorisation: System threat identification and classification. 
• Control: An embedded control component that acts as a "firewall" preventing the 
communication between the configured application and the host computer, if a 
policy-violation is detected. 
• Error tolerance: The communication between the FPGA board and the host is 
selectively controlled, following an error-tolerant policy. 
• Reconfiguratlon: Recovery of the system to a stable state is possible after the 
detection of an error. 
Concluding, it is useful to mention that the EDMU can be used in various ways; it 
can be integrated and specially configured to serve different design or system-operation 
targets. The analysis made so far, revealed different applications approaches for using 
EDMU. The most apparent ones are mentioned in the following lines: 
1. Omine FPGA-based, PCI applications debugging, testing and validation. The 
EDMU can also be thought as a design-for-testability embedded component, 
2. System-level integration22 and online operation of the hardware monitor core in 
critical computing systems. 
3. A useful "soft" PCI core plug-in module that can be adapted to fit specific design 
and/or operational needs. 
The research and development results delivered through this work claim a useful 
contribution to the field of concurrent hardware monitoring applied to dependable PC-
based systems with FPGA application support. The outcome of this research in its 
current stable version can be the starting point for answering more research questions. 
The growth of the FPGA market and the respective applications, along with the key 
role of SoCs in future critical systems make observability an important factor. The table 
7.1 includes the most significant properties of EDMU as far as their efficiency and 
impact to the system are concerned. 
22 The deSIgn and operalton requIrements ofthe candtdate systems have to be sinnlar to those of a PC-
based Acltve Router or any other networked reconfigurable FPGA PC archItecture 
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EDMU properties Property effect Comment 
Perturbation Minimal EDMU is passively integrated with the PCI core 
and thus It does not interfere with the application 
that is configured in a separate FPGA. The 
overhead of the area utilisation does not 
surcharge the application execution domain. 
Perfonnance High The selection of FPGAs for application-
processing and application monitoring, secures 
high perfonnance of the hardware monitor due to 
the inherent process parallelism of the FPGAs. 
Error detection! Fast Most of the erroneous events are detected almost 
policy violation concurrently, one clock cycle after their 
occurrence. Several other policies are based on 
counter-based measurements and their effect 
follows error-tolerance procedures. 
Preventmg error High If the detected error has a predefined high 
propagation severity rating, ED MU acts as a firewall by 
blocking the communication of a configured 
application with the host, one clock cycle after 
the detection of an error. 
Area utilisation Low EDMU was deliberately deSigned to occupy low 
FPGA area in order to satisfy the finn area 
utilisation requirements of dependable systems. 
Portabilityl High The hardware monitor can be easily integrated 
reusabilityl with other "soft" PCI cores (Le. by designmg a 
compatibility wrapper file). EDMU is also operating system 
independent. Any configuration environment 
that uses the PCI protocol, and thus a "soft" PCI 
core, can integrate EDMU as an embedded 
monitor conlJlonent (Le. PCs, SBCs). 
Extendibility High The predefined policies can be modified in order 
to follow a stricter framework. The simple 
structure of the hardware monitor component 
allows the integration of additional policies. The 
design ofEDMU can be easily extended in order 
to include the PCI-X core features 
Reduction of cost High The combination of the reconfigurable nature of 
the FPGAs with the monitor and control features 
of the EDMU minimises the need for spares, 
replacements and field testing; at the same time 
the system reliability is increased. Thus, the 
critical computing systems that integrate this PCI 
board configuration can achieve a cost-reduction. 
Table 7.1: A synopsIs of the most Important properties of the EDMU. 
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7.2 Future Work 
It is clear that any research work of this type can undergo considerable 
improvements and adaptations in order to achieve expansion of the functionality, better 
performance and greater portability and reusability. Many other related research fields 
can also take advantage of the current results. Taking into account these facts the 
hardware monitor was built in an incremental and simple way. The outcome is a 
hardware component with extendibility options and properties. 
One obvious extension to this work could be a comparison with software based bus-
monitor modules and error detectors. This comparison can underline the usefulness and 
the need of an embedded core for monitoring and controlling the transactions between 
the host and the PCI board. 
The EDMU can be enforced with more policies that will reflect the needs of other 
systems, or more complex needs of the currently proposed target architectures. The 
structure of the EDMU allows the easy system-level introduction of new rules. These 
rules will refer mainly to application initiated errors and not to PCI protocol errors 
since this study claims that the PCI protocol is verified in real time. The current 
simulation and real-time testbenches offer easy integration and testing of the potential 
new policies. 
Another significant expansion to this research work could be the real time 
performance analysis of the configured FPGA-based application. This can involve 
statistical analysis of several data samples that are collected at a specified rate or 
behavioural analysis of the application. The implementation of such an added 
mechanism in hardware, will require substantial amount of resources (i.e. embedded 
memory, LUTs). The current design does not occupy significant resources of the FPGA 
as was shown in table 6.1. Hence, the inclusion of on-chip performance analysis 
features on the existing EDMU structure will be an additional design, integration and 
cost issue, since it requires the use of state-of-the-art large FPGA devices. 
Alternatively, the data can be passed to the host and the whole process can be 
implemented in software. In this case the overhead in area utilisation is smaller (i.e. 
FIFO, interface with the host) but the host is overloaded with this processing 
consuming function. 
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A very useful and interesting extension to this research work could be the integration 
and cooperation of an embedded "soft" or ''hardwired'' microprocessor for delivering a 
hybrid monitoring scheme. There are many different ways that the microprocessor can 
be used in conjunction with the EDMU. For example the performance analysis can take 
place in the local embedded microprocessor and not in the host. Another indicative case 
could be the formation of the policies in software; writing, compiling and executing the 
policies in a software environment offered by the embedded microprocessor. The 
EDMU can be much more flexible in this sense; however, the monitoring component 
loses at the same time the performance advantage that it has in its current version, 
where all the computations are implemented in hardware. The integration of a 
microprocessor for enforcing and extending the monitoring functions of the EDMU 
will provide a hybrid monitoring system in this sense. 
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APPENDIX] 
Active packets have to be distinguished from passive packets. It is also important to 
have a system that is compatible with the existing IP networks infrastructure. Hence, in 
order to satisfy both of the aforementioned conditions, an active header encapsulating 
an IP packet was defined. Related work in Active Packet protocols is presented in [1] 
and [2]. The active header carries information as It is shown in Table 1. 
The Active Header 
Name Size (bits) 
type 8 
seq_ no 8 
options 16 
id 32 
last node 32 
Table 1. The ActIve Header 
Passive IP packets are encapsulated in UDP packets (figure 1). ACT is the active 
header. 
JP I UDP I ACT I JP I UDP or TCP I Payload I 
, , 
, , 
: .. Passive Packet .. ; 
Figure 1: The Active Header. 
The active packets are distinguished from the passive packets using the destination 
UDP port 44075 (active port) of the first transport header. The second transport header 
(UDP or TCP) is application-specific. The type field specifies the type of the active 
packet. The current active types that have been defined are: 
• type 0: UDP active packets (not encapsulated packets), 
• type 1: TCP active packets (wrapped TCP packets), 
• type 2: UDP active packets (wrapped UDP packets), 
• type 3: UDP active packets (administrative packets, not wrapped). 
The sequence number (se~no) is used to help the introduction of reliabihty 
schemes where measurement or reliability is required. The options field can be used to 
specify options for coding modules. The id field specifies the unique code module 
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number. This refers to the code module of a particular packet which should be handled. 
The last active node (last_node) field specifies the last active node that the packet 
passed through. 
The Active Packets may have one of the following operation modes: 
1. In the first scenario the Active Packet has a pointer to a certain application (JP 
core). The requested application is stored either locally in the Active Router or in a 
different location (e.g. a Code Server [3]). The Active Router detects and processes 
the Active Packet so as to serve the request. The requested application is then 
configured in the hardware platform. The Active Router forwards the user's data to 
the PCI card, so as to be processed by the Active Application. 
2. In the second approach, several Active Packets carry a configuration bitstream and 
data in their payloads. The Active Router detects and processes the Active Packets 
so as to serve the request. This processing stage includes authentication of the user, 
and integrity checks. The application is then configured in the target FPGA board 
and in the following stage the host transfers the user data. 
An experiment has already taken place in the Active Network of Loughborough 
University. The experiment described in the following lines is based on the topology 
shown in figure 3. The XiIinx PCI board, which is used in the current experiment [4], 
simplifies the process of reconfiguring the FPGA multiple times due to the build-in 
functions of the Linux software API. Rapid implementation of reconfigurable 
computing applications is made feasible in a time effective way using this PCI board. 
Three applications were used for configuring the Active Router (AR) on-the-fly. 
These applications are: 
1. A software-based application that computes the first complement of the data that is 
contained in the active packets' payload. It is a simple application (just for 
demonstration purposes) written in C. It has been assigned the module id=1. 
2. A hardware-based application that nibble-reverses the data of the active packet's 
payload. This is done in the FPGA and the nibble-reversed values are passed back 
to the appropriate active module. This application has been assigned the module 
id=2. 
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3. A hardware-based DES (Data Encryption Standard) encryptionldecryption 
algorithm. The ECB (Electronic Codebook) mode is used. The DES IP core was 
provided by the Free-IP Project [5]. This application has been assigned the module 
id=3. 
The active module that runs in the host splits the packets' payload into 32-bit words 
and passes them to the FPGA board via the PCI bus. The actJve module acts as a master 
and the FPGA as a slave. Each time, the active module performs five "PCI writes" and 
two "PCI reads". A 32-bit PCI bus is used. The block diagram of the DES algorithm is 
shown in the figure 2 below. The "PCI reads and writes" are: 
• 1st PCI-write: a 32-bit word (from the packet's payload) is passed to the FPGA, 
• 2nd PCI-write: a second 32-bit word is passed to the FPGA (these are the 64-bit 
length input data, "data in" in figure 2), 
• 3rd PCI-write: the key for the encryption or decryption is 64 bit long so it is split 
into two 32-bit words. The 3rd PCI-write passes the last 32 bits of the key, 
• 4th PCI-write: the first 32 bits of the key are passed to the FPGA, 
• 5th PCI-write: a 32-bit word is passed to the FPGA; this word has the value 0 or 1. 
If it is 0, the FPGA will decrypt the mput data and if it is 1 it will encrypt them 
("encrypt" in figure 2). 
Figure 2: The DES encryption/ decryption JP core. 
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After all these data are passed to the FPGA (they are stored in registers), two PCI-
reads are needed to take the encrypted or decrypted data back (32-bit data in each PCI-
read). This procedure is repeated until all the data of the packet's payload have been 
encrypted (or decrypted). The module id=3 has been assigned to the DES 
encryptionldecryption application. 
The Active Router is part of the experimental network shown in figure 9. The 
Active Router consists of two separate hosts: The Router-Active Forwarding Engine 
and the Active Element. The Router-Active Forwarding Engine consists of two 
modules: 
• A kernel-space loadable module that forwards the incoming active packets to the 
AE. 
• A user-space process that monitors the AE to check if it is "alive" (by sending 
ICMP requests). If it is not "alive" it removes the kernel-space module and hence 
no more packets are forwarded to the Active Element. It reloads it as soon as the 
Active Element is available again. 
192.1l'R 
Figure 3: An Active Network With a reconfigurable processing engme. 
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An application that is running on host A generates UDP packets having as 
destination host B. These packets are wrapped in host A into active packets of type 2 by 
an Active Daemon. The module unique identification is 2. 
At default, the active application with module id= 1 is running in the Active Router 
(AR). This is an active application that changes the data of the packets' payload to their 
first complement. When an active packet of type 2 (and module id=2) is transmitted 
from host A to host B, it will be routed by the AR. Prior to routing, the AR verifies that 
the active packet has module id=2 and checks which module is currently configured in 
the reconfigurable platform. In the tested case the configured application has module 
id= 1. At that point the AR has to make a decision: either to stop application 1 and run 
application 2 or to continue running the current application and just route unmodified 
the active packet to its destination. The AR has to check the available resources in the 
target platform. If there are enough, it stops application 1 and loads application 2, 
configuring the FPGA board with the appropriate bitstream. The AR downloads the 
bitstream from the code server and invokes the active module no 2. This active module 
configures the FPGA on the fly with the appropriate bitstream and passes all 
consequent active packets (with module id=2) to and from the FPGA. The application 
that 'runs' in the FPGA nibble-reverses the payload data of the packets. 
Next, Host A sends an active packet with module id=3. The application with 
module id=3 is an FPGA-based DES (Data Encryption Standard) encryption algorithm. 
The AR follows the same procedure as above (resources check, authorised packet etc) 
and then it stops the application that runs in the FPGA (no 2) and loads application no 3 
(DES encryption). Hence, the AR is able to switch from one application to another 
(1,2,3) and configure the FPGA device on-the-fly. 
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Offset Name Function 
OXOO LSOB Local space 0 base address reClster 
Ox04 LSOR Local space 0 rance remster 
OxOS LSOCFG Local seace 0 confiauratlon reOlster 
OxOC ReseNed 
Oxl0 LS1B Local space 1 base address rernster 
Ox14 LS1R Local space 1 range reClster 
OxlS LS1CFG Local space 1 confiouratlon reolster 
OxlC ReseNed 
Ox20 LTO Local bus tlmeout realster 
Ox24 ReseNed 
Ox2S LCTL Local bus control reClster 
Ox2C to ReseNed 
Ox4C 
Ox50 PICTL PCllnterruet control reClster 
Ox54 PISTAT PCI InterrUiil status reQIster 
Ox5S to ReseNed 
Ox7C 
Ox80 DOPAL DMA channel 0 PCI memory address reClster 
Ox84 ReseNed 
Ox88 DOLA DMA channel 0 local address reOlster 
Ox8C DOSIZ DMA channel 0 transfer size and direction reOrster 
0x90 DONDL DMA channel 0 next descnotor address reOlster 
Ox94 ReseNed 
0x98 DOCFG DMA channel 0 coniinurabon renlster 
Ox9C DOCTL DMA channel 0 control reolster 
OxAO D1PAL DMA channel 1 PCI memory address reOlster 
OxA4 ReseNed 
OxA8 D1LA DMA channel 1 local address reOlster 
OxAC D1SIZ DMA channel 1 transfer size and direction reClster 
OxBO D1NDL DMA channel 1 next descnntor address reOlster 
OxB4 ReseNed 
OxB8 D1CFG DMA channel 1 confiauratlon reClster 
Ox BC D1CTL DMA channel 1 control renister 
OxCO to Reserved 
OxFC 
Genenc bridge registers. 
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Th,s tIming waveform demonstrates the behaviour of the PCI Interface when a target 
signals an abort (target abort). Th,s event often occurs due to Incorrect programming 
or serious system errors. It can also signifY that the Initiator has Incorrectly attempted 
to burst data beyond the address space of the target. The user application must respond 
appropriately. 
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This timmg waveform demonstrates the behaviour of the PCI interface when no target 
responds (master abort). This event IS expected during some configuration transactions 
and special cycle broadcast cycles. However, during normal operation, this would 
occur due to incorrect programming or serIOus system errors. It is cntical that the user 
application respond appropriately. 

